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ABSTRACT
“A SPREADING AND ABIDING HOPE”: A. J. CONYERS AND
EVANGELICAL THEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION

Jacob Shatzer, B.A., M.Div.
Marquette University, 2014

In this work I argue that A. J. Conyers provides a promising example for countering
various weaknesses in evangelical theopolitical imagination. I make this argument in two
ways. First, I provide a critical reading of Conyers’s overall scholarly project, seeking to
understand it in its own context and in conversation with other scholars. In particular, I draw
on the influence of Jürgen Moltmann, Johannes Althusius, Eric Voegelin, the Southern
Agrarians, and Richard Weaver on Conyers’s thought. I then focus on Conyers’s political
theology, exploring how he diagnoses the modern world and what he proposes for remedies. I
explore Conyers’s political theology with an eye to these influences as well as to the
contribution that his work makes to current scholarship.
Second, I provide a reading of Conyers’s political theology while bringing it into
conversation with prominent political theologian William Cavanaugh. Cavanaugh serves as a
leading representative of contemporary political theology, and he provides a position that
many people find compelling. His work also proves useful in understanding Conyers, because
the two read modernity in overlapping and mutually reinforcing ways, with a few important
differences. Identifying these differences situates Conyers as a helpful political theologian and
also contributes to some current debates in political theology.
In my conclusion, I utilize the insights from Conyers to begin building an evangelical
political theology that points the way forward for overcoming typical weaknesses in
evangelical theopolitical imagination.
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INTRODUCTION

“Now is the time for evangelicals to declare themselves in a very intentional way for the
recovery of the intellectual aims that are unapologetically catholic—not as a way of losing
their distinctiveness, but as a way of recovering the task that made the separation necessary in
the first place: the safeguarding of a truly catholic vision of the world and its redemption.”1

Evangelicalism suffers from an underdeveloped theopolitical imagination.
Evangelicals excel—at least via media portrayals—at adopting and promoting political
stances on specific issues, but little reflection occurs on the level of imagination and how it
influences such choices. The imagination seems like a slippery concept because in its most
popular usage, it refers to thinking about what does not exist, or to pretending or inventing
something.
Two streams influence the sense in which I am using imagination in “evangelical
theopolitical imagination.” On one hand, I simply mean imagination in the sense of “moral
imagination”: the ability to think about what the world should be like and how to work for it
to be so. It includes moral vision, commitment to creative moral action, and the relevant
habits, practices, and reasoning.2 On the other hand, I mean imagination in the sense that
William Cavanaugh has used it in recent political theology. Cavanaugh, relying on the work of

1

2

A. J. Conyers, “Protestant Principle / Catholic Substance,” First Things (November 1996): 17.

James K. A. Smith’s recent work on imagination in Christian discipleship is very helpful in
broadening the way intellect and practices come together to form people. He defines “imagination” as
“a quasi-faculty whereby we construe the world on a precognitive level, on a register that is
fundamentally aesthetic precisely because it is so closely tied to the body.” See James K. A. Smith,
Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 17.
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Benedict Anderson,3 argues that politics is a practice of the imagination that organizes bodies
according to stories of human nature and human destiny that are ultimately theological in
nature.4 He relies on the concept of the “social imaginary,”5 which is a way of referring to the

3

See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 2006). Anderson argues that the rise of vernacular languages
and the printing press combined to influence the way people thought about themselves in relation to
others. He explains the rise of nationalism by turning to changes that made the imagination of such
communities possible. A nation is “an imagined political community—and imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign” (6). It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation
will never know everyone else. It is limited because no nation sees itself as coterminous with all
mankind. It is imagined as a community because the nation is conceived of as a deep comradeship,
and this fraternity makes it possible that people would be willing to die for the nation. He traces how
changes in religious community and the dynastic realm left a need for a larger frame of reference,
which nationality rose to fulfill. Changing notions of time also influenced these changes, as the novel
made it possible to think about homogenous, empty time (36). Print-languages laid the basis for
national consciousness in three ways. Print languages (1) created unified fields of exchange and
communication, (2) gave a new fixity to language, and (3) created languages of power of a kind
different than older administrative vernaculars (44–45).
4

William T. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination: Christian Practices of Space and Time (New
York: T&T Clark, 2003), 1–2.
5

The term “social imaginary” can be traced through four influential thinkers: Jacques Lacan,
Cornelius Castoriadis, Benedict Anderson, and Charles Taylor. Claudia Strauss argues that key
differences separate the concept in these thinkers. For Lacan, the imaginary is a fantasy, an illusion
created in response to a psychological need. Castoriadis, on the other hand, views the social imaginary
as a cultural ethos, a society’s imaginings. For Castoriadis, the social imaginary is singular; there is a
direct correspondence between groups and their unifying ideas. Anderson, however, focuses on a
concept that spreads beyond any one group and operates at the level of the nation. He shows how
vernacular print languages and print media shaped a larger community to be able to think of itself as a
unit, as a nation. Taylor, finally, draws on the concept of moral order and how the rise of individualism
has influenced the way societies think about themselves. He takes into account not simply theory, but
also practices, and how they shape the modern social imaginary. Strauss argues that Lacan’s negative
evaluation of the imaginary and Castoriadis’s uncritical singularity limit the use of these two theorists.
Both Anderson and Taylor, on the other hand, use the idea in a way that yields fruit for understanding
anthropology. See Claudia Strauss, “The Imaginary,” Anthropological Theory 6, no. 3 (2006): 322–44.
The relevant Lacan essays are “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I” (1949) and “The
Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” (1953). According to Strauss,
Castoriadis seems to be the most cited of these theorists on imaginaries, and the key text is Cornelius
Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1987), originally published in 1975. Anderson’s 1983 work on nationalism was most recently published
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unavoidable background beliefs that are the context for social theory and analysis,6 or in this
case, theopolitical analysis. The social imaginary has to do with how people understand
themselves, what they expect of each other, and what background practices inform social
behavior.7
In my use, the imagination includes both practice and theory. One recent scholar
using the idea of imagination theologically would disagree. James K. A. Smith separates
imagination from intellect. Relying on the work of Charles Taylor, Smith argues, “The
imaginary is more a kind of noncognitive understanding than a cognitive knowledge or set of
beliefs.”8 In a footnote, he admits to drawing the difference between practices and
understanding more sharply than Taylor does,9 but the body of his text leads one to believe
that such a sharp distinction between imagination and intellect is necessary to the social
imaginary. Taylor, on the other hand, intentionally draws a picture of a dynamic relationship
between theory and practice, such that both inform the other in the social imaginary—

as Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Finally,
Taylor’s work on the social imaginary can be found in Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). This shorter work was largely incorporated into Charles
Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007).
6

David Lyon, “Being Post-Secular in the Social Sciences: Taylor’s Social Imaginaries,” New
Blackfriars 91, no. 1036 (November 2010): 649.
7

This description is drawn from Charles Taylor. For a summary of Taylor’s work on the social
imaginary, see Lyon, “Being Post-secular in the Social Sciences.” See also Robert A. Kelly, “Public
Theology and the Modern Social Imaginary,” Dialog 50, no. 2 (June 2011): 162–73.
8

James K. A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation (Grand
Rapids: Baker, 2009), 65.
9

Ibid., 67n53.
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though such influence is not always readily apparent or translatable into propositions.10 The
sense of “imagination” that I employ depends more on this dynamic relationship between
theory and practice that Taylor expounds.
Like any group, evangelicals exhibit weaknesses, and some weaknesses flow directly
out of their distinguishing marks and strengths. Four tendencies—which exist in
evangelicalism to varying degrees—contribute to evangelicalism’s underdeveloped
theopolitical imagination. In short, evangelicals tend to rely on binary rhetoric and
polarization, they often (somewhat ironically, as I will explain below) take certain aspects of
modernity for granted and even champion them, they sometimes read Scripture in an
oversimplified manner, and they often fail to incorporate the insights of political theology into
their theopolitical imagination. Such weaknesses contribute to a growing exodus from
evangelical churches to more historically substantive Christian traditions, such as
Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism.11 But does evangelicalism itself have resources for
strengthening these weaknesses? I think that they do, and one potential resource is the work
of the late Baptist theologian A. J. Conyers, whose theological vision of the modern world
provides both content and method for overcoming evangelical weaknesses and developing a

10

For example, Taylor states, “What we see in human history is ranges of human practices that
are both at once, that is, material practices carried out by human beings in space and time, and very
often coercively maintained, and at the same time, self-conceptions, modes of understanding.” See
Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 31.
11

For a recent and controversial example, see Rachel Held Evans, “Why Millenials Are Leaving
the Church,” CNN Belief Blog, July 27, 2013, http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/27/why-millennialsare-leaving-the-church/. Also see Christian Smith, How to Go from Being a Good Evangelical to a
Committed Catholic in Ninety-Five Difficult Steps (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011).
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more critical, biblical, evangelical theopolitical imagination. In what follows, we will look
more closely at the weaknesses I have identified in evangelical political theology, and then
introduce Conyers in more detail before turning to the overall shape of this work.

Weaknesses of Evangelical Political Theology
Defining evangelicalism has never been easy or without controversy. David
Bebbington’s popular “Quadrilateral” defined evangelicalism by identifying four distinctives:
conversionism (the belief that lives need to be changed), activism (the expression of the
gospel in effort), biblicism (a particular regard for the Bible), and crucicentrism (a stress on
the sacrifice of Christ on the cross).12 Christians marked by such commitments generally fit
with the designation “evangelical” as it is used culturally and theologically today. The common
story of American evangelicals in politics is a simple one: emerging out of the Fundamentalist
entrenchment of the early twentieth century, evangelicals such as Carl F. H. Henry called
conservative Christians into cultural and political engagement in the name of the gospel. The

12

David Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992), 3. More recently, Timothy Larsen has provided a more expansive set of
distinguishing marks: An evangelical is: (1) an orthodox Protestant, (2) who stands in the tradition of
the global Christian networks arising from the eighteenth-century revival movements associated with
John Wesley and George Whitefield, (3) who has preeminent place for the Bible in her or his Christian
life as the divinely inspired, final authority in matters of faith and practice, (4) who stresses
reconciliation with God through the atoning work of Jesus Christ on the cross, and (5) who stresses the
work of the Holy Spirit in the life of an individual to bring about conversion and an ongoing life of
fellowship with God and service to God and others, including the duty of all believers to participate in
the task of proclaiming the gospel to all people. See Timothy Larsen, “Defining and Locating
Evangelicalism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Evangelical Theology, ed. Timothy Larsen and Daniel
J. Treier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1. For recent evaluation of “the Bebbington
thesis,” see Michael A. G. Haykin and Kenneth J. Stewart, eds., The Emergence of Evangelicalism:
Exploring Historical Continuities (Nottingham: Apollos, 2008).
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tale since Henry’s 1947 jeremiad, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, is one of
increasing influence into the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush presidencies—and even
into the Tea Party movement.
Various tendencies cause evangelical theopolitical imagination to suffer. These
tendencies are related to distortions that stem from evangelical identity markers, like those
formulated by Bebbington. In what follows I highlight four weaknesses that occur to varying
degrees: first, a tendency to reduce everything to a binary, us-versus-them rhetoric, which
stems in part from an evangelical emphasis on conversionism (a focus on conversion
contributes to viewing people in two opposing camps, which can then fuel an us-versus-them
rhetoric). Second, evangelicals uncritically embrace certain aspects of the modern world. This
is especially true about democratic and free-market institutions. Evangelicals try to promote
how such institutions can cooperate with the advance of the gospel without being as aware of
the ways these institutions can be harmful. This weakness is related to evangelical activism,
and specifically with the desire to leave fundamentalist isolationism behind. Third, in seeking
to be biblical, evangelicals sometimes revert to an oversimplified reading of Scripture, despite
their commitment to the Bible as authority. This oversimplified reading reduces the text and
makes it serve ideological ends, often related to modern institutions, and this weakness is a
perversion of evangelical biblicism. Fourth, evangelicals often fail to incorporate the
theological work of other Christian traditions, even when that work would strengthen
evangelical priorities. In the case of political theology, more could be done to connect the
thinking of evangelicals to that of other Christians. This weakness correlates (at least in part)
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to a focus on the Bible as the primary authority. Such a focus can lead to a neglect of other
sources for consideration, such as the work of Christians from other traditions. Each of these
individual tendencies—related to the very marks of strength that define evangelicalism—
weakens evangelical political thought and witness. In the following sections, I draw on various
examples to illustrate (though not conclusively prove) these tendencies.13 Every great tradition
ends up with certain flaws, and attempting to address them should help strengthen that
tradition.

Weakness One: Binary, “Us-versus-Them” Rhetoric
The first weakness is a consistent reversion to a binary, “us-versus-them” rhetoric. The
“us” and the “them” change depending on the topic, with the distinction being drawn even
among evangelicals. This tendency occurs at least in part because “Evangelical identity has its
origins in strongly particularist senses of Christian self-identity, and has tended to form its
own social culture over and against that of the world around (as witnessed to in its Puritan
and Pietist past).”14 These particularist senses of self-identity have positive roles to play, but
they can lead the theopolitical imagination to conceive of everything using such binaries.

13

What follows is not meant to be a conclusive scholarly study of evangelical theopolitical
imagination. Instead, I attempt to point to relevant examples from evangelical thinkers that show the
weaknesses and how they can lead to problems in evangelical theopolitical imagination. Thus I am
putting forth an illustration of the problem without claiming an exhaustive proof of the problem,
which is a lacuna this dissertation intentionally leaves open for future research. As I note below, there
are certainly examples of evangelicals who overcome these weaknesses in their work. Ultimately, I
argue that A. J. Conyers is one such thinker.
14

Tom Greggs, “Beyond the Binary: Forming Evangelical Eschatology,” in New Perspectives for
Evangelical Theology: Engaging with God, Scripture and the World, ed. Tom Greggs (New York:
Routledge, 2010), 153.

8
These constructed binaries artificially deform debates and conversations. The circles of
acceptability become increasingly narrow, with certain issues and attitudes framed as
essential. Even when evangelicals seek to be charitable, “our conversation frequently revolves
around where we place that binary dividing line.”15
One example of this binary framing is the way theologian Owen Strachan seeks to
define evangelical self-understanding with relation to social and political issues in American
culture. He describes “two major options in play right now” by which American evangelicals
can confront the broader culture’s shift against Protestant morals and ideals.16 Some react by
“cheering it,” by which Strachan means those Christians who are tired of fighting the culture
wars, tired of advancing the kingdom through politics and power, tired of being known for
what they are against. These self-described “young Christians” long for peace, for laying down
arms, for ceasing to wage wars and for starting to wash feet. If the evangelical churches
continue in the culture-war path, young Christians will look elsewhere.17 For Strachan, these
Christians lack courage, offer vague ways forward, and are in fact cynical about the power of
God’s truth.

15

Ibid.

16

Owen Strachan, “A Time for Sacrificial Witness: Our Role in the City,” The City 5, no. 3 (2013):

17

Here Strachan quotes evangelical writer Rachel Held Evans to epitomize this camp. See ibid.,

4.

4–5.

9
The other “live option,” in Strachan’s opinion, is courageous, bold witness in the face
of the culture, what he calls “a new Christian conservatism.”18 He sees this position as “the way
of the historic church,”19 and it shows that “In the midst of this whirl of opposition, Christians
testified to the ethics created by the gospel in the public square.”20 Strachan’s new Christian
conservatism “is eager to roll up its sleeves, figure out tough issues, shape them for public
understanding, and advocate them all the way to the end.”21 This option hopes for new
“Wilberforces,” who “will not rest, but will see the fight against abortion through to the end.
We hope for similar champions to arise and take on other matters of major cultural import—
sex trafficking, the uplift of the poor, the rescue of the weak around the world.”22 The main
elements of this “new Christian conservatism” appear to be a knack for knowing which issues
remain unchanging and worth fighting for, an ability to “speak up” into the “public square,”
and a willingness to do so “until the end,” an end which seems to only encompass political
victory or death.
Strachan makes strong points and is concerned with drawing evangelical attention to
worthy causes, but a binary vision weakens his overall framing. This binary framing arbitrarily

18

Ibid., 10.

19

Ibid., 6.

20

Ibid. To substantiate this point, Strachan turns to the Didache, which he seems to read as a
“public square” document in order to enlist it as an example of Christian witness in said square. In fact,
one of the weaknesses of his treatment of the “historic church” is that he fails to define what exactly he
means by “public square” and how the form of this question (what shape does Christian witness take)
might impact the issues of content (moral issues) he focuses on.
21

Ibid., 11.

22

Ibid.
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limits the “live options” to only two without adequately explaining why these are the only
options. This rhetorical move allows evangelicals to remove other “options” without
explaining why they are not “live” ones. The binary frame is reinforced by likening one’s
opponent to “liberalism”: Strachan, for example, twice summons the specter of “mainline
Protestants of a century ago” for comparison to the “culture cheerleader” option that he
criticizes.23 Both of these elements serve to strengthen the rhetoric of the piece but weaken
the nuance and overall value by overlooking some of the issues at stake.24 At this point, I am
less interested in the content of Strachan’s argument and more interested in the way his
binary rhetoric sets the debate in a certain direction, a direction that only affords two

23

Ibid., 6, 9. This move serves to turn the first option into a non-option, for the judgment that
mainline Protestants capitulated to cultural concerns to their own peril underlies the argument.
24

Strachan’s way of framing American evangelical options also fails to recognize other
tensions twisting beneath the surface. For instance, Strachan never explains what “speaking out” in the
“public square” means. What is the public square? Does any speech event qualify as “speaking out”?
Who must hear it for it to count? He fails to see what might underlie the thought of Christians such as
his first interlocutor, Rachel Held Evans: not only a discomfort with some evangelical Christian
culture-warrior concepts, but a discomfort with evangelical Christian culture-warrior forms of
engagement. The question is not simply “should we courageously bear witness or not?” Rather, the
questions must include “What does witness look like?” And “Does our form of witness give us an ‘image
problem’ in the broader culture?” Evangelical theologian David Fitch notes that evangelicals have an
“image problem”: “Whether because of our own actions or because of ‘guilt by association,’ we carry
the burden of being perceived negatively as a certain ‘kind of people,’ and it is hindering our public
witness. See David E. Fitch, The End of Evangelicalism? Discerning a New Faithfulness for Mission:
Towards an Evangelical Political Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011), xii.
By limiting the “live options” to two, tarring the “false view” with the brush of mainline Protestantism’s
cultural capitulation and collapse, and refusing to push beyond questions of content to questions of
form, Strachan’s piece reinforces the tension within evangelicalism on the question of Christians and
American culture.
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categories: us/conservatives/true evangelicals versus them/liberals/false evangelicals.25 It is
not the case that a simple “middle way” can be found between the binary positions, but that
the binary positions artificially limit a more nuanced response. In the end, Strachan’s own
noble intentions and strong arguments begin to be short-circuited by his reliance on this
binary. The binary also limits proper self-reflection and evaluation of what evangelicals take
for granted.

Weakness Two: Taking Modernity and Its Institutions for Granted
A second weakness of evangelical political theology is that evangelicals often take
modernity and its institutions—such as democracy, the nation-state, and free-market
capitalism—for granted.26 This weakness grows out of one of evangelicalism’s strengths: one
of the marks of Fundamentalism was not capitulation with modernity but a strong reaction
against it, including an isolationist “bunker mentality.” Evangelicalism has defined itself
against this isolationism. Taking modernity for granted appears in two forms: in some cases,
evangelicals do not think critically about how modernity and its institutions form them as

25

Polarizing political rhetoric not only unnecessarily simplifies issues and draws boundaries, it
also changes the way evangelicals understand and proclaim the gospel. According to the work of
Kenneth Collins, the evangelical left and the evangelical right have both compromised their witness by
reverting to an almost entirely political rhetoric. Protestants, both liberals and conservatives,
developed a political idiom to speak into the cultural issues as they lost cultural power. However, this
idiom became so enmeshed with the gospel in the churches that it began to override the distinctive
witness and mission of the church. See Kenneth J. Collins, Power, Politics and the Fragmentation of
Evangelicalism: From the Scopes Trial to the Obama Administration (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic,
2012), 250.
26

As with the other weaknesses, there are exceptions and points of hopeful change. For
example, Peter Leithart begins to critique what he calls “Americanism.” See Peter J. Leithart, Between
Babel and Beast: America and Empires in Biblical Perspective (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012).
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individuals and communities, and in other cases, evangelical theologians find a stake in
modern institutions and promote and defend them, while at the same time neglecting their
negative aspects.27
The modern institutions that most clearly receive evangelical support are democracy
and free-market economics. Evangelicals tend to champion both of these institutions without
seriously considering how these institutions are formative and not simply neutral. I will
discuss both of these examples in the next weakness, which will illustrate emphasis on the
Bible as final authority can lead to an oversimplified use of the Bible. The point in view,
however, is not whether one can be a Christian and a capitalist,28 for instance, but rather how
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Another angle to use for considering this tension is the relationship of Christianity to
Western civilization. In his book tracing the concept of the sacredness of human life, ethicist David
Gushee notes that Christianity itself is divided on the question of the relationship of Christianity to the
West. See David P. Gushee, The Sacredness of Human Life: Why an Ancient Biblical Vision Is Key to the
World’s Future (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013).
As Gushee observes, “It seems most of the highly regarded thinkers in progressive Christianity attack
the history of the church, at least after the conversion of Constantine, as at best a detour from the
church’s originally peaceable and liberating vision, and at worst a grotesque moral capitulation to
violence and imperialism” (116). On the other hand, Christians labeled more culturally conservative
tend to celebrate the achievements of Christendom and its positive legacy to Western civilization (117).
Not that this issue is the particular one in people’s minds when they consider issues like economics,
but that it lies in the background to a degree, influencing a positive or negative posture towards the
West and its heritage from the start and setting up this tension.
28

This is the question asked in Jay W. Richards, Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the
Solution and Not the Problem (New York: HarperCollins, 2009). Richards does an exemplary job of
explaining some “myths” regarding capitalism in order to argue that Christianity and capitalism are
not necessarily opponents. He admits that capitalism is not perfect and that sin is present, but in
defending capitalism so strongly he makes it more difficult to recognize the ways that capitalist
practices can form the social imagination in a way that goes against Christianity. We will look at this
issue more specifically when we deal with the work of William Cavanaugh in chapter 5.
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finding a stake in defending certain institutions can contribute to a social imaginary that is
then blind to the negative formation that even the best of human institutions can provide.

Weakness Three: Oversimplified Reading of Scripture
A third weakness of evangelical political theology is a reliance on oversimplified
readings of Scripture. In the evangelical quest to be rooted in the Bible, it is easy to enlist
biblical proof texts to support positions that one has already arrived at without taking into
account other positions or the exegetical and theological contexts of the texts being used.
Oversimplified readings of Scripture can also emphasize a surface-level interpretation of key
texts while neglecting the broader canonical context and the scriptural themes that speak to
similar issues.29 Further, evangelical readings of Scripture can become oversimplified not
because they lack sophistication but because they bring ideological concerns to the text
without adequately realizing this practice and accounting for it. In this instance, the
oversimplification stems from failing to analyze complex factors like ideological motives or
preferences. When the evangelical theopolitical imagination is blind to problems in modern
capitalism, for instance, evangelicals are less likely to see the biblical text speak against such
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For a positive example of attention paid to broader themes in relation to issues of
economics, see Ellen F. Davis, Scripture, Culture, and Agriculture: An Agrarian Reading of the Bible
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Davis uses Scripture in this text in a careful way. She
does not simply look for texts obviously about agriculture, but also looks for poetic symbolism and an
overflow of meaning that can apply here. She also presses on texts in the prophetic tradition that
include agriculture as an element, but one that other exegetes might downplay. Basically she comes to
Scripture with the concerns of the agrarian perspective, finds resonances in texts that connect to those
concerns (which is not hard to do, given how much these writings connect), and then allows the text
to inform her moral imagination. In many chapters, she then moves to concrete contemporary
examples, such as urban farming in Detroit and big business agriculture.

14
realities and are more likely to use historical context or other arguments to explain these
issues. I will illustrate this weakness by briefly turning to two different conservative
evangelical treatments of economic and political issues. In both cases, the scholars are rightly
concerned with the evangelical priority of recognizing the Bible as the ultimate authority, but
their interpretations are open to criticism for not incorporating the biblical witness more
broadly.
Economist John Lunn’s work serves as a representative example of evangelical
engagement with economics, shown both by his general affirmation of capitalism and also the
inclusion of his essay in The Oxford Handbook of Evangelical Theology.30 His reading of
Scripture is not oversimplified because he neglects historical context or careful attention to
the text; instead, he seems to come to the text with the desire to defend a certain form of
economics, which then drives—at least to a degree—his exegesis and argument.
Lunn addresses a concern that many Christians have about affluence in modern
industrial and postindustrial societies and how that concern relates to the Bible’s views on
wealth and poverty.31 He constructs an apology of modern capitalism by setting up a
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John Lunn, “Economics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Evangelical Theology, ed. Gerald
McDermott (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 402–17.
31

According to Lunn, the economy of Israel and Scripture is significantly different from market
economies. While this claim is not controversial, the way that he substantiates it provides the
foundation for the ethical arguments he constructs. Two elements of biblical-era economies are the
most important. First, Lunn explains that “most people in biblical times perceived all goods to be
limited in supply, including land, wealth, prestige, power, status, honor, and security. There was a zerosum mentality concerning any of these goods” (404). In such a system, it makes more sense to consider
that the rich and the poor are two poles; for the rich to have more the poor must necessarily have less
in a zero-sum game. Second, Lunn problematizes the terms “rich” and “poor” as they are used in the
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difference between biblical economies and market economies and applying those differences
to how Christians interpret the language of rich and poor and concepts of greed.
Modern market economies are different in key aspects from Bible times, in Lunn’s
eyes. These differences inform the way the ethical prescriptions translate. In Palestine,
exchange was personal, but modern market economies operate with impersonal transactions.
Also, in the Bible times intentions were very important, whereas in market economies it is
more important to abide by the “rules of the game.” And a difference in attitudes and basic
beliefs of people alters our understanding: people no longer view life as a zero-sum game but
see that market economies operate on the idea that all parties can benefit from transactions.

Bible (and therefore as they are used in authoritative ethical statements). Both “rich” and “poor” were
not economic descriptions but descriptions of attitudes or behavior. “Rich” did not refer simply to
someone with material wealth; instead it almost always referred to someone who came upon that
wealth in a dishonorable way, because they would have had to ignore and break biblical laws to obtain
more land. The “poor” on the other hand, were not people with little resources but “those who cannot
maintain their inherited status due to circumstances that befall them and their families, such as debt,
being in a foreign land, sickness, death of a husband, or some personal physical accident” (404). Thus,
Lunn concludes,
in the perception of people in limited-good society, the majority of people are neither rich nor
poor, but equal in that each has a status to maintain in some honorable way. Personal
assessment is not economic but a matter of lineage. In this context, the designations rich and
poor really refer to the greedy and the socially ill-fated. The terms do not characterize two
poles of society as much as two minority categories, the one based on the shameless desire to
expand one’s wealth, the other based on the inability to maintain one’s inherited status of any
rank (404–5).
By resituating the biblical descriptions, Lunn is able to make a more nuanced shift between the Bible
and its ethical standards with regard to the rich and the poor to modern market economies.
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Christians must keep certain guidelines in mind—like playing by the rules and helping the
poor—but must be careful in applying the Bible’s statements on economics.32
Lunn turns to issues of greed and materialism, the primary ethical concerns for
Christians in market societies. He briefly argues that greed is not necessary for market
societies to function, and insists that markets require virtue for their operation (he names
trust as an example). In fact, “markets can make us better. As people are more affluent and
have more choices, they can become either greedy and materialistic—or generous and
caring.”33 Wealth can be associated with exploitation, but it can also be directed at providing
people with better lives.34
Lunn serves as an excellent example of the evangelical desire to recognize the Bible’s
authority over all of life. And he takes the Bible seriously, providing a careful reading that
takes into account context and other important issues. However, his emphasis on how there is
so much that has changed between Bible times and today can serve to undercut the very
biblical authority that he wants to uphold. This emphasis can also condition evangelicals to be
so accepting of the free-market system that they neglect the critical faculties necessary for
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According to Lunn, four responses emerge from these changes for Christians who take the
Bible seriously. First, an appropriate ethic must emphasize the rules of the game, such as contracts and
regulations, because of the impersonal nature of transactions. Second, Christians should develop a
separate ethic to govern personal relationships. Third, “effort should be made to define the boundaries
between the world of personal relationships and the world of impersonal relationships” (408). Finally,
Christians must recognize that they have an obligation to the poor. It remains unclear whether this is a
third ethic, or if it is a subset of the impersonal or personal ethic Lunn points out in previous responses.
33
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Lunn, “Economics,” 414.

In Lunn’s eyes, the morality of the market economy emerges purely from the direction that
individual moral agents direct it. It is neutral at worst, and morally superior at best because of its
ability to raise people out of poverty.
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serving God and not money in a materialistic society. Evangelicals at least have to be willing
to question if enthusiasm for the free market and its strengths leads to reading and
categorizing biblical texts in a certain way, a way that unnecessarily limits evangelical
theopolitical imagination. An imagination that sees capitalism and the free market as the best
possible scenario can be blind to warnings in the biblical text, and reading the text this way
further reinforces evangelical theopolitical imagination regarding capitalism.
A brief example from Baptist theologian Chad Brand offers a more blatant instance of
an emphasis on Scripture’s authority leading to an oversimplified reading that can mislead
readers. In addressing issues of the size of government and the extent of taxation, Brand turns
to the Old Testament for insight. He argues that Solomon and Rehoboam’s taxation policies
led to the separation of Israel into the Northern and Southern kingdoms. They had great
wealth, and they did not create it through business but took it from others. This decision led
to the collapse. Therefore, since heavy taxation led to the collapse of that civilization, limited
government and low taxation are the wise course of action for today.35 And Brand’s work is not
a small, idiosyncratic contribution: his book is published by the Acton Institute for the Study
of Religion and Liberty, an influential conservative research institution devoted to integrating
Judeo-Christian truths with free-market economics.36 My interest here is not in ruling on the
validity of the Acton Institute or its various projects, but to note that such readings of
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See Chad Brand, Flourishing Faith: A Baptist Primer on Work, Economics, and Civic
Stewardship (Grand Rapids: Christian’s Library Press, 2012), 46–53.
36

See the Acton Institute Website, http://www.acton.org. John Lunn is also associated with the
Acton Institute.
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Scripture fail to advance issues of evangelical politics or economics and in fact weaken them,37
no matter what conclusions are reached.38
The problem is not that these evangelicals are being “too biblical.” My argument is the
opposite: they are not being biblical enough, because their readings can desensitize
evangelicals from broader, relevant biblical themes and can encourage them to accept
modern institutions to such a degree that they neglect the critical faculties necessary to
identify the evil that comes along with the good in any human institution. Such readings
oversimplify matters because they tend to neglect the negative aspects of even the best of
human systems. In addition, ideological readings meant to support current systems limit the
ability of Christians to imagine anything different. The problem with many evangelical
treatments of the Bible and politics is not that these thinkers turn to Scripture too often, but
that they rely on surface-level interpretations that do not take into account broader themes

37

Another aspect of this weakness deals not only with the way Scripture is used, but the
context in which arguments are made. In an article on evangelicalism and the political, Andi Smith
argues that evangelicals too often translate Scripture into ideology without allowing the narrative to
form us, or to question how the way we are formed by the narrative might challenge ideas that we
think we agree with, such as the free market. “The evangelical use of Scripture has consistently failed to
recognize the church as that community of narrative by which the truthfulness of our discipleship is
the appropriation of an alternative politics” (171). This piece points more toward the idea of witness,
and how embodying the Scripture’s narrative is a politics because it locates the present within God’s
time. This is a limited place to be, but we must grow more comfortable with such limitation, for it is a
reminder of God’s grace (172). See Andi Smith, “Evangelicalism and the Political: Recovering the Truth
Within,” in New Perspectives for Evangelical Theology: Engaging with God, Scripture and the World, ed.
Tom Greggs (New York: Routledge, 2010), 168–83.
38

In many cases, what passes as biblicism is really intuitionism in disguise. In the quest to be
biblical, evangelicals can sometimes resort to the most common-sense reading of a text, which is not
always the best reading. For more on this point, see J. Budziszewski, Evangelicals in the Public Square
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 30.
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and that they often bring concerns to the text that frame the reading to confirm previously
held positions.39

Weakness Four: Isolated from Broader Political Theology
Evangelicals rightly turn to the Bible and biblical arguments as the highest authority.
However, this emphasis can lead to a neglect of other sources for consideration, including
Christian scholarship from other traditions. A fourth weakness of evangelical political
theology is a lack of connection to and interaction with the political theology being done by
other Christian thinkers. Political theology has enjoyed a resurgence of interest in the last
decade, and evangelicals could benefit from theologians working in this field because the
resurgence in political theology connects to issues that evangelicals have historically
considered important: how social orderings and political activities relate to God.
Not long ago, conventional wisdom took for granted that God had disappeared from
public life. Few today believe this to be the case. Intellectual historian Mark Lilla claims that
God disappeared for a short time in a “Great Separation,” but modern insecurities had brought
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Another example of this oversimplified use of Scripture can be found in Wayne Grudem,
Politics - According to the Bible: A Comprehensive Resource for Understanding Modern Political Issues in
Light of Scripture (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010). Grudem assumes continuity in terms such as
“liberty” in his discussion, when such continuity is anything but clear. Also, he seems to engage in only
a surface-level understanding of how the government and the Christian might interact. So, when he
says that Christians can disobey when there is “direct obedience” at issue, he does not explain what
“direct” might mean or how it can be determined. This is too basic, for while it accounts for “Do not
murder even if the government tells you to,” it does not account for the way the disciplinary power of
the nation state can, for example, shape your understanding of murder to such a degree that you can
travel to other countries and kill in the name of the state and its project. Is this “direct disobedience”?
Do we think that it is not direct disobedience because we have been formed by the Christian story or
the state’s story?
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him back into the equation, leading to the tumultuous twentieth century. Peace and order
demand God again be jettisoned.40 According to William Cavanaugh, Jeffrey Bailey, and Craig
Hovey, theology never really went away: “theology, despite the hopes of some, never really
went away; it simply masqueraded in other guises throughout modernity.”41 Michael Allen
Gillespie agrees with this assessment. He traces out the way various theological notions were
translated into other, secularized ideas.42
Today, the time of God’s supposed disappearance has passed. Political theology seeks
to understand how theology can “speak to the public realm in its own voice again.”43 This
subfield of theology “asks how what we believe about God (theology) orders our life together
in the world (politics).”44 It is an exercise in vision, both seeing what really is and what could
be.45 Cavanaugh looms large on the contemporary landscape of political theology. His
theopolitical vision—seeing what really is and what could be—has grown in popularity and
significance. In particular, Cavanaugh’s work has challenged accepted views of the advent of
the nation-state (and its relation to religious violence), of economics, and of globalization. In
each area, he seeks to expose the problems with accepted views and demonstrate how a more
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Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West (New York: Knopf, 2007).
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William T. Cavanaugh, Jeffrey W. Bailey, and Craig Hovey, “Introduction,” in An Eerdmans
Reader in Contemporary Political Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), xviii.
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Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2009).
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faithful theological analysis yields a different posture and way forward in the modern world.
He focuses particularly on the implications of the Eucharist for imagining space and time and
for resisting modern problems.46
Does evangelicalism lack the resources for overcoming such tendencies, tendencies
that stem—at least to a certain degree—from the very strengths that mark evangelicals as
evangelical? Must younger evangelicals turn away from their tradition in order to be true to
their sense of Christ’s rule over political and economic life? I do not think so, and this work is
one step in the direction of overcoming some of the weaknesses within evangelicalism by
turning to a neglected evangelical theologian.47 Turning to the work of A. J. Conyers serves as a
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Cavanaugh’s work is central but not uncontroversial. In a recent book, Ephraim Radner
challenges Cavanaugh’s positions, especially with regard to religious violence (Cavanaugh argues that
typical explanations of so-called “religious violence” are actually used by the nation-state to create the
need for itself). Radner charges that Cavanaugh fails to take into account various sociological realities.
This debate will continue as theologians grapple not only with how theology can speak about public
realities (and whether “public” can be cordoned off from theology for theology to speak to it) but with
what theology has to say, returning to the concept of vision defined as seeing what is and what can be.
See Ephraim Radner, A Brutal Unity: The Spiritual Politics of the Christian Church (Waco, TX: Baylor
University Press, 2012).
47

I do not mean to argue that there is no hope for evangelicals, and that Conyers provides the
only way out. While I will argue that he provides a helpful way for combatting these specific
weaknesses, there are other promising works on evangelical political theology that show varying
degrees of promise in identifying and overcoming weaknesses in evangelical political theology,
including: Fitch, The End of Evangelicalism?. Fitch himself identifies some ways that evangelicalism has
gone off track politically. Russell D. Moore, The Kingdom of Christ: The New Evangelical Perspective
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2004). Moore, who now leads the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of
the Southern Baptist Convention, argues that a robust theology of the kingdom must orient any
evangelical political engagement in order to keep the church and its task primary. Leithart, Between
Babel and Beast. Leithart willingly critiques “Americanism,” by which he means the unique example of
American nationalism and its fusion with theological beliefs. He proposes that America is a “Babel,” an
empire offering unity, but not yet a “Beast” because it does not overtly persecute Christians. While
Leithart is useful in bringing “Americanism” to the forefront, he is limited in his analysis of what
persecution might entail. Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of

22
helpful starting point for constructing an evangelical theopolitical imagination that can aid in
navigating these weaknesses within the movement. In what follows, I briefly introduce
Conyers and explain the argument of this work in germ form.

A. J. Conyers (1944–2004)
Abda Johnson (“Chip”) Conyers III was born on May 29, 1944. 48 A significant lifechange occurred when he started eighth grade at Georgia’s Decatur High School in 1957, a
school known for its drug problems and football team. In October of that year, however, his
father moved the family to a farm in rural Georgia. Chip spent his high school years in a small
school among rural people who valued relationships with their neighbors. His family joined a
small church that was the center of community life, and Chip became involved in teaching
Sunday school. He was also an honor student and the president of the local chapter of Future
Farmers of America. During this time Chip began to read widely and to make connections

Political Theology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and The Ways of Judgment (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). O’Donovan’s work is useful in pointing out the ways that the Enlightenment
and the subsequent modern world have left a mixed legacy in Christian eyes. There are ways that
Christian concepts have positively influenced the culture, but there are other ways that the culture has
grown to be antichrist. Evangelicals need to take both possibilities into account, as Leithart attempts
to do in Between Babel and the Beast. Other examples could be named, including Craig L. Blomberg,
Neither Poverty nor Riches: A Biblical Theology of Possessions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1999).
Blomberg provides a careful and deep exegesis of Scripture across the canon in seeking to understand
material possessions.
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The information in this bibliography, unless otherwise noted, is found in Deborah A.
Conyers and James C. Conyers, “Biography of A. J. ‘Chip’ Conyers,” in Thriving in Babylon: Essays in
Honor of A. J. Conyers (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011).
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between American history and culture, particularly in relation to the Civil War. He had family
connections to the war, and its memory was a very real influence on him.49
Chip attended junior college at Young Harris College and was active in social and
political organizations on campus. He met his wife, Debby Anderson, at Young Harris, and the
two married on December 26, 1964,50 after graduating and moving to Athens to attend the
University of Georgia. There, Chip studied political science and planned a career in public
office or law. He continued to be influenced by conservatism, and subscribed to The National
Review.51
After graduation, four experiences influenced Chip’s direction. First, he and Debby
began attending a Baptist church. Chip had grown up Methodist but had become
disenchanted with that denomination due to some bad experiences in the Methodist campus
student organization. Second, after graduating from Georgia, Chip taught school for a year.
During this year, he decided to pursue seminary rather than law school due to a growing sense
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“Mostly he read about science, Karl Marx, and was an avid reader of Civil War history, which
was often discussed in the family and the classical writings of Bruce Catton and Douglas Southall
Freeman were readily available in the beautiful handmade plantation desk that had been rescued
during Sherman's fiery march through Georgia. He told me once that he had seen ‘Gone With the
Wind’ countless times, went to the Cyclorama in Grant Park (not Ulysses S.), and spent hours walking
around the many battle scenes in the area looking for artifacts. In Cartersville, GA there were some
famous old Indian mounds, and he and his brother loved to visit there and pick up arrowheads and
other trophies. At some point, he set up a ‘Civil War Museum’ on the front porch of his home and
invited all the neighbors to come for a tour. The family was steeped in this history which didn't seem
so far in the past then. They had letters sent between his great grandmother and his great grandfather
who was off fighting in the War. They knew many of the places he had been, including Vicksburg,
Mississippi” (Deborah A. Conyers, e-mail message to author, July 25, 2013).
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A. J. Conyers, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Concept of History” (PhD diss., The Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary, 1979), vita.
51

Conyers, e-mail message to author, July 25, 2013.

24
of a call to ministry. He believed that he could be more of a good influence on people through
the church than through politics.52 These two experiences combined to lead Chip to enroll in
Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in Wake Forest, North Carolina, the closest
Southern Baptist seminary. Seminary at Southeastern became the third significant experience.
At the time, Southeastern was the most liberal seminary in the Southern Baptist Convention
(which at an institutional level was more liberal in the 1970s than it is today),53 and this
atmosphere drove him to study, research, and think about the connection of theology and
various philosophies and worldviews. The fourth significant experience was Chip’s and
Debby’s church ministry. Chip was pastor of Good Hope and Mt. Carmel Christian Churches
in Youngsville, North Carolina from 1967 until graduation in 1971. After graduating with a
Master of Divinity degree, he served as pastor at Maple Spring Baptist Church in Louisburg,
North Carolina (two years) and a church in the small town of Ila, Georgia (two years).54 On the
whole, Chip enjoyed these ministry experiences, but he also grew to miss the more academic
and scholarly pursuits of seminary. It was becoming more obvious that his gifts were in
writing, teaching, and speaking; therefore, he decided to pursue a doctorate in theology in
order to have more opportunities to exercise these gifts.
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Chip began the PhD program in Systematic Theology at The Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary in 1975. He learned from scholars in theology and politics not only
through reading, but also through direct influence. Three thinkers in particular were
important sources for his growth and development. First was Dale Moody,55 who had taught
theology at Southern for almost thirty years by the time Chip arrived. Moody found that Chip
was interested in theology, history, and politics, and suggested that he focus his dissertation
on the writings of Jürgen Moltmann. This suggestion influenced more than just Chip’s
dissertation, as Moltmann’s influence can be clearly seen throughout his major writings. Chip
also worked as a graduate assistant to Moody from 1976 to 1977.56
The second influence was political scientist, philosopher, historian, and theologian
Gerhart Niemeyer of the University of Notre Dame. In the spring of 1976, Chip had classes with
Niemeyer and was influenced by his traditionalism, which gave Chip the chance to examine
political ideologies and gain a deeper understanding of the gospel in the modern world.
Niemeyer served as one of Conyers’s most significant connections to a strand of “conservatism”
that I explore later in this work.57
Third was Jürgen Moltmann. Chip and Debby spent six months in Germany, mostly at
the University of Tübingen. Chip had conversations with Moltmann that became the basis for
his dissertation, later revised and published as God, Hope and History: Jürgen Moltmann and
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Agrarians in chapter 1.
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the Christian Concept of History.58 Studying Moltmann’s view of history opened the way for
Conyers’s later critiques of the modern world from a Christian perspective.
Chip defended his dissertation the day that his daughter, Emily McCall Conyers, was
born: July 12, 1979. By the time his degree was conferred in December of 1979, he had already
finished his first semester teaching at Central Missouri State University as Baptist Chair of
Bible. While at CMSU, Chip organized a series of symposia on subjects such as bioethics, the
arts, and other topics, reflecting his broad interests. During these years, Chip and Debby also
welcomed a son into their family, Abda Johnson Conyers IV (“John”).
In 1987 Chip accepted an invitation to teach at the Baptist College of Charleston,
which was later renamed Charleston Southern University—a name Chip proposed.59 The
family spent seven years there, and Chip continued to publish and speak. In the summer of
1994, Chip moved to Waco, Texas, in order to become one of the founding faculty members of
Baylor University’s George W. Truett Theological Seminary. As a founding member of the
faculty, he was able to influence the curriculum, advocating, for instance, the use of primary
texts in the study of theology. The chance to be a part of something new, and his friendship
with Dean Robert Sloan, were the main factors drawing him to Truett.60 He went on to be a
beloved faculty member, twice voted by the graduating class as “Professor of Choice.” There is
now a “Conyers Scholars Program” at Baylor in his honor.
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Chip struggled with his health while transitioning to Waco. At his wife’s urging, he
visited a doctor, and a biopsy revealed that he was in the early stages of Chronic Lymphocytic
Leukemia (CLL). Chip continued in good health for the next three years; because the disease
was at such an early stage, the doctors decided close monitoring was the best way forward.
However, in the summer of 1997, his oncologist noticed an elevation in the number of white
blood cells and began to talk about chemotherapy. Chip hoped to make it to Christmas before
starting treatment, but by mid-November his condition and symptoms returned. He woke up
one morning with dizziness and blurred vision, too weak to stand. At the hospital he began to
slip into a coma, and he was transferred to a hospital in Dallas. Though he was released in late
January, his health never completely recovered from this prolonged illness: “From that time
until the end of his life six years later, he was in and out of hospitals, periodically receiving
blood transfusions, and regularly receiving chemotherapy.”61
Chip continued to fulfill his duties at the seminary, and he still found time to write. He
did not mention his sickness, but responded gladly to questions and expressions of sympathy.
During this time he wrote his final two books: The Long Truce: How Toleration Made the World
Safe for Power and Profit (2001) and The Listening Heart: Vocation and the Crisis of Modern
Culture (posthumously published, 2006). By 2002 he was diagnosed with an aggressive skin
cancer, requiring painful surgeries and skin grafts. When preparing for a bone marrow
transplant, he slipped on a wet floor. This accident required x-rays, which revealed a small
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mass in his right lung. This finding led to a diagnosis of small-cell carcinoma, a very aggressive
and untreatable form of cancer. The doctors said he had only a few months to live.
Chip lived nearly two more years, continuing to teach, write, and speak. He finished
his last book, The Listening Heart, shortly before dying on July 18, 2004.

Hypothesis and Method
In this work I argue that A. J. Conyers provides a promising way for countering various
weaknesses in evangelical theopolitical imagination. I make this argument in two ways. First, I
provide a critical reading of Conyers’s overall scholarly project, seeking to understand it in its
own context and in conversation with other scholars. I focus on Conyers’s political theology,
exploring how he diagnoses the modern world and what he proposes for remedies. Second, I
provide a reading of Conyers’s political theology while bringing it into conversation with
prominent political theologian William Cavanaugh. As noted above, Cavanaugh serves as a
leading representative of contemporary political theology, and he provides a position that
many people find compelling. His work also proves useful in understanding Conyers, because
the two read modernity in overlapping and mutually reinforcing ways, with a few important
differences. Identifying these differences will situate Conyers as a helpful political theologian
and also contribute to some current debates in political theology. In my conclusion, I utilize
the insights from Conyers to begin building an evangelical political theology that points the
way forward for overcoming typical evangelical weaknesses highlighted above.
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Outline of Dissertation
In each chapter, I explore an aspect of A. J. Conyers’s work that helps to
counterbalance each of the four tendencies that I earlier identified in evangelical political
theology. I begin the work with an intellectual biography of Conyers in order to understand
the foundation from which he engages the questions of theology and the modern world. I
argue that Conyers incorporates “conservative” political influences and his interest in Jürgen
Moltmann’s eschatology to forge a unique theological point of view that he focuses on
understanding the modern world in his mature work. I look at Conyers’s early work to gain a
sense of his understanding and critique of Moltmann and then provide important background
and context on the “conservative” political tradition that influenced him. In the second
chapter, I provide an overview of his work to show the trajectory that led to his focus on
theology and modernity. Together, these two chapters set up the context of Conyers as a
theologian while also pointing a way beyond the simple “conservative or liberal,” “us-versusthem” binary that often characterizes evangelical theology (Weakness One).
I turn to Conyers’s mature work on political theology in the third and fourth chapters
in order to highlight his contribution to a theological diagnosis of modern problems and his
theological remedies for those problems. In chapter three, I argue that Conyers diagnoses
modernity in a way that both harmonizes with other treatments and adds descriptive
precision. He does this by charting the use of a changing term (toleration) and related
conceptual shifts and disorders. This chapter begins to correct the evangelical tendency to
take modernity and its institutions for granted (Weakness Two). In chapter four, I argue that
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Conyers confronts modern disorders with a recovery of the theological concept of vocation,62
which reopens a proper Christian worldview and reestablishes important Christian practices
for resisting sin and being the church. Thus his work aids in the reimagination of space and
time. His work on vocation demonstrates how evangelicals can remain robustly biblical while
moving into more nuanced and careful readings of Scripture that can help overcome the
oversimplified readings that are often offered (Weakness Three).
In the fifth chapter, I turn to William Cavanaugh, one of the dominant voices in
contemporary political theology. I seek to understand his diagnosis of the modern world, as
well as his remedies for the problems he identifies. Throughout this treatment, I draw Conyers
into the conversation to demonstrate how each can strengthen the other. This chapter begins
to show the relevance of Conyers to the field of political theology, and it shows how his work
can serve as a bridge for evangelicals to engage in the political theology being done in other
traditions (Weakness Four).
In my conclusion, I attempt to make plain what an evangelical political theology
might look like that draws positively and critically on Conyers’s work. In the end, this
dissertation not only places Conyers among political theologians and evaluates the
fruitfulness of his work as a resource for evangelical theology, it also serves to test whether
Conyers’s work achieved the goals he set for evangelical thought in the quotation that opened
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Conyers’s work on vocation was part of a project funded by the Lily Endowment to design
and implement programs for students and others associated with universities on vocation. See A. J.
Conyers, The Listening Heart: Vocation and the Crisis of Modern Culture (Dallas, TX: Spence, 2006), 15–16.
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this introduction: “recovering the task … [of] safeguarding … a truly catholic vision of the
world and its redemption.”

32
1
OVERCOMING THE CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL BINARY VISION:
AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY

Introduction
While I laid out the general shape of Conyers’s career and interests in the brief
biography in the introduction, in this chapter I focus on Conyers’s intellectual biography and
how he incorporates various theological and political influences in a constructive manner that
points a way beyond the typical “conservative versus liberal” rhetoric that colors the
evangelical social imaginary.1 I make this argument in two moves. I explain the major
influences on Conyers’s thought and then follow with a chapter explaining and categorizing
his work. Taken together, these two moves provide a basic understanding of Conyers as a
theologian and lay the foundation for analyzing his treatment of modernity in chapters three
and four. These first two chapters prepare us to understand how Conyers shapes a social
imaginary for navigating the modern world.
In this chapter, I explain the major influences on Conyers’s political theology in three
steps that seek to highlight the way Conyers incorporated diverse influences in his creative
framework, using the tendencies from one group to counteract perceived weaknesses in the
others. First, I demonstrate how the eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann influenced Conyers early
in his theological career, as evidenced in the Conyers’s dissertation. Second, I show how

1

Conyers’s interaction with Jürgen Moltmann’s eschatology, which he refines by his own
interaction with a specific brand of conservative social thought, forges his early theological foundation.
Conyers incorporates “conservative” political influences and his interest in Moltmann’s eschatology to
forge a unique theological point of view that he focuses on understanding the modern world in his
mature work.
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Conyers drew on three particular examples of “conservative” social-political thought. I pay
particular attention to the way that he incorporates an older form of conservatism than that
commonly known today.2 Third, I return to his treatment of Moltmann. I move from
Moltmann to conservative social thought back to Moltmann in order to demonstrate how
Conyers uses his conservative framework to critique Moltmann and vice versa. Conyers on
Moltmann in the 1980s is different than Conyers on Moltmann in the late 1970s because of the
influence of the conservative social thought. This intellectual biography shows how Conyers
critiqued both Moltmann and a form of “conservative” tradition in order to lay his own
foundation for approaching theopolitical questions, a foundation from which he would work

2

The story of Conyers’s connection to an older form of political conservatism (what some call
“paleoconservatism,” see below) is complicated to tell. This complication stems from at least two roots.
On one hand, nowhere in his work on modernity does Conyers explicitly spell out his main influences.
On the other hand, conservatism as a movement in the American political scene has changed
dramatically over the last 70 years, due to the fusionist conservatism of William F. Buckley Jr. that
brought several types of conservatism together and ultimately dulled the emphases of some of these
groups. Thus the associations that modern audiences have with the term “conservative” do not
necessarily do justice to earlier forms. For just one example, some earlier conservatives maintained a
critique of capitalism that is no longer part of the “platform” of today’s conservatives. Conyers was
more influenced by an older form of conservatism than this fusionist conservatism, a term associated
with Frank Meyer, an associate editor for the National Review in its early years. Meyer was a main
figure in the effort to fuse libertarianism with traditional conservatism. For a helpful overview of the
conservative intellectual movement from 1945 to the mid-1970s, see George H. Nash, The Conservative
Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945, 2nd ed. (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1996). Nash identifies
three sources of the post-war intellectual movement: the classical liberals or libertarians (resisted the
threat of the expanding State to liberty, private enterprise, and individualism), the new conservatives
(traditionalists who resisted totalitarianism, total war, and the development of mass society), and a
militant anti-Communism. In fact, Nash argues that by the end of Reagan’s second term, conservatism
encompassed five impulses: “libertarianism, traditionalism, anti-Communism, neoconservatism, and
the Religious Right” (332). Also see George H. Nash, Reappraising the Right: The Past and Future of
American Conservatism (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2009). In that work, Nash provides further
scholarship on conservatism, considering key figures and assessing the future of conservatism. For a
more-recent evaluation of the current American political landscape with reference to types of
conservatism, see Brian Patrick Mitchell, Eight Ways to Run the Country: A New and Revealing Look at
Left and Right (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).
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in his two monographs on political theology. In this chapter and the next, I am primarily
concerned with understanding this foundation, while the specific connections between these
influences and his political theology will become more apparent in chapters three and four.

Jürgen Moltmann and Eschatology
Jürgen Moltmann is the most prominent theological influence on Conyers. He was the
subject of his dissertation (1979) and his second book, God, Hope, and History (1988)—a
revision of the dissertation with a few added chapters. In what follows, I first analyze the way
Moltmann influences Conyers’s views on eschatology and history as evidenced in the
dissertation and as demonstrated by Conyers’s critique of Moltmann in that work.3
Understanding the influence of Moltmann elucidates Conyers’s early theological vision and
trajectory and prepares us for evaluating his mature work on political theology.
Through his work on Moltmann, Conyers became convinced of the importance of
eschatology for orienting both the understanding and experience of history, opening it to the
future. Conyers turned to Moltmann for his dissertation work at the suggestion of Dale Moody,
Conyers’s doctoral supervisor at Southern Seminary. For one semester, Conyers studied with
Moltmann at the University of Tübingen.4 His dissertation pursued three goals: “(1) to state the
main features of Jürgen Moltmann’s concept of history as these come to light in an

3

I will not seek to evaluate the faithfulness of Conyers as an interpreter of Moltmann but
instead the main ideas the Conyers draws from him.
4

A. J. Conyers, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Concept of History” (PhD diss., The Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary, 1979), ix. Conyers maintained a relationship with Moltmann, as evidenced by
pieces such as his interview of Moltmann for Christianity Today. See A. J. Conyers, “Christianity Today
Talks to Jürgen Moltmann,” Christianity Today (March 20, 1987): 67.
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examination of his theological writings; (2) to determine how he has perceived the problems
related to the formulation of a theological concept of history, particularly as these problems
are evidenced in contemporary theology; and (3) to offer an estimate of his contribution to the
resolution of these problems.”5 The work focused primarily on three of Moltmann’s books:
Theology of Hope, The Crucified God, and The Church in the Power of the Spirit.
According to Conyers, Moltmann poses one central question, “How does a promise
work in history?”6 Scripture speaks of a God of history, but it uses words of temporal
significance like “hope,” “promise,” “covenant,” and other images of a God who is coming and
who goes before. Conyers notes, “Therefore Moltmann considers it fundamental that
‘Christian theology speaks of God historically and history eschatologically.’”7 God is known
from the category of promise, which points ahead to the eschatological coming of God.8
Conyers provides a brief review of how Christian theology has treated history in order
to set up his treatment of Moltmann on history. He divides his treatment into three
possibilities for understanding history, categorized as the “Augustinian heritage,” the
“Hegelian heritage,” and the “Kierkegaardian heritage.”9 According to this schema, the
Augustinian heritage believes “that history can be seen as a movement toward a goal, and that

5

Conyers, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Concept of History,” abstract, 1.

6

Ibid., 1.

7

Ibid., 1–2.
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Ibid., 2.

9

Ibid., 17.
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both the movement and the goal are the work of a Providence or of that which is outside of
history.”10 The Hegelian heritage holds “that history moves toward a goal, but that movement
and goal are of the nature of history itself and are thus understood from within history.” And
the Kierkegaardian heritage holds the view “that history which moves toward some provident
goal is unknowable and can neither be seen by faith nor by reason.”11 These labels make clear
the alternatives available for contemporary theology.12 The Augustinian heritage places the
weight of history’s purposeful movement on the transcendent; the Hegelian heritage, on the
immanent;13 the Kierkegaardian, on a strong historical dualism.14
The twentieth century occasioned a general revolt in theology against assurances of
meaning in history. Two convictions grounded this revolt: the general progressive
improvement of the human situation was no longer easily supported, and the “dénouement of
Life of Jesus research with its heightened emphasis upon the eschatological character of
primitive Christian consciousness provided little, if any, textual support for historical
optimism as a theological premise.”15 Recognizing these two convictions, Moltmann is part of

10

Ibid., 16.

11

Ibid., 17.

12

Conyers acknowledges that “while to state such views in quite these terms involves us
necessarily in an exaggeration from the point of view of the individual thinker, I believe we are
justified in saying that this is broadly speaking the way their thought is received in our century” (ibid.).
13

In a way, the Hegelian heritage inverted the Augustinian’s “history-within-salvation”
perspective to make a “salvation-within-history” perspective (ibid., 19).
14

Ibid., 17.
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Ibid., 50–51.
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a group of theologians seeking to relate Christian theological findings to historical experience
in a way that provides witness to its eschatological outlook. For Moltmann, revelation
“proceeds from the identity of God’s promise with the fulfillment of his promise”; it
determines to affect a future reality in terms of God’s promise.16 While the perceived present
seems to contradict the promised future, God demonstrates his faithfulness through his
promise. Through this treatment of theories of history and their impact on theology, Conyers
begins to set the stage for his analysis of Moltmann’s views on theology in the future tense and
its promise for political theology. He moves on to investigate the nature and development of
the concept of history as God’s open future.17
Conyers explains three perspectives, or stages, from which Moltmann’s dialogue with
modern theology and philosophy has brought him into the discussion of history. These three
perspectives arise out of the fact that “[Christian theology] must inevitably relate ancient
events and promises to a modern context and mission… But if it is to be more than a ‘fossil
theology,’ sealed up in a dead past, or a ‘chameleon theology,’ colored by its contemporary
environment, then it must demonstrate a contemporary faith that opens the past to its own
universal future.”18 The three perspectives correspond to the three main works with which
Conyers engages, as noted above.
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Ibid., 54.
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By “open future” here I mean the idea that God is drawing creation toward its future
consummation, as I will draw out below. It should not be confused with open theism, which is a
different matter.
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Conyers, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Concept of History,” 56.
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The first stage comes into focus in Moltmann’s Theology of Hope. Here he argues that
Christian hope provides history with a “promissory structure that remains eschatologically
open to a universal future,” with the emphasis on the resurrection, the eschaton, and the
future of Christ. It provides a view of history that is not closed off in irrelevant or inflexible
dogma.19 Conyers makes several interrelated points with regard to this stage. He shows that
Moltmann rejects any concept of history that sees it as a metaphysic of being, rendering
history unhistorical by seeking to escape the insecurity of thinking with the contexts of risks,
dangers, and promises that make up real history.20 Moltmann instead turns to the biblical
category of promise, which he sees as the key to thinking of history in terms of genuine
experience.21 At its core, history must be understood via Christology.22 Moltmann’s
understanding of history focuses on three developments in the history of Jesus Christ: “the
death and resurrection of Jesus has an eschatological focus and gives rise to an eschatological
Christology… it is an anticipation of God’s future.… The future of God in his kingdom has a
Christological focus and calls forth a Christological eschatology. In this sense it is an
incarnation of the future of God’s kingdom.… The structure that history takes, in anticipation
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Ibid., 56–57.

20

Ibid., 59–74.
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Ibid., 76–85. Conyers notes, “Here he finds that the movement of Israel’s world-view is
directed toward future goals, the remembered future of God’s promise. While this world-view is
reminiscent of their migratory heritage, it is here retained in the community cultus and in the
theological heritage of a settled agrarian society” (104).
22

Moltmann: “A Christian understanding of history at its core must… be developed out of
Christology” (quoted in ibid., 85).
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of God’s future, and the mode of Christ’s present in history are viewed in terms of mission.”23
Thus the Old Testament provides Moltmann with the concept of promise, and the New
Testament expands it by adding the ideas of anticipation, incarnation, and mission.
This Christian view of history expands to the horizons of universal concern because it
is rooted in the ultimate border of death in light of resurrection.24 The promises of the future
are not drawn out of the possibilities of the present order but are anticipated in light of the
new possibilities of the new creation.25 Mission, transformation, and openness to God’s future
are key concepts: “The point, in light of the suffering of this world and the promise of the new,
is not only to interpret things as they are but to transform them by faithful obedience in
anticipation of the future of God.”26 This promissory structure of history itself points to this
universal future that God has opened via the resurrection of Christ.

23

Ibid.

24

Conyers explains, “The resurrection which pointed beyond the horizons of the experienced
cosmos and of death was not the resurrection in abstract, but it was the resurrection specifically of the
crucified one. This resurrection therefore does not bypass the terrors of history, but releases the
promise of God from the very midst of history and its suffering. The concept of history which this
involves, therefore, speaks of a dialectic of the crucifixion and the resurrection, or promise and
experience, of the universality of God’s future and the particularity of the presence of his future” (ibid.,
105). Conyers deals more with the concept of dialectic, noting “The experience of anticipation and that
of incarnation must, therefore, mutually interpret one another. The one stretches forward to the future
of a God who is ‘ahead of us’ yet without becoming lost in utopian dreams. The other grounds that
hope in the concrete suffering of a God who is ‘for us’ yet without becoming lost in despair” (ibid., 96).
25
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Ibid., 92.

Ibid., 105. Other comments in the chapter expound on this: “The character of Christian
thinking about history does not call for theory, or an inquiry into the essence of things, but practice
and an inquiry into the transformation of things” (ibid., 93); “At this point in Moltmann’s thought we
begin to see that a Christian concept of history takes the form of mission… This is why Moltman
speaks of the resurrection as a ‘history-making’ event. Its historical character does not lie within the
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Conyers identifies Moltmann’s second stage in the book The Crucified God. Here,
Moltmann argues “for a theology of the cross that gives identity to, and determines the form of,
the historical mission of Christianity.” The emphasis is on hope in the form of remembering
the death of Jesus and in the solidarity of the God of hope with mankind’s suffering in
history.27 A truly Christian concept of history is “centered in the death and resurrection of
Christ—it means an eschatologically open history, one in which new possibilities are
appearing in history and are made possible by the history-making acts of God.”28 In
Moltmann’s thought, the eschatological process has an inner identity with Jesus’ mission, life,
and death. Thus, “whereas Moltmann began with a view of the anticipations that Christian
faith engenders in the context of experienced history, now he intends to show how that very
history, with its struggles and suffering, is taken up into the life of God. For Moltmann this is
the proper second step in understanding God’s promise in the resurrection of the crucified
Christ.”29 A proper understanding of history must share the same focus, the cross.
The cross is the concrete historical event that grounds the history of God as a history
of suffering.30 God reveals himself via a negative dialectic,31 revealing himself in the cross of

realm of theory, as if it could be proved on the grounds of an underlying foundation of existence, but it
belongs also to the realm of mission which brings forth its as-yet unrealized reality” (ibid., 98).
27

Ibid., 57.
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Ibid., 106.
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Ibid., 107.
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“Moltmann’s concept of history cannot, as we have seen again and again, be understood
apart from the concrete reality of historical events; and it is marked as Christian only when it springs
from the Christ event” (ibid., 121).
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Christ as the one who is abandoned by God.32 The transcendent aspect of the Trinity, however,
reminds us that the future must not be conceived as more of the same, a continuation of the
present, but as a new future, a new creation.33 When the resurrected one is identified with the
crucified one, then Christian theology becomes not about handing on something preserved
but about summoning the dead and godless to life. This means that Jesus’ death “opens history
toward its eschatological future precisely by offering hope to those most hopeless.… Thereby
human suffering is taken up into the history of God; in its cry of pain it participates in his
trinitarian history, which in the Sonlessness of the Father, and in the Fatherlessness of the Son,
is united in the suffering, thus hoping love, of the Spirit.”34 The Christian concept of history is a
Christian concept because of its openness to the future of God, who has demonstrated himself
in the cross and resurrection of Jesus.
Moltmann’s third stage comes into focus in The Church in the Power of the Spirit. Here
Conyers sees that Moltmann “relates the trinitarian structure of God’s history to the historymaking mission of the church.”35 He draws on the Spirit’s presence (mediation of eschatology
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However, Moltmann does not entirely reject the analogical principle; rather, he insists that
the cross must define the basis of the analogy. See ibid., 149.
32

“For Moltmann, therefore, as we have already seen, the negation of the negative lies in the
historical reality of the cross. Here, in the cross, is reflected a continual tendency in the biblical
experience of God: God is made known to the outcasts, to the unrighteous, and to the slaves. This
makes it possible to understand both the biblical presentation of Jesus and the Pauline theology of the
cross” (ibid., 148–49).
33

Ibid., 134.
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Ibid., 150.
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Ibid., 57.
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in history) and power (eschatological promise in terms of mission).36 The Spirit is the power of
futurity as well, drawing power from the pain of suffering and historical reality but connecting
believers to God’s open future.37 In Moltmann’s thinking, history is an open history with new
possibilities.38 Creation itself does not stand outside of this dynamic as something static and
established. Creation is open to the processes of history; it is open to the future.39 Moltmann
refrains from a vision or a theory of the kingdom of God, because “what is proposed in this
respect is not one final possibility, but the openness to infinite possibilities. Thus to conceive
of such an existence would mean to conceive of its limit.… For these reasons Moltmann’s
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Ibid., 152.
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“Like Bultmann, only without the ahistorical ‘Eternal Now,’ Moltmann can call the Spirit the
power of futurity, a power that is manifested in the fact that ‘it gives the believer freedom’ to be ‘open
for the genuine future, letting oneself be determined by the future.’ Yet here the eschatological
dimension does not forget historical reality and the pain of suffering, but draws power from it” (ibid.,
162).
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“Therefore God’s mystery is not a closed and perfect order above us, that which is eternally
unchanging and stands in contrast to the changes of temporal existence. It is open to the future, and as
the ‘sending’ suggests, is itself changed by the suffering, hopes, expectations, and possibilities of
human history” (ibid., 170). Conyers also notes, “Thus the concept of God inferred from ‘sending’ is one
of change, of process. This would mean that the Trinity has a future and a fullness that is not to be
conceived at the beginning” (ibid., 171).
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Conyers, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Concept of History,” 183–84. “The openness of creation is seen
as openness to the creative possibilities of the future. It is a willingness to endure the suffering and
crises of history in anticipation of the consummation of creation in God. It is not yet the establishment
of order, it is not yet the establishment of safety, for the promise of order comes not from the integrity
of the beginning but out of the anticipation of the future… Openness to the creative possibilities of
history, therefore, means accepting the risks of history in order to live by faith in hope of the new
creation” (ibid., 186).
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discussion of the kingdom of God necessarily relates the infinitely open possibilities of God’s
future to the relatively open possibilities of human history.”40
Conyers organizes Moltmann’s messianic mediation of the kingdom of God in three
“mediating categories”: anticipation (an attitude toward the future),41 resistance (resisting
whatever resists change, whatever is closed off against the future), and representation (selfgiving, giving oneself to risks for the sake of others).42 These categories, especially anticipation,
are not divorced from willing suffering in the present.43 Conyers summarizes his thinking on
the importance of the Trinity as follows:
The trinitarian process of God provides an inclusive symbol for the ideas of God’s
promise and God’s suffering that came forth in Moltmann’s first two major volumes of
theology. It is important here that one recognize the place of pneumatology, which
makes the death and resurrection of Christ, as an inner-trinitarian event, more than
an evocative symbol, but reveals it as an event opening up the tendency of the
resurrection to the universal possibilities of a new creation.… These possibilities for
the future… are nevertheless aspects of the present. Because, in that they are
possibilities—and not inevitable realities of some unavoidable future—they hold the
present accountable, thus calling forth into mission.44
For Moltmann, the Spirit draws believers into the dynamism of the inner-trinitarian
experience with history, opening up the new possibilities of God’s future for humans.
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Conyers, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Concept of History,” 191.
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Anticipating the kingdom of God points toward an unlimited freedom, which Moltmann
calls “indeterminate behavior” (ibid., 187).
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Ibid., 192.
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These three perspectives or stages in Moltmann’s work provide the shape for his
theology of history, as Conyers understands it. It is “a way to conceive history, to conceive it in
terms of Christian theology, and to conceive it in terms of a contemporary Christian
theology.”45 Conyers summarizes Moltmann’s contribution in his closing chapter: “History is
then seen as a dialectic of promise and experience, acted out in mission within the conditions
of history and directed toward world transforming goals whose ultimate horizon is universal
liberation and reconciliation with God. This dialectic of reconciliation presupposes that
history is open and capable of yielding new creative possibilities. Thus the very experience of
history as crisis, risk, and open possibilities provides the way for meaningful action.”46 The
cross is central, and it allows Moltmann to be sensitive to the historical pessimism evident in
his time. History is not reduced to some predetermined vision or order, and it is not reliant
upon anything immanent within the world itself.
Conyers also highlights some difficulties that he sees in Moltmann’s work. These
criticisms provide an important area of comparison with Conyers’s book on Moltmann
published nine years later (a comparison we take up below). In the final chapter of the
dissertation, Conyers levels one main criticism against Moltmann’s theology of history:
“Moltmann’s categories of promise and suffering, by which God is known in the world,
necessarily involve him in a radical critique of existence.”47 In other words, openness and new
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Ibid., 57. Emphasis original.
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possibilities in Moltmann’s thought make the connection to any present positive mediation
difficult to maintain. He has too severely restricted the mediation of the kingdom of God to
negative categories. This comes out in his treatment of messianic mediation, which as
“anticipation,” “resistance,” and “self-giving” is entirely negative, related to the absence of the
future’s newness in the present. Conyers turns to the concept of the kingdom of God in the
teaching of Jesus to emphasize that while there are elements that are waited for, Jesus seems
clear that there are positive ways that the kingdom is present now.48 While he acknowledges
the strengths of Moltmann’s treatment in connecting God as revealed in Scripture (especially
with themes of promise) to the experience of history now (with its crises and risks) in a way
that communicates the open future that God is drawing people toward, Conyers is concerned
that Moltmann leaves little room for positive categories.49 Conyers does, however,
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For his treatment of Jesus’ teaching, see ibid., 212–35. He also says, “the Kingdom is not only
hidden in terms of its futurity (which speaks of its absence from the present) and in suffering and
oppression (which speaks of its negation in the present). But it must also include that which is ‘already’
in a positive sense, even though its appearance is in unlikely form, belonging to children (Mk. 10:14), to
the poor (Mk. 10:23–25), and to the servant (Mk. 10:42–45), and even though its presence is not
immediately evident, as in the parable of the seed growing mysteriously (Mk. 4:26–29)” (ibid., 236).
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This is similar to the critique of Moltmann made in Arne Rasmusson, The Church as Polis:
From Political Theology to Theological Politics as Exemplified by Jürgen Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). He states, “One major change came in 1970
when the strong stress on eschatology and God as future was modified. One problem with this was that
theology tended to become mainly critical, criticizing present reality in the light of a hoped for future,
to which little content was given. The criticism became abstract with little to say about concrete
positive alternatives” (13). Rasmusson notes that while political theology arose as a way to mediate
Christianity to modernity, it became very critical of modernity (14). He argues that Hauerwas, and
Radical Reformed theology more generally, serves as a more promising way forward because the
church is viewed as an alternative society. It does not grasp for the power of the world or buy into the
myth that humans can control the future, but instead exists as an alternate way of being, defining the
world (by showing what it means to follow Christ) and pointing to a different type of community life.
This provides a surer basis for criticizing modernity, and it also gives the church and theology priority.
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acknowledge the danger of such positive categories: “For mediating categories, which are
essentially symbols of order, have a way of becoming petrified and claiming to be absolute
embodiment of truth.”50 Thus his criticism of Moltmann does not serve to devastate
Moltmann’s system or position. Instead, Conyers points cautiously to a way to overcome
Moltmann’s reliance on negative concepts—like absence and anticipation—by connecting to
more positive categories.
Conyers’s positive reception characterizes Moltmann’s influence at this stage. Conyers
approves of Moltmann’s emphasis on the cross and the idea that history must be understood
as God’s working reconciliation. New creative possibilities exist, and God summons people to
new life, not to some static element of the past. However, despite broad agreement with
Moltmann, Conyers begins to raise questions. He critiques Moltmann for failing to
acknowledge anything positive in the present. And in the wording of this basic critique—
using the language of “symbols of order”—we begin to see the evidence of the next major
influence on Conyers’s thought.

Braiding Three Strands of “Conservatism”: Conyers and Social-Political Thought
Conyers “braids” three strands of “conservative” political thought together in his work.
I begin by explaining who these figures were and how they influenced Conyers specifically.
(Chapters three and four will connect themes from Conyers’s work to these influences as I

Theology is then aimed at helping the church come to grips with its teaching and how to live that out
rather than how to get on with elite movements. As Conyers turns to other influences, he develops a
way for defining positive categories, as we will see below.
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explore his treatment of modernity.) First,51 I turn to Conyers’s use of Johannes Althusius as an
example of a political path not taken by modernity, one that offers hope that conditions could
be different.52 Second, I explain the work of Eric Voegelin, who provided Conyers with both
particular philosophical interpretations and broader categories for analyzing the modern
world. These categories enabled Conyers to identify positive aspects of the present that he felt
Moltmann lacked. Third, I turn to the work of the Southern Agrarians and the writings of
Richard Weaver, who provided Conyers with a perspective on modernity that he would
ultimately use to critique Moltmann and to formulate his own point of view. Conyers braids
these three strands to form his particular understanding of conservatism that carries through
his mature work.

Johannes Althusius
Johannes Althusius (1557–1638)53 provides Conyers a way to order social relations that
avoids the hyper individualism of modernity. At the start of The Long Truce, Conyers
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demonstrates a clear debt to this German Reformed jurist by turning to him as an example of
an alternate political path not taken by modernity.54 Considered by many to be a profound
political thinker,55 Althusius and his work were largely neglected and forgotten until a work on
his thought was published in 1880.56 Since then, scholars have shown more interest and some
of his works have been translated, most notably his Politica methodice digesta (originally
published in 1603).57 This work in particular demonstrates Althusius’s influence on federalism
as a political concept. In fact, as Daniel Elazar states, “Althusius’ Politica was the first book to
present a comprehensive theory of federal republicanism rooted in a covenantal view of
human society derived from, but not dependent on, a theological system.”58 In order to

digesta, which gained him immediate attention (Alain De Benoist, “The First Federalist: Johannes
Althusius,” Telos 118 [Winter 2000]: 27). In 1603, the citizens of Emden chose Althusius to be a
municipal trustee. This marked a turning point in his life. His service to Emden allowed him the
opportunity to apply some of his theories of autonomy and the freedom of states, especially in
Emden’s struggle against the Count of Frise (ibid., 28.). Althusius continued to serve Emden in various
capacities from 1603 until his death in 1638.
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understand this thinker’s influence on Conyers, I will first seek to gain an overview of
Althusius and then look more carefully at how he provides Conyers with an alternative
political vision as a starting point for navigating the modern world.
Althusius gains attention as “the first federalist” based largely on his work on
communities or groups in Politica.59 Politics “is the art of associating men for the purpose of
establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them… The subject matter of
politics is therefore association, in which [those living together] pledge themselves to each
other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and
necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life.”60 Althusius rejects the idea of selfsufficient individuals and instead focuses on the fact that being human is a function of
belonging to various interdependent groups. He builds on the concept of symbiotic relations,
which are established between those who have the same needs and find themselves in various
levels and types of proximity to each other.61 In Politica, Althusius deals specifically with the
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family, the collegium, the city, and the province.62 Each of these groups is important and has
authority based on its nature and function. In addition, the larger groups, such as the province,
do not exist on a separate plane from the smaller groups; rather, larger groups are made up of
the smaller groups. In other words, the largest-level group is not a group of individuals, in
which each individual relates as an individual to the state. Instead, the largest group is a group
of groups, relating to individuals on the basis of their existence in other groups. Althusius
explains that the largest association consists “partly from private, natural, necessary, and
voluntary societies, [and] partly from public societies,” and “families, cities, and provinces
existed by nature prior to realms, and gave birth to them.”63 In fact, “the social pact is the
progressive organization of organic communities of various sizes, in the formation of which
individuals have no part: if they enter into a contract, they do so as members of an already
existing community, which does not abandon its rights in favor of the larger community.”64
This organization maintains the integrity of the individual groups while still making
cooperation possible.
This relationship between groups influences two other theories that make Althusius
significant. First, Althusius promotes the principle of subsidiarity, that the larger groups
should only assume functions that cannot be adequately undertaken by the smaller groups.65
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This aims to keep initiatives at the lower level as well as to protect the lower levels from the
higher levels. Second, Althusius provides a concept of sovereignty that runs contrary to other
influential political thinkers such as Jean Bodin.66 In brief, Bodin’s sovereignty rests upon the
idea that the state is central and the source of all other authority.67 Intermediary bodies, such
as the family and partial societies are important, but they cannot infringe upon the powers of
the prince. Sovereignty is “unlimited power: having no rival in the political and social order.”68
The law, then, is nothing other than the prince’s orders, leading to juridical positivism.
Althusius’s view of sovereignty is the opposite of Bodin’s. For Althusius, the law emanates
from the social dimension and the state is under the law. Sovereignty is not an absolute
sovereignty detached from obligations; instead, sovereignty belongs to the symbiotic
community and to the sovereign only because he is made administrator on behalf of the
community.69 In Althusius’s political thought, all political associations, especially the larger

powers or tasks should rest with the lower-level sub-units of that order unless allocating them to a
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associations, are made up of other, lower-level associations into which humans are born and
into which they commit themselves based on various common interests. Authority and
sovereignty rise up from the lower levels and are entrusted to the sovereign as an
administrator, not as an absolute ruler: “I recognize the prince as the administrator, overseer,
and governor of these rights of sovereignty. But the owner and usufructuary of sovereignty is
none other than the total people associated in one symbiotic body from many smaller
associations.”70
In the first chapter of The Long Truce, Conyers interacts briefly with the thought of
Althusius, and “the first federalist” serves throughout the work as a figure representing an
alternate path, a different way of conceiving political association in opposition to the large
centralized states of the twentieth century. In his brief formal interaction with Althusius,71
Conyers focuses on two key concepts that form his foundation for approaching and critiquing
the development of the modern world. First, he develops Althusius’s sense of the nature of
politics. For Althusius, “Politics really regards how we live in community with one another;
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and often the most important group, the group that exerts the most influence on us, is not the
state. It is likely to be the family, the church, the collegium…, the guild, or the regional
community.”72 And these groups have coherent projects and goals as well: “These groups each
have their own end or goal. In fact, Althusius contended that just as the individual has a
vocation…so has the group—in its own way and for a given purpose.”73 Any full treatment of
politics, then, must respect the reality of these various groups, the significance they provide,
and the power that they have. Politics “includes the consideration of how and why people live
together, a matter prerequisite to any understanding of how they are governed or how power
operates in the national life.”74 Political life is about living together, in all the forms it occurs.
Conyers draws another concept from Althusius: the ability to push against thinking of
persons in isolation. While certain trends in modern thought make it customary to think in
terms of individuals governed by a central administration, Althusius considered it vital to first
attend to the function of smaller, non-governmental associations such as the family and the
collegium. For Althusius, political life is more than transactions between individuals and the
centralized power, a theme to which Conyers returns in his diagnosis of the “crisis” of
modernity. Conyers maintains these ideas of smaller groups and a proper understanding of
individuals as he seeks to diagnose problems in the modern world and propose alternate
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paths. Althusius remains an important example of a path not taken, a path that would not
lead to the bipolarity between a sovereign state and autonomous individuals.

Eric Voegelin
The work of Eric Voegelin (1901–1985) is the second strand of political influence on
Conyers. It provides him with a concept of political order and with an angle for critiquing
modernity. Voegelin is regarded as “one of the severest critics of… Cartesian subjectivity, its
successive philosophical practitioners, and its political and philosophical consequences.”75
Born January 3, 1901, in Cologne, Germany, he studied political science at the University of
Vienna and completed his doctorate in 1922.76 He then learned German constitutional law at
Berlin and Heidelberg before becoming an assistant to his mentor, Hans Kelsen, at Vienna.77
He also studied at Oxford and spent 1924 to 1926 in America at Columbia, Harvard, and
Wisconsin.78 After spending some time at the Sorbonne focused on French literature and
philosophy, Voegelin returned to Austria in 1927 and became interested in political
developments there. He grew a strong concern for examining radical ideologies, and he
published two books on the subject of race (both of which the Nazis withdrew from

75

Lee Trepanier and Steven F. McGuire, “Introduction,” in Eric Voegelin and the Continental
Tradition: Explorations in Modern Political Thought, 3rd ed. (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri,
2011), 1.
76

Michael P. Federici, Eric Voegelin: The Restoration of Order (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002),

77

Ibid.

78

Ibid., 1–2.

1.

55
circulation).79 After Germany occupied and annexed Austria in 1938, Voegelin was fired from
his academic position at the University of Vienna. He began to plan his emigration.80
Voegelin spent most of the rest of his career in the United States, with a decade-long
stint back in Germany. He taught at Harvard, Bennington College, and the University of
Alabama before accepting a permanent position at Louisiana State University in 1942.81 From
there, he returned to Germany in 1958 to establish an Institute of Political Science in Munich.
The last phase of his career took place at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, from
1969 to 1974. He continued to work until his death on January 19, 1985.82
Before delving into the major features of Voegelin’s thought, it is important to note
that scholars debate the degree to which they can label him a “conservative.” Voegelin himself
rejected being categorized so easily. While some vehemently argue that he was a wolf in
sheep’s clothing, an arrogant conservative pretending not to be,83 most scholars agree that he
does not fit well within any particular category. As one biographer describes it, “Whatever one
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may say of Voegelin’s ‘conservative’ leanings, they consist of neither a neo-classical liberal
reaction to the welfare state as in the American conservatism of the 1950s to the 1990s, nor of a
wistful longing for the ancient régimes of pre-Reformation Europe… Voegelin’s political
analyses are sufficiently unprogrammatic in political intent that his ‘politics’ in any
prescriptive sense evades ideological categorization.”84 If Voegelin was a conservative at all, it
was only as an “adopted son,” since conservatives did draw on his thought.85
Voegelin’s legacy relates to “exploring the nature of modernity and meditating upon
the sources of order in human existence.”86 This legacy and his major ideas flow from four
primary works. First, Voegelin signed a contract with McGraw-Hill to produce a textbook on
the history of political ideas in February of 1939, shortly after arriving in the United States.87
Though the agreement was to produce a 200-page manuscript within a year, two years later
Voegelin had written a much longer work (and by 1944 it was three volumes).88 However, he
abandoned the work between 1945 and 1950 due to an important development in his thought.
He came to see that ideas are concrete examples of symbols of order that men and women
develop from their immediate experiences. People use these symbols to give meaning to their
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history and to set up government, which is an attempt at world construction.89 Ideas can be
the subject of inquiry themselves, but describing and understanding political reality requires
pushing deeper.90 Thus he rejected the ordering premise of the History of Political Ideas
volumes. Yet, his rejection of the ordering premise did not nullify the fact that he still believed
the historical studies in that work to be essentially sound.91
Voegelin developed this new angle in two lectures, the second and third important
works. In 1951, he gave the Walgreen Lectures at the University of Chicago (later published as
The New Science of Politics).92 His inaugural lecture in Munich (1958) was published as Science,
Politics, and Gnosticism.93 In these works Voegelin developed his primary angle of critique of
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modernity: the need for a new science of politics because of gnostic elements in modern
ideologies. A new science was needed to overcome distortions caused by applying methods of
the natural sciences to politics and history. These distortions include a truncated view of
human nature, supposedly value-free social science, and viewing science as a type of saving
knowledge.94 Such moves were developments of earlier positions that Voegelin held. For
example, he believed that the problem of National Socialism was indicative of a larger
Western crisis. While others were content to critique the Nazis from a moral standpoint,
Voegelin pushed deeper into the roots of their ideas. As biographer Federici observes, “The
identification of these movements and the explanation of their pseudo-spiritual
characteristics constituted the beginning of Voegelin’s classification of modern political
movements as political religions. This insight led to the development of what he would later
call ‘gnosticism,’ a defining characteristic of modernity.”95 Voegelin saw modern ideologies as
variations of the ancient heresy of Gnosticism.96 By this term he meant the belief that humans
can transform the nature of reality through secret knowledge and social action.97 Gnosticism
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had three components: “a strong feeling of alienation stemming from a sense that some
essential aspect of one’s own humanity remains unfulfilled, a revolt against the conditions in
the world that purportedly cause this alienation, and the belief that esoteric knowledge and
political action will be sufficient to overcome these conditions. In short, Gnosticism is the belief
that human beings have the power to transform both themselves and the order of reality into
some sort of magical utopia.”98 This need for a new science and analysis of modern Gnosticism
stemmed from Voegelin’s assessment of modern disorder.

world. This was attractive in the early church because it provided an explanation of evil that did not
seem to provide a contradictory God, one who created good and then redeemed from evil (hence
Marcion’s attraction to this position), one who didn’t contradict himself. The central effort of
Christianity all the way up to Augustine and scholasticism was an attempt to rescue the world as the
creation from the negative role assigned to it by the doctrine of its demiurgic origin, and to salvage the
dignity of the ancient cosmos for its role in the Christian system.
Blumenberg argues that the solution for the origin of evil and the existence of evil came to have two
parts. Since theologians such as Augustine couldn’t justify evil based on existing sins, they laid blame
at the feet of original sin. Also, predestination explained why a great mass of damned still merited the
evil in the world as punishment of their sins. Man is responsible for his actions; this presupposes the
justice of God but does not prove it. In this approach Gnosticism isn’t really overcome; instead the evil
God is in a way transposed to the concepts of original sin and predestination, to the deus absconditus
of the Middle Ages.
This leads, in Blumenberg’s account, to a disappearance of order that calls forth human self-assertion
and will to power as an existential program. Man must decide how he is going to deal with his reality,
what option he will choose. This is connected to the rise of technique: alienating reality requires order
imposed on it by human willing. Because reality is indifferent, life must be indifferent to reality and
simply pursue the will to power. The search for instruments that man could use in any possible world
led to the mathematizing and materializing of nature. “The world as the pure performance of reified
omnipotence, as a demonstration of the unlimited sovereignty of a will to which no questions can be
addressed—this eradication even of the right to perceive a problem meant that, at least for man, the
world no longer possessed an accessible order” (171). “The radical materializing of nature is confirmed
as the systematic correlate of theological absolutism. Deprived by God’s hiddenness of metaphysical
guarantees for the world, man constructs for himself a counterworld of elementary rationality and
manipulability” (173). Man takes on the task of providing some sort of minimal order and purpose to
the world through self-assertion.
98

Trepanier and McGuire, “Introduction,” 4–5. Emphasis added.

60
The fourth significant work was his five-volume Order and History, which explored the
concepts of order and disorder in depth as related to history and politics.99 Voegelin identified
the “quaternarian structure” for order, which consisted of God, humans, world, and society.
Proper participation in this structure means order, while alienation leads to disorder.100 This
participation related to religious experience: “Voegelin’s analyses of order and disorder in
history have among their consistent aims a disclosing of the religious stratum of experience in
the creation of the symbols that have structured the human world and guided human
energies.”101 Voegelin’s relation to Christianity, however, was not straightforward.
Voegelin never belonged to a formal church, though he described himself as a “preNicaean Christian,” a “pre-Reformation Christian,” and a “Christian humanist.”102 Heilke
rightly notes the ambiguous position Voegelin holds among Christian thinkers.103 On the
negative side, Voegelin did lay some of the blame for the Gnostic problems of modernity at
the feet of Christianity, or at least Christianity gone awry.104 Even on the positive side, Voegelin
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gave Christianity a limited place. The political question at issue in these debates comes down
to “the source of moral and even institutional and civilizational authority for political
regimes.”105 Voegelin focused on Christianity’s civilizational role, not on the Christianity of the
local community of faith.106 Concerned with the quaternarian structure (God-human-worldsociety dynamic of order), Voegelin saw Christianity as important for a proper orientation of
those four elements but did not focus too much on particular local expressions.
Voegelin influenced Conyers in three ways. First, the surface of both of Conyers’s final
books shows an engagement with Voegelin’s philosophical thought. Conyers turns positively
to Voegelin’s History of Political Ideas as a source for understanding particular philosophers
and philosophical movements. Second, Conyers picks up the emphasis on order at least partly
from Voegelin. Third, he developed a critique of modernity very similar to Voegelin’s
Gnosticism critique, though he chose to use different terminology. These last two influential
elements extend back to the beginning of Conyers’s theological work. He includes Order and

Douglass argues that Voegelin interprets Christianity selectively and that his concern to undercut
Gnosticism leads him to distort Christianity in order to make distinctions clearer (“He seeks, in effect,
to create a Christianity that has no affinity whatsoever with the metastatic expectations of modernity.
The question, however, is whether this can be done and still do justice to the faith and experience of
believers”; 154).
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History in the bibliography of his dissertation,107 and the language of “order” factors into his
main critique of Moltmann in that work, as noted above. Conyers also cites both The New
Science of Politics and Science, Politics, and Gnosticism in the published version.108 Voegelin’s
influence on Conyers will become more apparent in chapters three and four as I describe
Conyers’s diagnosis of modernity and his solutions.

Southern Agrarians and Conyers’s Conservatism
The Southern Agrarians are the third strand of political thought that influenced
Conyers’s “conservatism,” and they helped him make connections between moral order and
economic concerns in the modern United States specifically. The work of these “Twelve
Southerners”109 was taken up by a generation of Neo-Agrarians, represented most prominently
by Richard Weaver, who influenced Conyers significantly via Ideas Have Consequences.
Understanding the agrarians will provide a clearer picture of the type of conservatism that
shaped Conyers and will begin to clarify one source of his creative moves in seeking to
navigate the modern world.
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In 1930, Twelve Southerners published a book of essays entitled I’ll Take My Stand.110
The group became known as the Southern Agrarians, due to their focus on the South as a
region and on agrarianism as a preferred economic option over industrialism. Nearly all of the
contributors were in some way associated with Vanderbilt University. The main organizers of
the volume, John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, and Donald Davidson, as well as one of the other
contributors, Robert Penn Warren, were previously involved in a literary publication called
The Fugitive, which focused on poetry and was published for a few years in the early 1920s.
Later in the 1920s, Tate, Ransom, and Davidson began to experiment with the idea of a
symposium on Southern culture and values. Several factors influenced this decision, including
feelings that Northerners were imposing their views on the South through events such as the
Scopes Trial,111 as well as the growth of a movement promoting the “New South,” which was
basically an industrialized and “Northernized” South. In order to defend Southern culture,
Ransom, Tate, and Davidson organized the publication of the volume.
In the most basic sense, the Southern Agrarians were concerned with the advance of
industrialization and the types of values and ways of life that it imposed upon people,
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including the concept of progress and the rise of consumerism.112 They measured a society not
by economic progress but by human product: what sorts of people did societies help
produce?113 While some argued that social values and morals could be dealt with apart from an
economic system, the agrarians insisted that they were inextricably tied together. Thus, they
turned to the South, especially the pre-Civil War South, as an example of a society that was
not built around industrialization but instead around agrarianism. For them, the main
contribution that the South could make to broader national issues was to remain faithful to
this older way of structuring life in order to avoid the evils and aimlessness bound up with
industrialism and consumerism. The broader nation was falling prey to the messianic cults of
rationalism, scientism, and industrialism.114 Some of the thinkers were committed more
literally to farming than others, but all generally agreed in the distinction between industrial
and agrarian.
The individual essays varied in their topics, approaches, and particular views. Writers
covered Southern art, education, religion, economy, history, and race, among others. The
essays were written with little consultation between the authors, and the variety makes it
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nearly impossible to find completely coherent positions in the book.115 While the essays varied,
scholars have identified four common themes that characterize the essays: family, place,
leisure, and religion.116 Any further unity derived from the volume must come from the initial
common statement of principles. For example, “All the articles bear in the same sense upon
the book’s title-subject: all tend to support a Southern way of life against what may be called
the American or prevailing way; and all as much as agree that the best terms in which to
represent the distinction are contained in the phrase, Agrarian versus Industrial.”117
By industrialism, the book means “the economic organization of the collective
American society. It means the decision of society to invest its economic resources in the
applied sciences. But the word science has acquired a certain sanctitude.” In fact, “It is out of
order to quarrel with science in the abstract, or even with the applied sciences when their
applications are made subject to criticism and intelligence. The capitalization of the applied
sciences has now become extravagant and uncritical; it has enslaved our human energies to a
degree now clearly felt to be burdensome.”118 The statement expands into the issue of “labor
saving,” which assumes that labor is an evil. The “apologist of industrialism” assumes that evils
will disappear once we have bigger and better machines. Consumption is the end that justifies
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modern labor, “But the tempo of our labors communicates itself to our satisfactions, and these
also become brutal and hurried.”119 Religion cannot flourish in industrial society, because “We
receive the illusion of having power over nature, and lost the sense of nature as something
mysterious and contingent.”120 For the agrarians, a system of values cannot be separated from
an economic base, and it cannot be rebuilt without addressing problems at this base. The
laborsaving devices and logic of industrialism and capitalism lead to increasing disadjustment
and instability in society.121
On the other hand, agrarianism stands as a more promising model. It is the idea “that
the culture of the soil is the best and most sensitive of vocations, and that therefore it should
have the economic preference and enlist the maximum number of workers.”122 Other forms of
work should approach the agrarian model. This change is necessary because “if a community,
or a section, or a race, or an age, is groaning under industrialism, and well aware that it is an
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evil dispensation, it must find the way to throw it off. To think that this cannot be done is
pusillanimous. And if the whole community, section, race, or age thinks it cannot be done,
then it has simply lost its political genius and doomed itself to impotence.”123 The Southern
Agrarians put this very question to American society, and in doing so attempted to promote a
different way of political organization and being in the world rooted in a different economy.
While the book I’ll Take My Stand gained the most attention, both then and in
contemporary scholarship, it “was to be only the opening salvo in a much larger crusade.”124
During the early years of the New Deal, the agrarians were very active in making proposals,
and they even joined forces with the English Distributists on issues of property reform.125
Together they edited an Agrarian-Distributist book in 1936, Who Owns America?126 However,
this was ultimately a failed alliance due to jealousies that existed and differences concerning
the platform of the alliance. By 1937, Southern Agrarianism began to fall apart.127 The various
leaders went their separate ways, focusing on their careers and other projects.128
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It can be tempting to interpret the entire project of the Southern Agrarians negatively
because of the racism present in parts. In I’ll Take My Stand, for instance, only one essay deals
explicitly with race, and while it does so in a fairly progressive way for the time,129 it still
affirmed a type of segregation. In addition, Donald Davidson, one of the key figures in
agrarianism, was a staunch supporter of segregation throughout his life. However, rather than
moving from such facts to the conclusion that the entire agrarian project is simply an attempt
to return to a pre-Civil War South including racism, a more nuanced approach is necessary.
Political theorist Christopher Duncan makes this point: “Yet focusing only on [racism], while
understandable to a point, leaves us in ignorance of the vast majority of what the Agrarians
had to say and teach. If what they had to teach us is as important as I and others have thought,
then we impoverish ourselves, which seems a shame.”130 In fact, as Duncan argues in his book,
“what is left over once the racism is sufficiently acknowledged and isolated is worthwhile,
important, and potentially even politically useful for people interested in sustaining
community, morality, and civic virtue in this country.”131 So, while acknowledging the racism
present in individual writers, the project overall can be carried on without the racist elements.
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The vision that the agrarians had for broader society, taken up by later thinkers, does not
require racial subordination.132
The Southern Agrarians must be understood within a broader political context. The
first way to connect the Southern Agrarians to their political context is done by looking at the
tradition in which they are rooted. Scholars have done this in numerous helpful ways. In The
War Within, historian Daniel Singal places the agrarians in a shift from Victorian to Modernist
thought, putting them barely in the modernist camp.133 Eugene Genovese sees an element of
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southern nationalism present.134 Richard Gray’s Writing the South sees the agrarians as
embroiled in a sort of “cultural lag,” in which there is “not only disharmony between the
material and non-material culture, but discontinuity and division within the non-material
culture itself: the familiar vocabularies, the old codes and customs are seen to be threatened,
there is a perceptible and evidently unbridgeable gap between them and the material
conditions of existence, but they are clung on to—tenaciously, with increasing difficulty, and
with growing self-consciousness.”135 However, these positions all fail to consider the broader
political tradition that orients the agrarians. For this perspective, the work of Duncan proves
insightful. He argues that the agrarian movement is best understood as a Christian subspecies
of classical republicanism, a subspecies that points to the spiritual significance and even
sanctity of work and land.136 Understanding the agrarians in this light helps to explain their
enduring significance, for they challenge the way the relation of means and end have been
changed in modern society.137 The agrarians were not simply a reactionary interest group but
one rooted in a particular political trajectory. They creatively applied that trajectory to their
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heritage in the South and proposed ways that the Old South’s conception of moral order and
economy might prove helpful in combatting the ills of industrialization and moral disorder.
The second way to connect the Southern Agrarians to their political context is to
connect them to later developments in which their thought played a role. For this we turn to
Richard Weaver.
Richard Weaver (1910–1963)138 is rightly labeled the Saint Paul of the Southern
Agrarians.139 He is considered the first systematizer of the Southern Agrarians and one of the
most significant figures carrying on their concerns,140 both in his dissertation on the South
(The Southern Tradition at Bay, which he wrote at LSU with Cleanth Brooks, who was tied to
several of the agrarians) and in later essays and books.141 Earlier in his life a Socialist,142 Weaver
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describes his conversion to the “Church of Agrarianism” in religious terms, and “at the core of
that conversion was a commitment to restoring ‘the kind of poetic-religious vision of life
which dominated the Middle Ages,’ as well as a conviction that the grounds for such a
restoration could be discovered through a more profound appreciation of his cultural
heritage.”143 Neo-Agrarian scholarship focused on agrarians’ modern poetics and abstract ideas
instead of on their political statements.144 Weaver traced Southern Agrarian ideas back to first
principles,145 and his work in such scholarship cemented him “as the most eloquent
spokesman, since the Second World War, for the traditional idea of his region—the notion,
that is, that the Old South was an embodiment of Christian, chivalric values, the last outpost
of feudal culture in the Western world.”146 In the eyes of M. E. Bradford, another prominent
inheritor of the Agrarian tradition, “what was essential to the Agrarian enterprise… found its
final completion in Weaver’s more general and sustained excursions into social theory,
rhetoric, educational philosophy, intellectual history, and related fields.”147
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Weaver’s purpose was not only the recovery of ideas, but also the recovery of belief.148
For “In seeking a philosophy sustaining a recommendation of life, Weaver turned to those
venerable traditions of Western thought that spoke in terms of meaning, purpose, and truth—
in terms of affirmation: He turned to the Platonic-Christian heritage and its manifestation in
the American South.”149 On the most basic level, Weaver argued that society’s decline was
traceable to the rise of nominalism and the rejection of realism, and in the American context
the example of the South proved to be a promising way to begin to remedy this problem. His
critique of modernity was inseparable from his apology for the South.150
In his work on the agrarians, historian Mark Malvasi holds up Weaver as one of two
figures carrying on the project.151 Weaver argued that the Northern interpretation of being
American dominated simply because they had won a great war; the defeat forced the living
tradition of the South into silence.152 However, the southern tradition still “offered a core of
resistance to the most powerfully corrupting forces of the modern age: rationalism, positivism,
and science… The southern tradition, alternately, enabled men to see that civilization lay not
in the accumulation of wealth and power but in the moral and aesthetic conceptions with
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which men’s imaginations informed reality.”153 While modern man had rejected both the past
and the transcendent as a source of meaning under the influence of industrialization,
southerners had more reserved demeanor and expectations. Nor was this merely a matter of
taste: “Without a vision of order preserved and disseminated by men of virtue, character, and
intellect, civilization would collapse into a barbarism and chaos that would inevitably
engender despotism and tyranny.”154 Yet Weaver did not give in to a blind materialism or
behaviorism; while he pointed out the faults that industrialism encouraged (calling it caustic
and seeing it as running rampant over traditions and associations), he insisted that humans
are responsible for the choices they make.155 Still, systems such as industrial capitalism played
a role in shaping people and their choices. For Weaver, modernity was the institutionalization
of many of the seven deadly sins and the loss of order.156
Order was Weaver’s passion, “the inner order of the soul, the outer order of society.”157
In his eyes, modern people “had lost their moral orientation, had become ‘moral idiots,’
unable to respond to the perversion, brutality, or challenges of their world. Heartless and
indifferent, they lived not immorally but amorally, without the capacity even to measure their
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descent and degradation.”158 If this loss of moral orientation was not remedied, Weaver feared
the collapse of Western civilization, which he valued not simply in and of itself, but because it
was an imperfect embodiment of important values, such as piety. Piety was necessary to
recognize the existence of a Creator and an order outside of the human will.159
Weaver did not hold out for a literal return to the Old South and its ways of life. He
admits that no one would want that: “The Old South may indeed be a hall hung with splendid
tapestries in which no one would care to live; but from them we can learn something of how
to live.”160 However, as Malvasi notes, “The achievement and promise of the South, Weaver
argued, posed a challenge to the modern world to abandon the demonic forces of science and
technology and thereby to save the human spirit.”161 Part of the reason the southern tradition
could serve in this way was that it maintained a religious worldview over against pure science
and materialism.162 According to Weaver, what the agrarians “were saying is that there are
some things which do not have their subsistence in time, and that certain virtues should be
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cultivated regardless of the era in which one finds oneself born.”163 The Old South offered
Weaver a pattern for community, a pattern that was the modern world’s only resource for
reform (or at least the resource closest to the American context).164
Weaver turned to the South as a tradition worth maintaining in order to have true
civilization. His most significant contribution to conservative thought, in the eyes of one
political scientist, was his delineation of what is necessary for civilization and culture to
flourish.165 In particular, he spoke of “social bond individualism.” This idea captured the
southern conservatives’ version of Christian individualism, distinguishing it from the
bourgeois individualism associated with the Renaissance and the French Enlightenment.166 In
an essay originally published in 1963 in the journal Modern Age,167 Weaver argues that there
are two types of American individualism, one worth guarding and the other impossible to
build upon. To illustrate, he provides a “prophet” for each. The individualism worth guarding
Weaver termed “social bond individualism,” represented by John Randolph of Roanoke in his
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defense of state’s rights combined with the political prudence to compromise when necessary.
For Weaver, social bond individualism “battles unremittingly for individual rights, while
recognizing that these have to be secured within the social context.”168 Randolph believed in
the limited role of the government, which secured the “individual” side of the equation, while
also insisting on the defense of the smaller but “natural” unit over against the state, which
pretends a right to rule and run roughshod over the smaller unit.169 This defense protects the
other side of the equation, the social bond side, recognizing that a proper individualism
operates within group bonds.
On the other hand, Weaver called the impossible form of individualism “anarchic
individualism,” represented by the withdrawal of Henry David Thoreau. This form slips into
idealism and seeks to withdraw from every form of association, for “Anarchic individualism is
revolutionary and subversive from the very start; it shows a complete despite for all that
civilization or the social order has painfully created, and this out of self-righteousness or
egocentric attachment to an idea.”170 Thoreau’s individualism brought him to a studied
withdrawal from society, but Randolph’s individualism moved him toward political action at
the local level.171 Individualism, for Weaver, is worth guarding when located within the proper
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social context.172 However, modern talk of individualism tends to lean toward the anarchic
variety, enthroning the individual apart from and over any other bonds, bonds that in fact
secure true individualism.
Conyers demonstrates this same concern with individualism. He deals with it
explicitly in two works on theology. In a 1998 article on Baptist theology, he argues that the
individualism that is characteristic of modernity is an autonomous individualism.173 In his last
article, published in 2004, he draws on this theme again in connection with modern theology:
“Individualism and rationality are not, strictly speaking, features of modernity, but rather they
are features of a Christian view of life that, through the filter of the Enlightenment, were made
to conform to what is the heart of modernity and of postmodernism as well.”174 As is shown in
these two articles, Conyers operated with a similar distinction between different types of
individualism. Not all individualism is nefarious.
Conyers also inherits a concern for religious imagination from Richard Weaver. In
Superfluous Southerners, John Langdale argues that Weaver ultimately believed that “a
revitalization of the religious imagination was essential to resisting ideology’s gnostic impulse
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to debate the spoken and written word.”175 Conyers’s work on modernity, which we will
explore in full in chapters three and four, turns to just such a revitalization of the religious
imagination through the concept of vocation. While waiting to develop that concept further
until later, we should note this important connection between Conyers and Weaver’s project.
When one hears the word “conservative” today, the likes of Richard Weaver and the
Southern Agrarians are not what springs most immediately to mind. This is due to political
change in the mid-twentieth century, which deserves brief mention here in order to
understand the relation of the Southern Agrarians to contemporary conservatism.176 In the
mid-twentieth century, William F. Buckley Jr. fused together various conservatives and other
groups in order to form what is more commonly thought of as “conservative” in contemporary
political thought.177 Buckley and his National Review succeeded because of their “ability to
unite antistatist libertarians, who wanted to roll back the New Deal state; socially conservative
traditionalists, who opposed the secularism and relativism of liberalism; and anti-
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Communists, who feared liberal weakness in the face of Communist aggression abroad and
subversion within the United States.”178 In proposing a new “conservative” identity, Buckley
marginalized older leadership of the Right and newer contenders, transforming right-wing
politics.179 He “paired a politics of liberty (and the pristine market) with a politics or order—an
embrace of modernization with a rejection of cultural modernism.”180
This new conservative identity had an important impact on the agrarians and their
reception. Murphy notes, “Radical conservative critiques of progress, such as that of the
Southern Agrarians, were marginalized after World War II, not so much by liberals, who
tended to be intrigued by conservative anti-modernism, but by the postwar conservative
movement, which aimed to co-opt the label ‘conservative.’”181 The degree to which Weaver
held together the moral element and the economic element is debated. Paul Murphy charges
that New Conservatives like Weaver jettisoned the economic critique of industrial capitalism
in order to have their message better received in post-World War II conservatism. In fact, “By
the end of the 1950s, Davidson—as well as Tate, Weaver, and others in the Agrarian circle—
had planted the seeds of a universalist reinterpretation of Agrarianism, one with only limited
criticisms of industrial capitalism and fewer assertions of southern identity.”182 This criticism
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of Weaver, however, painting him as a compromiser of true agrarian ideals, does not seem to
hold. Historian Eugene Genovese argues that Weaver openly attacks capitalism.183 Other
thinkers who did turn away from the economic critique did so to make Southern Agrarianism
more palatable and influential in Buckley’s new fusionist conservatism. Whether the Southern
Agrarians and Neo-Agrarians toned down their economic critique as much as Murphy charges
or not,184 Buckley’s fusionist conservatism would continue to develop in favor of the free
market, defining conservatism from the 1950s onward.
The Southern Agrarians and Neo-Agrarians, however, are not truly themselves without
the economic critique, and their most faithful followers maintain it. At the root, the Southern
Agrarians held that a society’s values and morality are inextricably connected to its economic
system. One prominent contemporary writer in the agrarian stream of influence is Wendell
Berry. Berry’s essays on agrarianism in collections such as The Unsettling of America and The
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Art of the Commonplace,185 as well as his fiction centered on the fictional community of Port
William, Kentucky, demonstrate a clear connection to the Southern Agrarians and their twin
emphasis on the critique of a society’s morality and its connection to an economic system. In
fact, “The belief that industrial capitalism and Western notions of progress subvert an organic
and healthy social order lies at the heart of [Berry’s] social criticism.”186 Berry continues the
call for rootedness that marked the agrarians.187

Summary of Conservative Influence
The influence of Althusius, Voegelin, and the agrarians worked together to shape
Conyers’s particular type of conservatism—one source of his creative moves in navigating the
modern world. Conyers’s conservatism does not contradict his critiques of the modern world
or his constructive themes that would seem more at home outside of the conservative
movement of today, because Conyers is connected to the Southern Agrarians and what some
call a “paleoconservatism.”188 This form of conservatism predates Buckley’s fusionist
conservatism and its allegiance to the free market. Conyers’s connection to this tradition,189
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especially via the work of Richard Weaver, provides the hermeneutic key for understanding
his conservatism and the perspective from which he diagnoses and seeks remedies for the
modern world. Weaver’s influence is most clearly evinced in themes such as place and
Conyers’s stance of humility and piety. Conyers draws on several significant ideas from these
conservative thinkers, including an emphasis on intermediate associations (Althusius), proper
individualism (Althusius and Weaver), the importance of order (Voegelin and Weaver), and
the connection between economic systems and morals (Southern Agrarians and Weaver).
(Each of these ideas will play important roles in chapters three and four, where we will
explore Conyers’s political theology and expand on this admittedly brief mention of these
significant concepts.) In a sense, Conyers stands alongside Wendell Berry;190 two Southern
Baptists influenced by the Southern Agrarian tradition and seeking to incorporate its critique
into their work. While Berry’s work is more widely known and appreciated, Conyers’s is more
explicitly theological in working out the implications of southern conservatism. In fact, Berry
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could be critiqued for not having enough of a place for the church in his work,191 whereas the
church plays a central role for Conyers, as we will see. Now that we understand Conyers’s
dissertation on Moltmann as well as the three primary sources of his conservatism, we can
turn to Conyers’s published book on Moltmann (God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and
the Christian Concept of History), which was published nine years after he defended his
dissertation. Analyzing this later book on Moltmann will demonstrate how Conyers
incorporates what he has learned from these forms of conservatism to build a deeper critique
of Moltmann and to begin to solidify his own theological foundation.

Returning to Moltmann: A New Critical Angle in God, Hope, and History
God, Hope, and History shows Conyers engaged in a more thorough critique of
Moltmann, a critique that would help him establish his own foundation for navigating the
modern world. Though Conyers drew most of the book straight from the dissertation,192 he
added a different framework and critical angle that together show the way he drew from
conservative thought. In short, Conyers enters a new topic of engagement with Moltmann
(hierarchy and power) that he builds based largely on the work of a new thinker (Richard
Weaver), whom Conyers evidently came across between the dissertation and the book, since
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Weaver is not mentioned at all in the dissertation. Weaver’s thought and the topic of
hierarchy and power provide Conyers with a critical angle on Moltmann that sets Conyers on
a trajectory of theological concern. He fleshed out this trajectory more in his final two books.
He retains Moltmann’s emphasis on eschatology and the future, and even his “openness” to a
degree, but he tempers it by providing it with structure and moral order based on concepts
drawn from the conservatives discussed above. Such synthesis helps Conyers overcome the
conservative-liberal binary and to form creative theological responses.
In the first chapter of God, Hope, and History, Conyers introduces one of Moltmann’s
criticisms related to theology of history. In works such as The Trinity and the Kingdom,193
Moltmann insists that monadic monotheism has caused problems for the church.194 He
recognizes various evils, such as human domination of nature through science and technology
and oppression in the social sphere. These evils, in Moltmann’s eyes, are “a consequence of
the hierarchical, dominating, power-oriented thinking that inevitably results when
philosophical monotheism becomes the ruling principle in theology.”195 For Moltmann,
hierarchy favors stability, not freedom, and thus hierarchical views of theology are
detrimental to a theology of hope. He sets up a dichotomy between hierarchy and eschatology
as two views of reality. Conyers calls this view into question, thus reframing his engagement
with Moltmann. While the dissertation focused on expounding Moltmann’s theology of
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history, the book takes on the task of understanding Moltmann’s theology of history in order
to assess this dichotomy between hierarchy and eschatology, between order and hope.
A different view of hierarchy arises in Conyers’s thought. To him, “Both hierarchy and
eschatology, order and hope, are ways of speaking about ethical foundations. While hierarchy
suggests loyalty to the highest and best, eschatology suggests loyalty to that which is lasting.
They are two visions dealing with the same issue of ordering human action and affection.
While eschatology raises open questions about the end and goal of things, hierarchy offers a
provisional answer.”196 In this new frame for his dissertation work, Conyers seeks to ask
whether hierarchy might actually be required for a theology of history with an eschatological
focus.197 While Moltmann too easily identifies hierarchy with the abuse of power,198 this
conflation is not a warranted move in Conyers’s mind.
Conyers’s fondness for hierarchy and order was encouraged by Richard Weaver,
whose Ideas Have Consequences199 is cited sparingly but significantly in Conyers’s arguments

196

Ibid., 13.

197

Ibid., 15.

198

Ibid., 185. This also reveals Moltmann’s anti-Catholicism.

199

Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (1948; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984). While Weaver did publish other work, including additional books and many shorter
writings, Ideas Have Consequences is the only source by Weaver that Conyers cites, so it is the only one
that we can be sure he knew. Interestingly, Weaver objected to the title Ideas Have Consequences,
viewing it as banal. Instead, he preferred two earlier titles, “Steps Toward the Restoration of Our World”
and “The Adverse Descent,” both of which lend further clarification to Weaver’s perception of his own
project. See Smith III, “Introduction,” xxxv.

87
about hierarchy.200 Especially after World War II, Weaver devoted his work to cultural
restoration. In a 1945 letter, he stated, “The atomic bomb was a final blow to the code of
humanity. I cannot help thinking that we will suffer retribution for this. For a long time to
come I believe my chief interest is going to be the restoration of civilization, of the
distinctions that make life intelligible.”201 Much of his work would continue to bear this
burden, and the burden is clearly evident in Ideas Have Consequences.
Weaver shows that every advanced society explains its values in terms of social and
political hierarchy. This hierarchy can reflect different things, whether it be the inescapable
state of things (ancient Egypt) or the horizon of hope (early Hebrew society).202 Conyers
connects these problems to the issues surrounding nominalism through the analysis of
Weaver. Conyers notes that “while [Weaver] holds in common with Moltmann a critique of
dominating power and the will for conquest, he also sees the problem evidenced in the loss of
hierarchy. It is interesting that Richard Weaver used almost the same language as Moltmann
in his critique of the Baconian development in science and technology, but the precise
difference is linked to a defense of hierarchy.”203 Conyers’s difference from Moltmann moving
forward follows along similar lines.
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In his concluding chapter, Conyers makes several arguments about hierarchy. He
seeks to demonstrate how it fits with a proper eschatological understanding of theology and
history. Hierarchy causes openness to as-yet-undefined possibilities of existence, an openness
toward God. By this he means that “hierarchy in Christian theology is represented not in the
concreteness of the cosmological order, where the divine nature of this order is everywhere
asserted, but in an openness (from below) toward him who gave measure and value to all
things because he is the ultimate value. This hierarchy is ‘open,’ not because of the power
exerted from above, but because of the disposition of reverence from below.”204 Hierarchy also
suggests that relative and questionable nature of all earthly powers, because hierarchy is
rooted in something that is longed for but not yet fully realized.205
Finally, Conyers draws on the concept of humility as the way to resolve hierarchy and
eschatology. Eschatology’s openness to God is expressed in terms of hope in Scripture, but
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openness to God in terms of hierarchy is humility.206 This humble hierarchy is different than
hierarchy understood as authority exerted downward by some power; instead,
from the standpoint of a world open to God in humility, hierarchy can mean precisely
the opposite of the presumptuous and calculating use of power—in fact it is the
restraint of power and becomes so by resisting the temptation of power. Hierarchy as
nothing other than the elaborated will to power is hierarchy as a disguise for
something else—but precisely the reason it is so useful as a disguise is that we all have
an intuition that the sense of hierarchy—embodied in the virtues of piety, humility,
reverence, and worship—is the very thing that protects the world from unqualified,
self-justifying power that is unbound and set loose upon the world.207
Hierarchy properly understood is indispensable for an eschatological understanding of
theology.
The new framework for Moltmann’s theology of history that Conyers provides in this
book focuses on Moltmann’s reaction against the abuse of power and his identification of the
abuse of power and hierarchy.208 Conyers agrees with the crisis with power, and issues
surrounding power in the modern world motivate much of his later work. Thus he begins to
lay the building blocks for this later work with respect to critiques of power in the modern
world. However, with this new framework and drawing on Richard Weaver’s work on order
and hierarchy, Conyers distinguishes hierarchy and the abuse of power. He shows that
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hierarchy can be construed in a way that is properly open to God as the one “who gave
measure and value to all things because he is the ultimate value.”209 Therefore, hierarchy
should not be identified with the abuse of power, as in Moltmann. Rightly understood,
hierarchy is “an antidote to the predatory tendencies of a society bent on the political,
economic, and technological exploitation of the world.”210

Conclusion
These three steps—from Conyers’ early work on Moltmann to the conservative
influences back to Moltmann—show the major influences on Conyers’s theology and reveal
the way he fuses these diverse influences together. This fusion of influences puts Conyers in a
place beyond the oversimplification of a conservative-liberal binary that often plagues
evangelical discussions because it situates him in a more critical space between the typical
labels, from where he can grapple with each in order to develop his own nuanced position. In
agreement with Moltmann, he sees eschatology, openness, and hope as important elements of
a Christian view of history. However, conservatives such as Weaver lead him to see a place for
order and hierarchy that challenges Moltmann’s conflation of power with the abuse of power.
Against the conservatives, however, he defines both order and hierarchy in a way that does
not depend on past structures alone but on the future toward which God is calling his people,
again showing the influence of Moltmann’s eschatology. By working through these issues in
his early work, Conyers lays a firm foundation and trajectory for his theology and for forming a
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social imaginary and moral vision adequate for navigating the modern world. With this
trajectory in mind, we turn to his theological corpus.
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2
OVERVIEW AND CATEGORIZATION OF CONYERS’S WORK

Introduction
This brief chapter serves to extend the thesis of the first: Conyers incorporates various
theological and political influences in a constructive manner that points a way beyond the
typical “conservative versus liberal” rhetoric that colors the evangelical theopolitical
imaginary. Here I provide an overview and categorize Conyers’s work to demonstrate his
primary interests as well as a shift in his writing that occurs later in his career. This chapter
shows the influence and trajectory identified in the previous chapter, and it provides the
necessary context for us to engage Conyers’s mature work beginning in chapter three. The
arguments of this chapter and the previous build on one another to show how Conyers
develops his theological foundation. He incorporates “conservative” political influences and
his interest in Moltmann’s eschatology to forge a unique theological point of view that guided
his navigation of the modern world in his mature work.
Tracing Conyers’s theological work further demonstrates the impact of the influences
we explored in the previous chapter. His work spans from a 1971 article in Christianity Today to
his final book, The Listening Heart, which he finished just prior to his death (published 2006).
In what follows, I make a threefold argument. First, Conyers has a primary scholarly
theological project—oriented around eschatology and history—that spans his entire
theological career and shows the enduring influence of Moltmann. His published works
outside the scope of this primary project can be understood as church and ministry focused.
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Second, a shift occurs in 1996, when Conyers’s mature work narrows in focus and changes in
audience. It is at this point that Conyers expresses his desire for evangelical theology to
promote a “truly catholic vision.” Third, one of Conyers’s final pieces articulated an idea of
“vocational theology” that sheds light on what he was working toward in his post-1996 work
and provides a clarifying context for understanding his political theology. This threefold
argument demonstrates the influence and trajectory identified in the previous chapter, and it
will provide the necessary context for us to engage Conyers’s mature work beginning in
chapter three.

Primary Theological Project
Conyers’s early interest in politics, as evidenced by his undergraduate degree (political
science), combined with the recommendation of his Doktorvater Dale Moody to study the
work of Jürgen Moltmann, set him up for a unified theological project spanning from his
doctoral dissertation at Southern Seminary (1979) to his final book (2004). At the most basic
level, this project was concerned with exploring eschatology and history for different
audiences and with different questions in view, including popular-level theology and more
academic angles.
In the first chapter of The End: What Jesus Said about the Last Things,1 which I will deal
with in more detail below, Conyers reflects on the significance of eschatology in his own
thinking. He tells a story of walking in Atlanta with his mother as a young boy and seeing an
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old, frazzled man wearing a sandwich-board sign saying, “The End Is Near.” When he
innocently asked his mother how the old man knew, she replied simply, “He doesn’t.” This
incident illustrates some “social wisdom” that he learned as a young child: “Those who talk
about the end, those who parade with their sandwich signs announcing doom, are not to be
taken seriously. And anyone who takes up that subject seriously is at least running the risk of
being associated with those old men, those ultimate misfits, announcing doom on the streets
of modern cities, where all sensible people ignore them.”2 This social wisdom would have an
impact on the way he thought about eschatology.
College and graduate school confirmed for him that eschatology “was a fertile ground
for every misspent human expectation.”3 He proceeds in The End through a historical roll call
of doomsday predictions and adventist movements: Greek chiliasts, Montanists, early
Crusaders, Joachim of Fiore, fervor around the Black Death, Konrad Schmid, Thomas Münzer,
and John of Leiden.4 His reading of Eric Voegelin and Gerhart Niemeyer showed him that the
imminent expectation of a final state of being had a deadly influence on Western culture.
Modern mass movements, such as Nazism and communism, created social disorder by
reducing Christian hope to a this-worldly, immanent expectation.5 This led to a shift in
Conyers’s view of eschatology and its relation to navigating the modern world:
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Suddenly I began to see the world of public events in a more vivid and significant way.
A light came on—and it illuminated what was happening in my world. From the Nazi
movement and its announcement of a Third Reich (like Joachim of Fiore’s “Third
Age”), which is also called the Thousand-Year Reich (a millennial kingdom), to the
communist movement with its expectations of revolution resulting in world peace
and prosperity in a secular millennium, I began to see striking similarities with what
had gone on before on the fringes of pseudo-Christianity. Modern movements,
following in alarming fashion the pattern of Thomas Müntzer and John of Leiden,
from dreams to madness, from madness to horrible cruelty, were no longer fringe
movements but were setting the fate of whole continents, murdering millions and
dragging the world to the edge of an atomic abyss.6
It was this view of history7—birthed by his reading of Voegelin and Niemeyer—that helped
cause a shift from seeing eschatology as a fringe subject to a subject shedding light on the
violent world of the twentieth century.
While Voegelin and Niemeyer helped Conyers see the explanatory power of
eschatology, the work of Southern Baptist theologian Dale Moody and German theologian
Jürgen Moltmann convinced him of the central place of eschatology within Christian thought:
eschatology was “a central thrust, a theme that permeated everything, and made the gospel
apply to everything, and made sense of everything.”8 This conviction grew stronger as world
events continued to unfold. Conyers specifically mentions the Jim Jones affair of 1978, when
an Indiana minister led his large congregation on a trip that ended in mass suicide in the
jungles of Guyana. He came to see that:
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The street-walking doomsayers, the flagellants, the Jan Bockelsons and the modern
apocalypticists of the secular type—the Stalins and the Hitlers—were only at a very
superficial level bringing discredit to New Testament expectations of the last days. In
fact, in a much more significant way they were confirming what had been said long
ago, when Jesus linked sin to judgment yet promised the ultimate triumph of God,
when he taught that the path any man or woman takes leads to an end and can be
understood only in light of the end.9
In fact, ultimately life’s choices come down to a simple and direct religious choice, a yes or a
no to God, Christ or antichrist. This growing realization pushed eschatology to the center of
Conyers’s interests because he was convinced that it was at the center of Christian theology
and at the heart of the issues boiling in the world around him.
A brief overview of Conyers’s most important works related to eschatology will
provide a better understanding of the shape of his theological project. In his dissertation,
Conyers worked on the concept of hope and history in the work of Jürgen Moltmann, as
explained above. Though completed in 1979, the dissertation was not published until 1988 as
God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and the Christian Concept of History. Four of the
book’s eight chapters were from the dissertation. These four chapters develop the concept of
history from Augustine to Moltmann and then proceed to work through three of Moltmann’s
important books: Theology of Hope, The Crucified God, and The Church in the Power of the Holy
Spirit.10 The final part of God, Hope, and History deals with “human perspectives in the history
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trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (Fortress Press, 1993); Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power

97
of God,” with a chapter on Joachim of Fiore earlier published in Perspectives in Religious
Studies,11 a chapter focused on consumer society and ecological concerns, and a chapter on
order and hope. The development between the dissertation and the book shows Conyers
digging deeper into tradition (especially via the insights of Richard Weaver), and then
applying his insights to issues in society around him, as he recounted in his reflections in The
End. Additionally, his work on consumer society and ecological issues, focused on the work of
Moltmann, begins to show some of the themes that he continues to develop later in his career
in his own political theology.
Next, Conyers wrote two books on eschatology at a more popular level. First was The
Eclipse of Heaven: Rediscovering the Hope of a World Beyond, published in 1992 with
InterVarsity Press.12 In it he developed the basic insight that a loss of transcendence
characterizes modern life and evacuates it of moral bearings and meaning. Written at a more
popular level than God, Hope, and History, Eclipse of Heaven sought to popularize his basic
eschatological ideas and their relation to the way society is ordered.13 In 1995, InterVarsity
published another Conyers book on eschatology, The End: What Jesus Said about the Last
Things. Though related to his eschatological interests, this book was again on a popular level.
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It sought to “recover… something of the directness and practicability that was once found in
Mark 13 and its parallels…[and] a sense of its power to address the real fears and aspirations of
the human heart.”14 This book fits within his major project because of its topic, but it is unique
in being focused on expositing and reflecting on specific biblical passages, whereas his other
works on eschatology take Scripture into account but focus on doctrine and history more fully.
Around the time these two books were written, Conyers also published two articles that
center on similar themes: “Communism’s Collapse: The Receding Shadow of Transcendence”
and “After the Hurricane.”15
Conyers did not publish his next monograph fitting into this project until 2001—The
Long Truce: How Tolerance Made the World Safe for Power and Profit. While it may seem that
this book does not fit with Conyers’s eschatological interests, it must be kept in mind that
Conyers’ interest in eschatology was always connected to progressive theories of history and
what was going on in the world around him. His project focused on the centrality of
eschatology and its connections to history and culture. The Long Truce fits well within this
project, for in it Conyers develops the basic thesis that the Christian practice of toleration
(which at its roots meant the humility to listen to others) had been warped into the “doctrine”
of toleration. This “doctrine” served to relativize religious commitments to private concerns,
leading to tolerance being used to minimize any commitments or bonds besides the bond
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between the individual and the modern state. As I will develop more fully in the next two
chapters, Conyers connects this basic thesis to issues of morality and theories of history in
ways that show how toleration as used in the modern period came to challenge Christian
eschatology. Around the time he was writing this monograph, Conyers also published related
articles, such as “History as Problem and Hope,”16 “Simms’s Sabbath Lyrics and the Reclaiming
of Sacred Time in the Religious Imagination,”17 and “Rescuing Tolerance.”18
Over two years after Conyers’s death, Spence Publishing released his final book, The
Listening Heart: Vocation and the Crisis of Modern Culture,19 which the American Library
Association listed among its top ten books on religion for 2007. In this work, Conyers turns
again to the themes developed in The Long Truce but begins to plot ways that the Christian
tradition provides practices that can reorient Christian life around a proper understanding of
what it means to live human life before God. The concept of vocation is one key element of
this understanding. Part of responding to God’s call is recognizing the eschatological reality
that God is drawing his people toward; rather than seeking control, one should assume a
posture of faithful response to God and God’s work. Related articles include “Why the
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Chatahoochee Sings: Notes Towards a Theory of ‘Place’”20 and “Vocation and the Liberal
Arts.”21
Conyers’s own explanation of his interest in eschatology in The End, especially in light
of his major works on eschatology, makes clear that he had a consistent, major theological
project spanning from his dissertation to his final book. This project can be described simply
as “eschatology,” but more nuance needs to be added after surveying the various works above.
Several elements are essential. First, Conyers was consistently concerned with the doctrine of
eschatology because of its centrality for the Christian faith. Second, he found Moltmann’s
work of particular interest in this connection. Third, he saw eschatology as a main element of
the teachings of Jesus. Fourth, he believed that eschatology illumined the major societal issues
of his day. His major theological project, represented by both books and articles, pursued all of
these elements at different times and culminated in his final two books. These books attempt
to deal with issues of political theology, navigating the modern world, and especially the need
for a proper telos, a proper end, to orient human life together.
While publishing on his primary theological project regularly throughout his career,
Conyers also produced articles and books that can best be understood as arising from
opportunities to serve the church. I break these works down into three rough categories:
biblical studies, doctrine, and theological imagination.
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Conyers published his first book, How to Read the Bible, with InterVarsity in 1986.22 He
drew primarily from his own teaching material at Central Missouri State University.23 In it he
deals with the art, the practice, and the importance of Bible reading in the home and in the
church. He introduces basic topics such as history, the role of faith, and differences between
the Old and New Testaments. A few of Conyers’s articles fit into the general category of
introductory or popular biblical studies as well. He published in the evangelical magazine
Biblical Illustrator twice: “James: A Pillar of the Church” (1988) and “A Profile of Levi” (1995).
One of Conyers’s books relating to eschatology, The End: What Jesus Really Said about the Last
Things (1995), also fits within this category, because the book is structured as an exposition
and reflection on Mark 13 and parallel passages. These works demonstrate Conyers’s
professorial responsibilities and commitment to teaching the Bible for the church.
Broadman and Holman published Conyers’s only other book not related to his major
theological interests in 1995. It was entitled A Basic Christian Theology,24 and as its title
suggests, this work serves as an introduction to theology, fit for an undergraduate course or
church study. In it he emphasizes that “The whole fabric of theology, if it is in fact Christian,
has to do not simply with circumscribing God, or some idea of God, within a system of
thought, but it has to do with drawing human beings into the circle of God’s redemptive
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purpose.”25 This statement provides helpful context for Conyers’s broader work in theology: he
is concerned with drawing people into God’s work, not merely describing it. This concern
illuminates the connections mentioned above between various aspects of his work on
eschatology, seeking not only to describe it but also to see how it connects and makes sense of
life today. His theological work, as shown in this basic introduction, is rooted in the idea of
being called by God into a way of life.
I categorize a mixture of other works under the general idea of “theological
imagination.” In other words, these works touch on issues of Christian vision and formation,
such as ethics and education. This category covers early works such as “Is Patriotism
Christian?”26 and “Teaching the Holocaust: The Role of Theology,”27 and it extends to later ones
such as “Cloning and the Moral Imagination”28 and “Beyond Walden Pond: Illusion and Reality
in the Pursuit of the Simple Life.”29 These works again demonstrate that his interests always
find their termination in the living of the Christian life today, and the formation of Christian
communities.
These three rough categories—biblical studies, doctrine, and theological
imagination—are admittedly broad and overlapping, because the work of Conyers itself was
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broad and overlapping. In his work in biblical studies, he sought to bring people into the text
that it might be significant for their lives, and in his work on doctrine and theological
imagination, he sought to be rooted in the biblical text. Categorizing the works in this way,
however, helps to make clear the breadth of topics on which he published and to emphasize
his interest in the lived quality of the Christian life, and the necessary rooting of that life in the
Bible and right doctrine.

Shift c. 1994–1996
In the first half of his scholarly career, Conyers focused fairly evenly between his main
theological project and other ministry opportunities in his publications, especially articles. He
wrote for Christianity Today and produced introductory-level books on biblical studies and
theology. However, a shift occurred around 1996, with the publication of “Protestant Principle
/ Catholic Substance” in First Things.30 From this point forward, Conyers published nothing in
Christianity Today, nothing on biblical studies or introductory doctrine, and no books outside
of his main theological project.31 Most of his publications after this point were directly or
tangentially related to his main project, and his audience shifted from Baptist and evangelical
circles more narrowly to evangelical and Catholic circles more broadly. The mid-1990s
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represent a sharpening of focus and a broadening of audience in Conyers’s work. At this point
he developed a focus on promoting a “truly catholic vision” for navigating the modern world.
Conyers endured two major changes in the mid-1990s. First, in the summer of 1994 he
moved to Waco, TX, to help start Truett Seminary at Baylor University. Second, he learned
that he was in the early stages of cancer, specifically CLL, that same summer.32 He had no
significant publications in 1994, but in 1995 he published two books and one article. All three
could be characterized as “popular”: The End: What Jesus Said about the Last Things, A Basic
Christian Theology, and an article in the Biblical Illustrator entitled “A Profile of Levi.”33 All
three pieces were in process to some extent before his 1994 move and cancer diagnosis. In the
two books, he acknowledges Charleston Southern University, his home prior to Truett.34 His
article on Levi, though published in the spring of 1995, describes him as “Chair of the
Department of Religion, Charleston Southern University.” This description indicates that he
wrote the piece prior to transitioning to Baylor.35 Thus the shift from 1996 and beyond can
with some certainty be identified with his move to Waco and diagnosis with cancer in 1994,
since the 1995 published works predate those events, at least in their genesis.
In November 1996, Conyers published “Protestant Principle / Catholic Substance” in
First Things. This essay marks the shift and in a way serves as a promissory note for the rest of
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his work. Beginning the article by referring to the dialogue over Mark Noll’s “scandal of the
evangelical mind,” Conyers sets out to answer the question, “Is there something in Protestant
thought itself that, doing the work of a computer virus, finally renders impotent even the best
of the Protestant intellectual tradition?”36 He gives an example: the belief in Scripture as a
more or less unmediated guide raises objections to academic theology. These same objections
can spur anti-elitism among evangelicals. At first blush, the focus on small things and
distinctions can seem antithetical to the democratizing spirit of Protestant Christianity.
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However, Conyers notes that specialists serve others; just as automobiles made by engineers
are made for others, theology done in the academy is for others as well.37
Pushing deeper on the issue of anti-intellectualism, Conyers ties it to the fact that “In
the late middle ages, Western people began to lose confidence in universals.”38 The shift from
realism to nominalism, from universals as real to a reality made up of unrelated particulars,
led all fields of learning to imitate the natural sciences in the modern era. “Science in the
modern sense moves from concrete facts to theoretical principles. The latter are subject to
change, and the former exact from modern science the most ardent loyalty.”39 The Protestant
movement bought into this imitation in a limited sense, beginning to treat the Bible as a
sensible source of facts that could then be shaped into theories, forgetting that “the word of
God refers to God—and that God cannot be taken as merely another fact in the universe of
facts.”40 Actually, the root meaning of fact is a thing done or a deed; so, in scholastic thinking,
“facts” were accidental, something participating in truth but subordinate to essential truths. In
modern thinking this understanding is turned on its head, for facts are allowed priority and
principles, values, and virtues become hardly real at all.41 So, in trying to give Scripture its
proper place, the Reformation also lost “(not at first, and never altogether, but at length)
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fifteen hundred years of Catholic intellectual tradition… Protestants also lost, in the bargain, a
memory that these questions had really arisen from pastoral concerns, and were not merely
the speculative preoccupations of scholars.”42 Conyers insists that this loss was never the
intention of the Reformers, but once “Scholasticism-gone-mad had been reined in, those
words would have a different ring.”43
This understanding opens up two ways to view the Protestant Reformation. First, we
could see the Protestant movement, along with the evangelical continuation of it, “as a
rediscovery of a truth that was so valuable to the understanding of the Gospel and the nature
of salvation and the Church that it must be defended at all costs against every competing idea.”
Or, second, “we can see the Reformation as a correction made in the nick of time, at great cost
to those who remained with the Western Church and those who left. It was a necessary
correction in the course of the Church of Christ… Now considerable time has passed. And the
time comes to correct the correction.”44 The idea that councils, creeds, great theologians,
apologists, and philosophers could be abandoned was not the intention of the Reformers but a
course taken by generations of followers. Conyers’s call is clear:
Perhaps now is the time, now that Protestants are noticing that something is seriously
missing, to reach back and affirm a truly ‘catholic’ tradition: one that did not deny
philosophy but used it to the glory of God and for the sake of the Church…Now is the
time for evangelicals to declare themselves in a very intentional way for the recovery
of the intellectual aims that are unapologetically catholic—not as a way of losing their
distinctiveness, but as a way of recovering the task that made the separation necessary
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in the first place: the safeguarding of a truly catholic vision of the world and its
redemption.45
This call to “correct the correction” and to return to a catholic tradition marks a shift in the
focus of Conyers’s project and in his audience, as noted above. From this point forward, his
publications are tied to this “correct the correction” sentiment, and they are published in
venues such as First Things and Touchstone, known for their evangelical-Catholic engagement.
This sentiment also provides a new shape and vigor to his overall theological project. While
earlier in his career, his works on eschatology were focused on Moltmann (the dissertation)
and expositions of Scripture (his two popular-level books), his final two books tie
eschatological issues firmly to the quest to understand the shape of Western culture, and to
provide a course correction rooted in this “catholic” tradition of which he speaks. Of the
articles published from 1996 until his death, only a few are outside of his main theological
project, and of those only one or two do not contribute to the shift to “reclaim the catholic
tradition” shift.
Two aspects of Conyers’s move to Truett Seminary likely played the largest roles in
this shift.46 First, being at a seminary connected to a prestigious university such as Baylor
University afforded him more opportunity to publish and speak in different venues. Second,
part of his task as a founding faculty member at Truett was to help craft the curriculum, and
he gained a reputation for being passionate about orienting the curriculum around primary
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treatment but exceeds the scope of my argument here. I am seeking to mark and describe the shift, not
provide an exhaustive account of its causes or effects.
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texts from the great catholic tradition of the church.47 This period, marked by the 1996 First
Things essay, marks a shift in his focus on these issues, and they would characterize his later
work. His theological method would be guided by a deep sense of vocation.

Vocational Theology
In various works Conyers explains what he sees as the essence of modernity and why
it is problematic. In its essence, modernity is a change in orientation: “This change of
orientation experienced in modern times is a profound one: moving the human being from
the role of receptive discoverer, listener, and responder to the world, to that of shaper,
fashioner, even creator of the world.”48 In fact, “the underlying impulse of modernity was to
reject the ‘givenness,’ the irreducible limits and obligations of human life.”49 Modernity
rejected the given nature of the world, preferring to see the human as the shaper of it. Thus,
modernity is fundamentally man-centered.50
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This identification of the essence of modernity influences Conyers’s understanding
and critique of postmodernity, which he refuses to classify as separate from modernity or free
from its problems. Postmodern thinkers often point to individualism and rationality as the
key features of modernity, and then critique those features in order to provide something
different. Conyers, however, sees these as features that are present prior to modernity and
that are simply changed by it: “The impulse of the Enlightenment cannot be adequately
circumscribed with words like ‘individualism’ and ‘rationalism,’ but must be seen as the
ancient hope to be delivered from necessity and to be free in the sense of one who is
autonomous (a law unto oneself) and thus self-created.”51 In his final article, Conyers provides
a helpful summary of his understanding of modernity and its relation to postmodernity:
The heart of my argument is this: it is a mistake to think that postmodernism, as we
have come to know it in the writings of Foucault and Derrida, for instance, is in fact a
critique of modernity. It is instead an attempt to save the sinking ship of modernity by
throwing overboard some of its most inessential features while preserving its essence.
Individualism and rationality are not, strictly speaking, features of modernity, but
rather they are features of a Christian view of life that, through the filter of the
Enlightenment, were made to conform to what is the heart of modernity and of
postmodernism as well. The heart of modernity is not individualism per se, but the
individual without God—the autonomous individual. And it is not rationalism per se,
but a rationalism that is capable of making human beings autonomous.
Postmodernity as we have to know it is perfectly loyal to the project of modernity,
while posing as its critic in order to escape what would result in authentic
Postmodernity—the return to the idea of a God who creates, sustains, and intercedes
in life and Who is therefore the true center and anchor of our existence.52
So, for Conyers, “these [postmodern] thinkers are most anxious to preserve that part of the
Enlightenment disposition that is most antagonistic to Christianity… For the heart of the
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matter is the question whether God is acknowledged as God, or whether we wish to be our
own gods.”53 Postmodernism does not escape modernism but in fact appropriates its major
impetus, human autonomy without God. True postmodernity would not further the
underlying essence of modernity but react against it. The issue at this point is not so much
whether Conyers’s assessment of postmodernism is right or not (such an assessment would
take us too far afield), but the fact that he sets up a theological distinction (based on his
reading of postmodernity and modernity) and that he then utilizes in his political theology as
it frames the way he understands what it means to be human in the modern world (especially
in connection with the idea of the will).
Conyers sets up a theological distinction that he sees as undergirding all of the
problems of modernity and postmodernity. A shift occurred from what we will call a
vocational theology—in which the world is seen as other, created by God, not made by
humans and in which God initiates and calls humans to obey—to a theology of choice—one
in which the meaning of the world is largely created by human willing. Conyers’s vocational
theology views truth as given by Another, while a theology of choice views truth as made.54
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The distinction between truth as given and truth as made is not as straightforward as it
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While postmodernism (rightly) critiques modernity’s version of individualism supposedly
neutral rationality, it fails to depart adequately from the modern project because it does not
address the underlying theological distinction. This issue of theological method—focusing on
God as the one who makes and calls—forms and informs not just theology but ethics as well.
It alters our way of being in the world. It is with this overarching concern that Conyers
attempts to understand and articulate the crisis of modernity, including the role of toleration
in that crisis (toleration being his main avenue for describing it).

Conclusion
In this chapter I have made three main arguments, all extending the thesis of the last
chapter. First, Conyers has a primary scholarly theological project, oriented around
eschatology and history, that spans his entire theological career. His other published works
unrelated to this primary project can be understood as church and ministry focused. This
project shows the enduring influence of his early work on Moltmann and eschatology. Second,

Modernity did not shift to truth as human creation, but from truth as analogical creative participation
to an arbitrary making cut off from the transcendent. Cutting human making off from the
transcendent denies the dignity of making itself (xv). For Miner, “It is coherent to follow the words of
Christ and think of human beings as making the truth, in a sense which affirms that human making is
more creative than the imitation of nature, yet it is not cut off from the divine Logos, because its
creativity is fundamentally a finite participation in the infinite Verbum” (126).
The key question becomes “What must be the case if human construction is to participate in truth, and
not just an exercise in the augmentation of power and utility?” (127). This question shows where Miner
and Conyers come back together. Though Conyers maintains a difference between “given” and “made”
when it comes to truth (a distinction he may have qualified had he read Miner), ultimately both draw
the line before the modern conception of the truth as arbitrarily made for the increase of power, which
is what marks the modern difference. Human reason can be considered constructive and creative
because it is a participation in the divine. Such an explanation fits with Conyers’s notion of vocation
and faithful response to God.
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a distinct shift occurs in 1994–1996, when Conyers’s work sharpens in focus and changes in
audience, striving toward an idea of a “truly catholic vision.” Such language shows how
Conyers himself saw his work as beginning to address issues of moral vision and, in our
terminology, the social imaginary. Third, the concept of “vocational theology,” articulated
most clearly in a later article, sheds light on Conyers’s conservative theopolitical work on
navigating the modern (and postmodern) world. The idea of “vocation” connects the ideas of
God’s eschatological work and the good hierarchy and order that Conyers sees. This overview
of his work further validates the significant influences on Conyers identified and analyzed in
the previous chapter.
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Conyers’s unique blend of older forms of
conservatism with a deep grappling with Moltmann’s eschatology helped him to build a
foundation for his theological work. This foundation provided Conyers with a perspective that
cannot be neatly categorized as “conservative” or “liberal” in today’s narrow sense of these
terms and thus provides a route away from the rhetoric that so often characterizes evangelical
debates on theopolitical issues. Now that we have gained an understanding of Conyers’s main
influences and his the overall trajectory of his work (including the sharpening of focus and
broadening of audience in his later work), I turn to analyze his mature work, in which he
diagnoses problems in the modern world and begins to plot a way to navigate through these
problems. In this work, Conyers serves as a resource for addressing some of the other
weaknesses we have found in evangelical theopolitical imagination.
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3
EXPOSING PROBLEMS IN MODERN INSTITUTIONS:
CONYERS AND THE MYTH OF TOLERATION

Introduction
While evangelical theopolitical imagination tends to take the modern institutions of
the state and the free market for granted, Conyers exposes the dangers of both in his mature
work. He identifies the problems of modern culture by focusing on the idea of “toleration,”
how it changed in meaning and use, and how shifting notions of power influenced and
benefited from that change. In this chapter I analyze Conyers’s diagnosis of modernity by
exploring his treatment of the changing notion of toleration and the disorders he identifies
alongside this change. Using this process, beginning with Conyers’s historical arguments and
ending with analysis of various disorders, I demonstrate that he sees the problems of
modernity as rooted in a change in the conception of what it means to be human in the world.
Conyers’s significance for theological readings of modernity is more than an
explanation focused on some changes in toleration as a concept. Instead, I argue that
Conyers’s diagnosis of modernity, while most obviously dealing with the issue of toleration, is
actually subordinate to a larger concern of articulating a difference between vocational
theology and a theology of choice, which we explored in the previous chapter. Failure to see
this concern weakens Conyers’s arguments and obscures his contribution to questions of
theology and modernity and theological method. By using the lenses of toleration and
vocational theology, Conyers refuses to take modern institutions for granted or promote them
but instead exposes how they form agents counter to Christian discipleship.
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Defining the Crisis
Conyers digs deep into the development of the modern world, seeking to show how
various changes occurred.1 To do so, he turns to the idea of “toleration,” providing a genealogy
that accounts for the shift in orientation that he identifies. Conyers’s treatment of toleration
can be situated within three different types of studies. First are positive accounts of toleration.
Historians have traced the development of toleration as a practice, roughly equivalent to
religious freedom.2 This first group lacks a critical view of toleration, seeing it primarily as an
unquestioned good. Second are more negative accounts. Theologians have addressed how the
idea of tolerance has impacted cultural understandings of truth, leading to a loss of a robust
sense of truth in favor of tolerating conflicting views.3 This group focuses primarily on the
cultural consequences for explicitly religious claims and less on how the state or capitalism
might find toleration useful. The third view pushes deeper than both of these two, looking to

1

In chapter five, we will explore how Conyers’s understanding of the crisis relates to other
descriptions of modernity, most notably the work of William Cavanaugh and Ephraim Radner on the
issue of religious violence. Doing so will show how Conyers’s work contributes to broader political
theology while also helping generate stronger evangelical theopolitical imagination.
2

For example, see Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Also see Ole Peter Grell and Bob Scribner, eds.,
Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
For a work focused on the early American context, see Chris Beneke and Christopher S. Grenda, eds.,
The First Prejudice: Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in Early America (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
3

In 1999, the Eighth Edinburgh Christian Dogmatics Conference dealt with the issue of
toleration, and various papers have been published in Angus Morrison, ed., Tolerance and Truth: The
Spirit of the Age or the Spirit of God? (Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 2007). For a recent, popular-level
evangelical treatment of the issue, see D. A. Carson, The Intolerance of Tolerance (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2013).
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the purpose tolerance serves. Conyers contributes to this perspective by charting out not only
how the idea of toleration changed, but what power interests the change served and how the
change fits within Conyers’s larger theological vision. While the first group generally fits under
the label “liberal” and the second more “conservative,” Conyers’s presence in this third group
shows another way he defies easy categorization. Having developed his theological vision in
the previous chapters, I turn in what follows to understanding Conyers’s diagnosis of
modernity and the role that toleration played, as well as his particular contribution to
understanding the way the idea of toleration has changed.
Conyers provides an overview of his assessment of the crisis of modern culture before
articulating his understanding of the provenance of the modern idea of toleration. He does
this in four steps. First, he provides a brief history of toleration in order to demonstrate that
the idea of toleration as an explicit public virtue was born during seventeenth-century trials.
Second, he argues that toleration is better understood as a strategy than as a virtue. Third, he
expands on the concept of sovereignty and the question of whether strong central states were
inevitable. Fourth, he argues that toleration has become a substitute for love in the quest for
strong, centralized power.
The idea that toleration is a public virtue was born during various trials in the
seventeenth century.4 Conyers highlights three. First, religious wars devastated communities

4

This sense of toleration as a virtue is certainly still prevalent. For example, see Mark Lilla, The
Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West (New York: Knopf, 2007). He claims, “Today we
have progressed to the point where we are again fighting the battles of the sixteenth century—over
revelation and reason, dogmatic purity and toleration, inspiration and consent, divine duty and
common decency. We are disturbed and confused” (3). Lilla’s narrative is one of decline from a hard-
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on the continent, and while religious differences were not the only reason for fighting, they
“were also the occasion for the protraction and exacerbation of conflicts.”5 Second, rising
nation-states took in large territories and united peoples previously unrelated politically.
These new arrangements were not simply the results of the religious wars; in addition, they

won state of tolerance, a necessary public virtue that helps calm the fanaticism of religiously informed
politics. Lilla’s reading of toleration is consistent with Conyers’s, except that Conyers laments the way
tolerance dissolves social bonds while Lilla applauds such destruction in favor of his preference for the
modern West.
Another example of Lilla’s type of interpretation is found in Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our
Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Penguin, 2011). Pinker argues that, contrary to popular
belief, human violence has actually decreased and we live in a time that is remarkably nonviolent
when compared with the past. “This book is about what may be the most important thing that has ever
happened in human history. Believe it or not—and I know that most people do not—violence has
declined over long stretches of time, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our
species’ existence” (xxi). Pinker looks to identify endogenous variables (those that are inside the
system, where they may be affected by the very phenomenon they are trying to explain) in order to
isolate exogenous variables (those that are set in motion by forces from the outside and therefore
explain) (xxiii). He does not specifically name “tolerance” as one of his main “better angels” (turning
instead to empathy, self-control, moral sense, and reason), and the term does not even earn a listing in
his index. However, while the form of his argument utilizes different terms, the content is similar to
Lilla: violence has declined because people have moved from a religious fanaticism to a more
measured, reasonable, and generous spirit toward others. He uses the terminology of “the benefits of
cooperation” (678) in a way that correlates with toleration as well.
Pinker goes out of his way to say that religion has had nothing to do with the decline in violence (676–
78). He ties the fact that particular religions have at certain times helped to the idea that religions
respond to society’s intellectual and social currents, meaning that any good development in religion
can actually be traced to society’s influence on religious beliefs, not vice versa (678). In this case it
seems that Pinker’s materialist methodology (671) and bias against organized religion make his
analysis less helpful since it keeps him from considering the potential positive influence of religion or
how religion itself may have been negatively influenced by the “better angels” that he extols.
5

A. J. Conyers, The Long Truce: How Toleration Made the World Safe for Power and Profit (Dallas,
TX: Spence, 2001), 5. For Conyers’s own primer on The Long Truce, see A. J. Conyers, “Rescuing
Tolerance,” First Things (September 2001): 43–46.
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created the demand and opportunity for concentration of power.6 In place of the various
associations that had previously made up complex human society, Europe saw a growth in
larger and more comprehensive governments over the next several centuries.7 Third (and in
line with traditional conservatives such as Richard Weaver), Conyers argues that new social
arrangements led to the isolation of the individual. As the nation-states gained power, people
thought about themselves less in terms of previously important institutions such as the family,
the church, or some other social setting, and more in terms of autonomous free agents.
Associations with others began to be viewed more and more as accidental and volitional
rather than necessary and obligatory. The result of these features set up two distinct features
of the modern period: a powerful state and a lonely individual.8
Toleration emerged as a public virtue amidst these changes. Toleration, however, is
not properly called a virtue but instead relies on other virtues.9 It eases the tension created by
the fact that people are different; it seeks harmony but is not itself harmony. Toleration is
better understood as a strategy, and “in the case of a strategy, everything depends upon what

6

“War was both the emergency that created the demand for and the opportunity to effect the
large-scale concentration of power.” Conyers, The Long Truce, 5.
7

This argument shows the influence of another thinker in the conservative movement, Robert
Nisbet, who “traced an increasing theoretical antipathy to intermediate power structures between an
omnipotent government and the naked individual.” See George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual
Movement in America Since 1945, 2nd ed. (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1996), 46.
8

9

Conyers, The Long Truce, 6.

“[Toleration] calls upon virtues, such as patience, humility, moderation, and prudence; but
toleration itself relates to these qualities not as another quality of the same sort but as a policy
intended to achieve some other end” (ibid., 7).
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purpose that strategy serves.”10 In the context of the increasing power of nation-states,
toleration served not simply to help people live in harmony but to neutralize differences
(including religious differences) among vast populations in order to provide the central power
with an expanding authority over the entire populace.11 Thus toleration as a modern doctrine
is not about helping minority groups survive persecution; rather, it is about centralizing power
and destroying other systems of authority in order to do so.12 Toleration as a strategy serves
the increasing power of the nation-state, not in the sense that some group is intentionally
using tolerance for this end but in the sense that sovereignty and toleration work together in a
mysterious way.13
While some scholars view the evolution toward larger states as inevitable,14 Conyers
draws on political resources that provide a path not taken by modernity, inspired in part by

10

Ibid., 8.

11

Insisting that religion is a private matter and that the state will take no part in religious
disputes, neutralizing religious commitments upholds the power of the state as of paramount
importance; the state frames reality. See ibid., 9.
12

As Conyers says, “toleration as a modern doctrine… has little to do with the survival of
minority groups and everything to do with the centralizing of power,” and once we realize that groups
have their own system of authority, we realize that “the central power makes peace with groups by
detaching them from their spiritual essence and then testifying to its respect for the dispirited remains
of what was once both the body and soul of a culture” (ibid., 10).
13

14

See Conyers’s discussion of this, ibid., 10–12.

Conyers points specifically to Sovereignty, written by F. H. Hinsley, in which Hinsley argues
that the evolution toward larger states was inevitable. See ibid., 13.
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the work of Althusius as explained in our first chapter.15 He urges his readers to “nurture a
suspicion” that the seemingly inescapable nature of centralized authority is in fact a modern
superstition and that even if centralized powers are going to take care of certain things (such
as defense), we do not need to conclude that these same powers must take care of things more
naturally belonging to other elements of society. For this option he turns to the work of
Althusius.16 While the state is one kind of community, other human associations exist.17
Politics is really about how humans live in community, and often the most important group is
not the state.18 In the rise of the modern nation-state with its emphasis on a strong centralized
power and an autonomous individual, “associations” like the ones drawn on by Althusius

15

Conyers likely draws the language of a “path not taken” from Donald Livingston. In
particular, Conyers cites Livingston’s Donald W. Livingston, “The Very Idea of Secession,” Social Science
and Modern Society 35, no. 5 (1998): 38–48. In the piece, Livingston argues that the idea of secession, or
the right of a smaller federation to withdrawal from a larger one, was an important part of the
Althusian political scheme. However, Hobbes’s notion of consent emphasized the sovereign, central
state, and left no room for withdrawal for various reasons. Livingston notes a shift in American
political imagination from an Althusian orientation to a more Hobbesian orientation after the Civil
War. However, “There is no reason why Europe and the United States could not have followed the path
marked by Althusius” (48).
16

In his diagnosis of modern ills, Conyers repeatedly points to Althusius as a positive option
not taken. For a treatment of the influence of Althusius on Conyers’s theology, see chapter 1.
17

From early in Conyers’s theological career, he demonstrated knowledge of the difference
between the state and other relationships, and the importance of prioritizing the other forms of
association since they are more concrete and real. For instance, in treating the concept of patriotism,
Conyers locates it not in allegiance to the state but in love for the near-neighbor. See A. J. Conyers, “Is
Patriotism Christian?,” Christian Heritage (June 1972): 11–12.
18

In Althusius’s thought, “the proper beginning of political thought is the recognition that
human beings live in natural communities the occur spontaneously and that nowhere do they live
alone—or, if they do, they live in an unnatural state” (Conyers, The Long Truce, 14).
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faded away in influence and power.19 For Conyers this was not inevitable but a decision to
follow a certain path.20
Though Conyers acknowledges that elements of Althusius’s views are still present, a
different view gained preeminence, one focused on all powers being lodged in a sovereign
center. Toleration plays an important role on this path: “the issue is partly expressed in the
unscientific maxim that groups arise from the power of love and the organization of the state
arises from the love of power. However we might want to qualify this ‘proverb,’ we have the
beginnings of a depiction of the modern crisis, which is, in a real sense, the struggle between
the love of power and the power of love.”21 Once the search for the good is abandoned in favor
of “toleration” and survival becomes the dominating concern, the temptation is to abandon
any speculation and instead pursue only practical goals. In one sense, “toleration is the
pragmatist’s substitute for love.”22 Because the good is neither defined nor sought, toleration
takes the place of love in pursuing the goals of power and profit.
For Conyers, the crisis can be defined simply: a strong centralized state and
autonomous individuals have replaced complex human social arrangements. Toleration
serves as a strategy for creating and maintaining this split. In order to establish his view of this

19

Althusius maintained that five associations existed that had different work and goals than
the state: family, collegium, city, province, and church (ibid., 15).
20

The path that Conyers sees modernity taking is further developed below in his more
detailed history of the crisis.
21

Conyers, The Long Truce, 12.

22

Ibid., 20.
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moral crisis, Conyers pushes deeper into the historical modification of the term “toleration” in
order to develop the history of this crisis.

History of the Crisis
Conyers spends the bulk of The Long Truce advancing his thesis regarding change in
the usage of the word “toleration.” However, in drawing this change out he gets into more
than just the change in the use of this word. He also provides his views on the development of
modernity along the lines of the rise of the nation-state and the rise of autonomous
individualism. He seeks to deal with two matters that seem to be out of sync: on the one hand,
toleration developed in the context of Christian society and the intellectual life of the church,
but on the other hand, toleration as a public policy or public virtue did not appear until
political life began to be marked by increasing secularity.23 He deals with these matters in four
steps: explaining the ancient practice of toleration, the role of hopes and fears in the change in
toleration, the development of a “bipolar vision of society,” and the use of tolerance to dissolve
social bonds.

23

Ibid., 28. Conyers notes that the idea of toleration was rare until the seventeenth century: “In
the English language the word ‘tolerance’ or ‘toleration’ was rarely used in reference to public policy or
public philosophy—even in referring to religious attitudes—until well into the seventeenth century.
By the turn of the eighteenth century it had become a prominent idea, a policy in several European
states, the cry of religious dissidents, and the doctrine which most obviously marked off modern
society from the earlier feudal society with its understanding of the compactness of religion, laws,
community, fealty, and piety” (ibid., 26).
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The Ancient Practice of Toleration
Conyers distinguishes between the practice of toleration as seen in the ancient world
and the doctrine of toleration developed in modern times. He begins explaining the practice of
toleration by turning to roots of the tradition in the Bible. Developing what he calls a “peculiar
paradox” found in Scripture,24 he notes two key elements. As the product of Hebrew
prophetism, the Bible advances the unshakable conviction of “ethical monotheism.” In fact,
“The trend in biblical traditions, even at its earliest stages, is contrary to tolerance. It is the
opposite to openness toward the plurality of religions and the variety of moral communities in
the ancient Mediterranean world.”25 However, a paradoxical trend is also present within
Hebrew exclusivism (and later Christian exclusivism): “To reject the god of the foreigner on
monotheistic and exclusive grounds is to accept the foreigner himself as a fellow human being,
tied in kinship by the fact of their both being created by the same God. In one and the same
gesture, one rejects the foreign gods and embraces the foreigner.”26
In Scripture, tolerance means being willing to hear other traditions and to learn from
them, something encouraged by both the Old and New Testaments. This willingness is tied to
the virtue of humility,27 for it is essential in understanding creaturely reality.28 Toleration in

24

Ibid., 31.

25

Ibid., 29–30.

26

Ibid., 30–31. Conyers notes various examples of this paradox, including Jonah’s being sent to
Nineveh and Ruth the Moabite’s place in the line of David and the Messiah.
27

The virtue of humility also plays an important role in Conyers’s treatment of Moltmann’s
view of hierarchy in God, Hope, and History, as mentioned above.
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the Bible is rooted in seemingly exclusive monotheism, which believes that all people were
created by the same God, and in both the created and fallen state of humanity. Christians both
learn from and teach all others.29
Conyers next turns to church history to illustrate the ancient practice of toleration
rooted in humility. His treatment of the practice of toleration in church history focuses on
only three thinkers.30 First, Justin Martyr serves as an example of a hospitable spirit to pagan
philosophies.31 Second, Clement of Alexandria “cured the church of its fear of pagan
intellectual achievements.”32 His synthetic thought engaged the world of pagan philosophy
while maintaining the priority of the Christian tradition. Third, Thomas Aquinas aided in
rediscovering Aristotle and modeling a way of theology connected deeply to an exchange of
various ideas. Thomas was influenced not only by Aristotle but by the tradition of Muslim
philosophers as well, such as Averroes.33 In Conyers’s estimation, these examples point to a

28

“…even with our best efforts at understanding the things of God, we are prevented from
reaching that sublime goal. We are prevented by our creatureliness and by our sinfulness. Therefore, it
is a matter of grace that truth comes to us from many directions” (Conyers, The Long Truce, 33).
29

Ibid.

30

Conyers’s paucity of examples in this section may be explained by his attempt to describe
the practice of toleration in the ancient world rather than provide exhaustive proof of the prevalence
of the doctrine. Still, more than three samples, especially spanning the amount of time that he does,
would serve to strengthen his argument about the practice of toleration in church history.
31

Conyers, The Long Truce, 34–36.

32

Ibid., 36.

33

Ibid., 39.
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humble tradition of openness.34 This tradition of openness and humility served to root the
doctrine of toleration that emerged in modern times.35
By “the doctrine of toleration,” Conyers means a particular teaching regarding
restraint and non-interference. When toleration first began to be used in its new form, “it

34

“There was, long before the Enlightenment, a tradition of openness—born of the humility
that was counseled by Clement and others in antiquity—that helped to shape the direction of
Christian thought and of Western culture… It was a definite practice; and it was a practice and attitude
that left the lines of communication open among believing and thinking communities” (ibid).
35

Conyers’s connection of this Christian practice to the modern doctrine used by the state
serves as an example of the type of political instruction dealt with in C. C. Pecknold, Christianity and
Politics: A Brief Guide to the History (Cascade, 2010). Pecknold argues that a new construction of politics
arose in the modern period, a politics actively engaged in re-constructing a Christianity that could
serve the purpose of national politics. Civil religion is this purpose-built faith. Pecknold attempts a
broad-brush sketch of a complex history running from the classical period to the early church, from
the organic unity of medieval society to the disunity of early modern Christendom, and from the
national divisions to the secularizing, liberal-democratic cultures generated by modern nation-state
formation. Pecknold makes five basic claims (xix–xx):
1. The Western political imagination borrows Christian ideas about time and community,
especially ideas about the purposefulness of history, communal salvation, and hope for the
future.
2. The development of Christian thinking about the Eucharist and its changes made way for
early nation-states to conceive of politics in mystical terms; and this borrowed mysticism
gives rise to nationalism as a tool for collecting human allegiances into a new unified political
body.
3. Conscience slowly became detached from the Christian community and attached to the
nation-state.
4. The transfer of “mystical body” from Eucharist to church to society to state to the market
also made it possible to transfer this idea to liberal democracy.
5. We have to think in more complex ways about the relation of Christianity and politics, the
relation between faith and political reason. The conclusion is that the politics that truly
liberates humanity is the politics that is truthfully ordered to the city of God.
“Toleration” serves as a concrete example of Pecknold’s first claim, relating to the way the Western
political imagination borrows from Christian ideas of community.
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became a kind of encapsulated speech about the values of a public weary of fighting over
doctrinal differences.”36 The term implies that there is something to endure, something to
treat with patience. It does not imply neutrality. However, Conyers turns to the “Declaration
of Principles on Tolerance” (signed by member states of UNESCO in 1995) to highlight the
main features of the modern doctrine as it now stands. The declaration states, “Tolerance is
respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our forms of
expression and ways of being human.… Tolerance is not concession, condescension or
indulgence. Tolerance is, above all, an active attitude prompted by recognition of the
universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others.”37 Conyers notes that the
contemporary meaning of toleration as outlined here is the virtue of restraint or noninterference with the ways of others. And the reference has shifted; toleration is no longer
about the classical idea of “the good” but is instead focused on “human rights” or the freedom
of individuals.38 It is meant to be a prescription for community, for non-interference among
groups. At its most extreme it is a form of hard individualism. But this shift in referent entirely
empties the concept of content; toleration has become merely formal. And because of its
focus on individualism, it actually serves as the community’s antibody:39 “it is a solvent that
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Conyers, The Long Truce, 40.
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Quoted in ibid., 42.

38

Ibid.
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Cf. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).
Taylor argues that modern individualism does not mean ceasing to belong—what he calls “the
individualism of anomie and breakdown”—but “imagining oneself as belonging to ever wider and
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resists the glue of common conviction that holds people together,” because it evacuates the
content of common goals and common values in favor of the formal values of tolerance.40 A
paradox emerges in that it is put forward as a doctrine suitable for living life in community
when in fact it weakens communities.41 Conyers identifies that the issue is what sort of
community this new virtue serves. The short answer is that the rise of toleration fits with the
emergence of large nation-states.42 Conyers further expands on this brief answer.

Hopes, Not Fears: Toleration, Economics, and War
Some scholars define the modern world as a quest for certainty. Certainty is part of
the picture, but Conyers sees more nuance in the intellectual climate of the time. For instance,
Stephen Toulmin argues that philosophy turned into a modern dead end as a result of the
quest for certainty beginning, as the story goes, with Descartes’s desire for a secure basis for
rational thought.43 Thus, Conyers concludes, “For Toulmin, the motive for this sudden rigidity

more impersonal entities: the state, the movement, the community of humankind” (160). Modernity
has meant a shift in social imaginary so that intermediate units of belonging are relegated to the
margins. But does such an explanation require an equivocation of the term “belong”? If a person now
imagines herself as “belonging” to the state, is that not at the same time ceasing to “belong” in the
sense that she would have belonged to more immediate communities? Taylor may claim that she has
not ceased to belong, but the features of that belonging change to a large degree, as Conyers’s analysis
will show.
40

Conyers, The Long Truce, 43.
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Ibid., 44.
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In nation-states, “there is consequently a need for bureaucracy that can deal directly with
individuals and not be hindered by the competing loyalties and authorities that create groups within
the population” (ibid).
43

This view hearkens back to the work of John Dewey in The Quest for Certainty, in which he
argues that society needed the courage and confidence provided by security, but we no longer do.
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in modern thought was that dreadful fear that had come upon Europe in unstable times.”44
Conyers marshals two arguments against this interpretation. First, Toulmin’s understanding
of modernity as caught up in rigid intolerance with only periodic occasions of relief is contrary
to most of the evidence. The arguments for religious toleration in the writings of Pierre Bayle,
John Locke, and John Stuart Mill, along with the ambiguity and mystery present in the
romantic movement of the nineteenth century, defeat this picture of modern rigidity. These
examples of toleration emerge from within modernity itself, which Toulmin fails to
recognize.45 Second and more significantly, Conyers argues that modernity is not
characterized primarily by fear and a quest for certainty, but by an opportunistic desire for
power.46 Thus opportunism better explains the changes related to toleration.47

44

Conyers, The Long Truce, 48. Toulmin himself was attempting to overcome what he
understood as a deficient narrative about modernity. See Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden
Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
45

Conyers, The Long Truce, 48–49.
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“What we find in the seventeenth century is not a rigidity based on fear (at least not as a
primary motive) but a new opportunistic spirit motivated by the desire for power. What occurred in
that period were surely the terrors of war, just as Dewey and Toulmin had seen. But more than that,
there was a new sense of opportunity—unparalleled in any time since the rise of the Roman Empire—
for the growth of economic and political influence” (ibid., 49).
47

However, Conyers continues to return to the concept of “fear,” especially in that it frames his
treatment of Hobbes. While he clearly wants to describe the age as one of opportunism rather than
fear, the presence of the concept of fear in thinkers such as Hobbes requires him to maintain fear in his
treatment and description. His argument seems to be that, while fear certainly had a place, especially
in the description of thinkers such as Hobbes, it was really the economic opportunism of the time that
drove toward tolerance. And fear is in some ways best understood as created by these new
opportunities: they feared losing what the opportunities presented. So even though fear was present,
tolerance became prominent more because of opportunism.
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Conyers chooses to focus on the opportunities of the modern period rather than its
dangers in order to explain the changes. The collapse of ecclesial power was related to the rise
in political power unhindered by church restraints. War resulted from a combination of
fragmenting religious loyalties, withering ecclesial restraints, and sudden possibilities for the
increase of power for secular authorities. New power had to replace or at least displace
traditional forms of social authority. Both sovereignty and tolerance serve this purpose.
Sovereignty had a twofold relationship with the religious wars, for it was both the means of,
and the grounds for, expanding power.48 Tolerance was the necessary concomitant feature of
this expansion of secular sovereignty, clearing the ground for the broader, more formal power
of the nation-state.
Furthermore, toleration stands in a parallel relationship with two other forces that
reduce the capacity of a culture to exert traditional authority: economics and war. These three
forces neutralize traditional social relationships.49 This neutralization can be seen very simply
in economics. Conyers’s perspective here falls in line with that of the Southern Agrarians,
though applied to an earlier time period. For Conyers, “The ‘modern’ in modern economics is
the tendency to free commercial operations from personal relationships.”50 Interests in
business enterprises became abstract, represented by money, the universal commodity.

48

As Conyers phrases it, “it was both the means by which a sovereign authority expanded its
power, and it constituted the emergency that justified such power” (Conyers, The Long Truce, 50).
49

They “tend to neutralize traditional social arrangements, thus creating a society that no
longer operates on the basis of interpersonal relationships, but on the basis of abstraction—that is, on
the basis of rationalized categories” (ibid., 52).
50

Ibid., 53.
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Conyers identifies two general changes in economics from the fourteenth century to the end
of the seventeenth. First, there was a loss of rootedness or concreteness of the economic
system due to the increased use of money.51 While money was present and used in earlier
societies, in the modern period it became a way in which vast numbers of people could
become literally “invested” in an abstract way.
Second, commerce became increasingly abstract. There was more and more distance
in transactions. Though there have long been people dealing in money as investors and
lenders, the seventeenth century saw a pair of developments in this regard: vastly increased
numbers of people connected to an actual enterprise (whether fishing, building, or domestic
commerce) as investors, and the ease with which one person’s or company’s resources could
be employed in vastly unrelated enterprises. Rather than invested as workers, more people
were abstractly involved and interested only in money.52 The radical fluctuations in this new
economy, with downturns in 1620, 1640, and 1664, brought great gains and great losses that
contributed to a feeling of instability and vertigo.53 New opportunities drove this abstractness
related to the economy, which contributed to growing hopes that in turn gave birth to new
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Because of “the introduction of a fluid commodity such as money, that can at once represent
grain, beef, gold, oil, the labor of farmers, the skill of craftsmen, the risk of investors, and the wages of
workers, we find that the appearance of a localized and concrete basis for the economy begins to be
lost” (ibid., 54).
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“People were no longer so inextricably identified with a trade…their sole interest came to be
one thing and one thing only. Their status in society had not to do with a role so much as with the idea
of possession. And that possession was expressed abstractly… It was expressed in the precise
arithmetic of a monetary sum” (ibid., 55).
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fears, fears of losing newly acquired wealth. Conyers’s willingness to critique free-market
economics demonstrates his affinity with the agrarians and is evidence of another way that he
calls into question modern institutions. Also, while his analysis of toleration and the rise of
the state might become less important as globalization replaces nationalism as a theopolitical
force, his analysis of economics will continue to provide insight.
Related to these new hopes and fears, war also played a role in dismantling natural
social arrangements.54 Citing William H. McNeill’s The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed
Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, Conyers draws on the concept of the “bureaucratization of
military administration.”55 There were far-reaching consequences of the development of wellordered militaries. The military drill, for example, is analogous to what happened to the entire

54

While Conyers acknowledges that the wars of religion were more complicated than the
name suggests, he maintains that the wars were intense manifestations of religious differences. But at
this point in his argument, he is less concerned with the genesis of these wars as with the form that
increased militarization lent to society. Other Christian theologians have explored the connection
between war and the bonds in society. See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas, War and the American
Difference: Theological Reflections on Violence and National Identity (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,
2011).
55

Conyers, The Long Truce, 59. One of McNeill’s main insights that Conyers draws on is as
follows: “European rulers’ remarkable success in bureaucratizing organized violence and encapsulating
it within civil society continued to dominate European statecraft throughout the eighteenth and well
into the nineteenth century. The victories Europeans regularly achieved in conflicts with other peoples
of the earth during this period attested to the unusually efficient character of European military
arrangements; and such successes, in turn, facilitated the steady growth of overseas trade which
helped to make the costs of maintain standing armies and navies easier for Europeans to bear. Hence
European rulers, especially those located towards the frontiers of European society, were in the happy
and unusual position of not having to choose between guns and butter but could instead help
themselves to more of both, while their subjects—at least some of them—were also able to enrich
themselves.” See William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since
A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 144.
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society, an observation also made by Michel Foucault.56 As Conyers sees it, the practice of
daily drill and rigorous discipline with close attention to details of dress and manner created
“a military culture of an entirely modern cast.”57 Under such training, “the huge assembly of
compatriots loses those older natural distinctions, and the members of the newly created
machine of war are distinguished only by the artifice of military rank and military unit. An
army, under the pressure of war…becomes a microcosm of society, turning (much more
gradually) from its sacred identity—from its blood, its soil, its temples, and its gods—to the
secular exigencies of utilitarian purposes.”58 This training results in great efficiency in
achieving material goals, though simultaneously losing moral and spiritual character.59 The
new military efficiency made possible scalable political economies.
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This is similar to the argument of Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish. There Foucault
explores how the form of the prison as an institution serves to form society in specific ways, creating
certain types of individuality. For example, “To sum up, it might be said that discipline creates out of
the bodies it controls four types of individuality, or rather an individuality that is endowed with four
characteristics: it is cellular (by the play of spatial distribution), it is organic (by the coding of
activities), it is genetic (by the accumulation of time), it is combinatory (by the composition of forces).
And, in doing so, it operates four great techniques: it draws up tables; it prescribes movements; it
imposes exercises; lastly, in order to obtain the combination of forces, it arranges ‘tactics’. Tactics, the
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Alan Sheridan, 2nd ed. [New York: Vintage, 1995], 167). I do not mean to convey that Conyers draws on
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exemplifying the trend of an emphasis on human will and power. See Conyers, The Long Truce, 180.
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Conyers could push this insight further to trace how the military/war aspects serve to form
and disciple people. One example of this type of analysis is James K. A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom:
Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), 103–10. Smith argues that the
rituals of nationalism serve as a pedagogy of desire: “certain constellations of rituals, ceremonies, and
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These forces worked together to neutralize the natural social groups favored by
thinkers such as Althusius. While natural society is made up of a variety of overlapping groups
functioning to pass on obligations, intervene in disputes, enforce rules, and provide culture, a
society developing toward a strong central power finds itself in competition with these
smaller local authorities. Because nation-states asserted their authority from distant
population centers such as Paris or London, they needed partially or completely to
circumvent the authority of natural social groups in order to function efficiently.60 Conyers
turns to Thomas Hobbes to demonstrate the modern necessity of removing any authority
between the sovereign and the individual: “Hobbes’s nominalist basis allows him no authority
except that of the individual, and through the individual, the state. Other authorities are
illusory or seditious… All power and right resides in the individual.”61 This change reduced
theology and the concerns of the church into private rather than public matters. However, in
the eyes of Conyers this reduction raises an important question: “How can [society maintain
itself on this residue of a culture’s fundamental commitments] and pretend that the issues
once fought out at the theological level no longer matter? How long can it pretend that the
character and virtue of a people, that which makes social life commodious and predictable,

spaces that… invest certain practices with a charged sense of transcendence that calls for our
allegiance and loyalty in a way meant to trump other ultimate loyalties” (104). Conyers stops short of
pushing into specific issues of nationalism, instead dealing only with war itself. However, especially in
the modern West, the military is not the only group habituated into military loyalties and practices.
Conyers’s treatment would be stronger if he extended his insights beyond the military into the
military-entertainment complex as Smith does.
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can simply be taken for granted?”62 The answer to this question inevitably calls on toleration,
either the old form of tolerant practice or the modern form of the doctrine of toleration,
which sets aside questions of vocation and purpose.63 Now that he has set up the context for
the development of the doctrine of toleration, Conyers moves to treat four thinkers who show
this development in their thought: Thomas Hobbes, Pierre Bayle, John Locke, and John Stuart
Mill.

Obtaining a Bipolar Vision of Society
Conyers turns to Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Bayle to establish and critique what he
calls the “bipolar vision of society.” At its most basic level, this idea refers to modernity’s
increasing tendency to view all of life as operating between two ends of a spectrum: the strong,
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The issue could be explained as a contest of formation: toleration serves to form people for
the state project, while the concept of vocation rooted in Christian theology provides another sort of
formation. This relates to the social imaginary, or in similar terminology, the interpretive framework.
Michael Budde puts the issue well: “Christian formation, when it’s done well, is a lifelong effort to push
against interpretive frameworks not rooted in the word become flesh, in the Christ that brings the
Kingdom of God among us and that calls us to live in the world as if that kingdom has already begun.
Putting on the armor of God is as much perceptual as intellectual, as much a matter of changing the
operating system of our hearts and minds as it is a matter of accepting new propositions about
creation, history and destiny. It means that the process of making disciples is about taking down the
scaffolding of some interpretive frames and replacing them with those of the church and the followers
of Jesus—dismantling the complexes that make nationalism seem normal, subverting the
conventional wisdom that might makes right, and giving people new eyes with which to see and new
ears with which to hear all that’s been going on around them all the whole, but to which they’ve been
oblivious so long as they lacked the right equipment with which to catch, retrieve and act upon this
God-soaked reality.” See Michael L. Budde, The Borders of Baptism: Identities, Allegiances, and the
Church (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011), 123.
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central authority on the one hand, and the autonomous individual on the other.64 Hobbes’s
thought contributed primarily to the increased tendency to focus on the centralized power,
while Bayle’s work strengthened the concept of the autonomous individual.
Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy was tied to the events of his age. Conyers notes two
important influences on Hobbes’s life. First, Hobbes served as a tutor and companion to
William Cavendish, with whom he traveled extensively. This travel exposed Hobbes to
subjects such as Euclidean geometry, which impressed him with its logically and inescapably
arranged method. Hobbes hoped other sciences could achieve the same level of certainty.65
Second, Hobbes’s thinking was shaped by viewing reality as a state of motion rather than a
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This bipolarity between the state and the individual can be developed further, especially
with relation to individual difference and the power of corporations. For example, see Sheldon S.
Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2006). Wolin develops centrifugalism (which fears democracy because it
homogenizes, suppressing significant differences and thus seeks identity more in those differences;
focus on race, class, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.) and centripetalism (contemptuous of
democracy for its weakness yet envious of its appeal; large business corporations are an example).
Both presuppose that society has had a prior experience of democratization and both exploit that
experience. Centrifugal forces rely on the government to protect them, while centripetal forces seek
expansion and dominance. Multinational corporations are in a powerful position; the state and the
corporation have become partners, and each has begun to mimic functions historically identified with
the other. “Corporations are extensively engaged in administering penal institutions and operating
health-care systems, and they have assumed important roles at every level of public and private
education” (588). The citizen gets blended in this way too, with political behavior becoming
assimilated to economic behavior. And corporate money influences elections to such a degree that
state actors have become more dependent upon corporate power than on their own citizens. Because
of this power of corporations, it could be argued that the bipolar condition of modernity has begun to
give way to a bipolarity not of individual-state but individual-multinational corporation. This change is
ironic, because just as the nation-state once served to dissolve other associations in favor of its
sovereignty (Conyers’s bipolar disorder), the nation-state now begins to fall victim to being an
“intermediate association” in a greater narrative: globalization. For more on globalization, see chapter
5.
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state of rest, no doubt partly influenced by his meeting of Galileo in Italy: “The world for
Hobbes and his successors was a world of no given order, but a world infinitely malleable.”66
The world awaited an order created by human imagination and will. This notion influenced
the way that Hobbes conceived of the political.
While Conyers does not spend time working systematically through Hobbes’s corpus,
he provides his understanding of Hobbes’s project as a whole. Hobbes thought it impossible to
conceive of philosophy in terms of traditional metaphysics with its appeal to the notion of a
moral aim; instead, a new philosophy must replace this moral element with natural science.
For Conyers, “This is not only a description of Hobbes’s work and his intentions, but it is the
root of the problem which incessantly presents itself in Hobbes.”67 The moral element had to
be replaced by human intention.
Conyers identifies two primary intellectual influences on Hobbes. First, Puritanism’s
analysis of human ills parallels Hobbes’s theory of the individual in the social setting. Puritan
thought tended toward Gnosticism because of its emphasis on the brokenness of the created
order.68 This thinking fit with Hobbes’s emphasis on human beings in nature as being in
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Puritanism, in this reading, was “a kind of gnostic style of theologizing that finds no good in
the created order, in the human nature, or in the institutions arising in such a world. For the gnostic—
and, one could almost say, for the Puritan—Christianity is altogether a theology of redemption
without the inclusion of a theology of creation.” Ibid., 72. This is admittedly a controversial reading of
Puritanism, and one in which Conyers refers to no secondary literature on the topic. Instead, he seeks
to draw parallels between what Hobbes thought and how that thought might relate to the Puritanism
that was present at Magdalen Hall, Oxford, while Hobbes was there.
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constant warfare due to a focus solely on one’s own interests. Just as the extreme position of
some Calvinists led them to believe the worth of the human being relies entirely on God’s
redemptive purpose, Hobbes saw the salvation of man as entirely dependent upon a different
higher power: the state. The second intellectual influence identified by Conyers is nominalism,
which he understands filtered through the work of Richard Weaver primarily.69 Hobbes’s
nominalist stance led again to a focus on voluntarism, moving engagement with the world
from the domain of intellect to the domain of the will.70
In order to summarize Hobbes’s thought, Conyers finds six principles in Hobbes’s
writing that have nearly an axiomatic status in placing the individual in society and that
demonstrate the importance of the two intellectual influences identified. The principles are as
follows: (1) “Philosophy is the science of reducing things to their causes and determining the
consequences of causes.”71 This means that everything is boiled down to the efficient cause
and the material cause, with the formal and final causes not being true causes.72 Hobbes sets
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In fact, “it was Hobbes perhaps more than any other who brought nominalistic thought to
the surface in modern discourse” because of the dominance of this perspective in Leviathan and
Elements of Law (ibid., 74–75). Conyers provides several quotes from Leviathan and Elements of Law to
illustrate this point.
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Conyers mentions Richard Weaver in this connection, which is further evidence that
Weaver is Conyers’s primary source for the nominalist critique and analysis (ibid., 75). Further
evidence of Weaver as Conyers’s main source for this critique is that Weaver’s Ideas Have
Consequences is the only source Conyers uses to discuss the decline of logical realism in A. J. Conyers,
“Three Sources of the Secular Mind,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 41, no. 2 (June 1998):
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This insight about the modern narrowing of causation bears important fruit in analyzing
various modern ethical issues. One particularly helpful and confrontational example of this is the work
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aside the language of the two causes that have most to do with religion and morality. (2) “The
individual’s motives are governed by fear and (consequently) by the desire for power.”73
Because individuals want conflict, individuals fear others and seek power to achieve their own
desires. (3) “The civil order is an artifice, it is not a reflection, as it was for the ancients and
medieval, of the metaphysical order of existence.”74 Human progress and technological
mastery of nature theoretically know no bounds. Humans work to impose their wills on
nature. (4) “Hence, the moral order is an artifice.”75 Only positive law forms the foundation for
any moral system. (5) “The commonwealth must be large enough to secure safety or to pursue
common advantage among the nations.”76 Justice is no longer the framework for the political
order; instead, the libido dominandi of the emerging modern state is. (6) “The authority of the
sovereign within the social order must be absolute.”77 Hobbes does not even attempt to deny

of Jeffrey Bishop, who explores the implication of the loss of final causes in the practice of medicine.
He argues that modern medicine’s epistemology (using the dead body as means to obtain curative
information for living bodies) and metaphysics (rejecting formal and final causation for sole focus on
material efficient causation) has created a complex set of practices that shapes the way medicine cares
for dying patients and the way patients perceive their dying. See Jeffrey P. Bishop, The Anticipatory
Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of the Dying (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2011).
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that government is about coercion.78 No matter what form authority takes in the modern state
(monarchy or democracy), “the authority itself is single; everything is governed from a central
point of concentrated power.”79 These principles bring Hobbes to the conclusion that the
natural world calls for mastery at the hands of the human will. Knowledge of the world is not
for love (as it was for Augustine) but for mastery and possession.80 For Hobbes, the fears of
modern individuals call for the concentration of power in a central authority in order to
assuage fears, a central authority created by human will.81 This is the first end of Conyers’s
spectrum creating a bipolar vision of society.
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Here Conyers turns to the example of Althusius again as a positive influence. One of the
lacunae is Conyers’s treatment of modernity is the lack of positive development of Althusius, towards
whom he repeatedly gestures without much explanation, besides what was treated above.
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Conyers’s reading of Hobbes can profitably be compared to both Cavanaugh and Radner,
since Hobbes is a bone of contention between these two. Cavanaugh and Conyers are both critical of
Hobbes, while Radner is appreciative. However, as we will see, Conyers’s focus on toleration can help
adjudicate the debate and situate Radner’s appreciation. Radner criticizes Cavanaugh’s reading of
Hobbes in A Brutal Unity: The Spiritual Politics of the Christian Church (Waco, TX: Baylor University
Press, 2012). Radner notes that for Cavanaugh, Hobbes and Locke are key “myth makers” who promote
false consciousness by claiming that certain arguments about Christian faith promote violence (41).
Here Radner is referring to Cavanaugh’s The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots
of Modern Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Cavanaugh argues that Hobbes ignored
the economic and legal factors that led to religious conflict and instead laid the blame at the feet of
Christian preaching, “where simple people are led astray by seditious preaching” (125). According to
Hobbes, violence results from an improper distinction of temporal and spiritual power (127).
Cavanaugh sees Hobbes as mistaken, while Radner sees Hobbes as identifying a key danger illustrated
in the religious wars. For Radner, “we must still ask what kind of religion or Christianity would permit
such killing. What kind would provide the motivating conceptual structures of meaning to legitimize
it?” (41). Hobbes’s role, then, is not a negative one of marginalizing religion, but in fact falls in line with
a medieval notion of the valorization of the peacemaking sovereign, “who acts according [to] the
imposition of law, and who stands over the Church’s claims to some alternative and generally divisive
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Pierre Bayle’s work sets up the other side of the spectrum, developing the concept of
the autonomous individual. While it is fairly well known that Bayle played a vital role in
changing convictions on the sovereign rights of the individual in matters of conscience,
Conyers develops a certain irony in what Bayle championed: “Although the idea of the
development of liberal democratic institutions is that they protect the individual from the
overweening designs of the state, in fact, Bayle’s case against persecution and in favor of
protecting the ‘erring conscience’ was not so much cast against the state as against the
traditional social powers of the church and local communities.”82 In short, though Pierre Bayle
sought to protect the individual from the institutions that were more powerful at the time
(like the church), his theory ultimately led to an autonomous individual that had nothing to

route to social order” (Radner, Brutal Unity, 54n75). For Cavanaugh and Conyers, Hobbes is a key figure
leading to modern problems; for Radner, Hobbes is a helpful figure providing important distinctions.
Radner’s positive use of Hobbes focuses on Hobbes’s development of “conscience” (see Radner, Brutal
Unity, 353–61). Radner turns to Hobbes for navigating the public/private continuum of conscience and
the reality of multiple consciences. Hobbes is interested in “peacekeeping” and therefore shows that
the difference between public and private lies not in procedures as in the purposes “they guide and
hold accountable the otherwise fluid character of human knowing, feeling, and decision making” (361).
The very act of living together creates the need for multiple consciences, so that an individual’s private
conscience can hold one thing, while the public conscience does not insist upon that particular truth
for the sake of peace and unity. For these purposes Radner calls upon the concept of toleration, which
rightly rings problematic to us at this stage in understanding Conyers’s work. For the sake of toleration,
the individual is willing to sacrifice conscience itself (Radner uses this language of sacrifice; 396). For
Radner, Hobbes is a hero precisely because he helps facilitate this toleration that allows for the
operation of multiple consciences; for Conyers, Hobbes is a problem for this very reason, because
Conyers sees the public conscience and its allegiance to the state as problematic for other associations.
Radner is quite explicit: “Indeed, by the seventeenth century, the theology of discord had provided
important tools to political thinkers, from Hobbes on, to do the job the Church had clearly been unable
to do; that is, to figure out how people might live together without destroying each other” (380;
emphasis mine). I deal in more depth with Radner and Cavanaugh below. See chapter 5.
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protect it from the more powerful state, whose power was no longer balanced by the
mediating groups.83
In Bayle’s life, the principle issue was “the friction between the majority Catholic
population in France and the minority (Huguenot) population.”84 Bayle came to the
conviction that from a human point of view indecisiveness is appropriate: the human
conscience is an “erring conscience,” requiring toleration as a policy. As Bayle argued against
force as a means of conversion, he provided a more unique angle by arguing that the
conscience has a stronger claim on the soul than group obligations do.85 Bayle did not seek to
occupy a moderate position between warring parties such as Jesuits and Calvinists; instead, he
provided a different center, the “individual.”86 An erring conscience had rights in Bayle’s eyes,
and the idea of the private conscience is important. He moved from this position of rights for
an erring conscience to the point that anything done against the lights of conscience is evil.
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Some still see the church and its problems as the dominant problem that needs controlled
by the liberal state. For example, see Radner, Brutal Unity. Radner sees secular civil alternatives to the
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As Conyers explains, “he located a new center of gravity for civil and religious responsibility,
one that would prove to be the hallmark of modernity. This new center of gravity is no longer any
particular public or private authority. It is, instead, the newly emerging notion of the individual—one
might say, without exaggeration, the autonomous, the self-ruling, individual” (ibid., 98).
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He not only wanted to protect the conscience from abuse but to enthrone it as “supreme
arbiter.”87
Conyers identifies a paradox in the work of Bayle on toleration. While Bayle makes
strong arguments for toleration in the face of religious persecution, he does not regard the
state as a threat.88 He notes that Bayle’s work on Hobbes is remarkably positive; Bayle is clearly
more concerned with the church than the state in issues of toleration. But this strong leaning
toward political absolutism is striking in the midst of writing on toleration. Bayle’s concerns
are with non-governmental authorities, such as the church:89 “When Bayle spoke of
oppression, he had in mind the kinds of oppression from which the individual might be
liberated by the state. And what if the remedy proved more oppressive than the cure? Such a
question apparently did not occur to Bayle in quite that form.”90 In fact, Bayle reminds us that
individuals might feel less threatened by a strong central power than local ones like neighbors,
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“Bayle opened doors that neither Locke nor Hobbes had entered; he opened the way to
making the private conscience the supreme arbiter of matters of conscience” (ibid., 107).
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“Yet what we find in Bayle is not an argument against the powerful exercise of the same
sovereignty that had crushed the Huguenot community, sent him and his coreligionists into exile,
burned his books, and brought about the imprisonment and death of his brother. Instead, we find that
he defends the idea of political sovereignty, even of royal absolutism” (ibid., 115).
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As Elisabeth Labrousse puts it, “Following Hobbes…, Bayle sees absolute monarchy as
signifying the supremacy of the civil power and its independence from religious authorities,
specifically the national clergy and the Vatican. Only an authoritarian, absolute monarch in France can
be powerful enough to keep the tribe of ecclesiastics in their place. To this extent, of course, every Huguenot
was bound to be anticlerical” (Elisabeth Labrousse, Bayle [New York: Oxford University Press, 1985], 76,
emphasis added).
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guilds, and the church. He is willing to sacrifice religious authority to the authority of the state
for the sake of rescuing the freedom of the individual.
For Conyers, the problem with this change is not only that the nation-state has
become too powerful and thus seeks to destroy the mediating groups such as the family. He
notes that there is also a difference between the natural groups and the state. Natural,
spontaneous groups resist organization, while the state cannot exist without a heavy level of
organization. The two are competitors: “The organized, rationalized state finds the
spontaneous loyalties within families and religions inconvenient to organization.”91 The
individual gravitates to bonds of affection, common experience, and common interests, and
“the group, or groups communicate to the person a sense of place and purpose, a complex of
ideas through which to view the world, so that one might properly identify both the self and
others.”92 However, since such bonds are inconvenient to the state’s need for organization,
toleration serves to weaken the bonds by implying that the discipline of the groups is imposed
in a restrictive or manipulative way, impeding the individual’s freedom and thus sending the
individual into the seemingly protective arms of the sovereign state.93
In her published Gifford Lectures, the late political ethicist Jean Bethke Elshtain deals
with sovereignty, and tells its story through its connection to God, the state, and the self.
While she ends up with a similar picture as Conyers does, she takes a slightly different route.
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While pushing this point, Conyers recognizes that such developments were unintended on
the part of thinkers such as Bayle.
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For Conyers’s bipolar vision, strong state sovereignty and a robust individualism arise together.
However, in Elsthtain’s tale, there is an extra step. She argues that changing notions of God’s
sovereignty led to absolutist state sovereignty. Then, as a second step, individual selfsovereignty emerged from absolutist state sovereignty, not along with it: “As sovereign state is
to sovereign God, so sovereign selves are to sovereign states.”94 Elshtain constructs her
argument by first turning to the likes of Hobbes and Locke to understand the state, and then
turning to Descartes, Kant, and others for the development of the self. What Conyers uncovers
is that in the development of a strong centralized power, the autonomous individual was
necessary as well. Because a bipolarity was necessary for the state’s sovereignty to work and
for autonomous individualism to be protected, they arose together, not in separate steps as
Elshtain argues.95
Together, Hobbes and Bayle demonstrate the creation of a bipolar vision of society.
Hobbes exalts the necessity of a strong central power in order to protect humans from one
another. Bayle, on the other hand, promotes toleration while at the same time advancing a
political absolutism in line with Hobbes. Bayle’s work stems from a concern to protect
individuals from oppression at the hands of institutions like the church in matters of
conscience. For Conyers, these thinkers set up the two poles: a strong central state and an
autonomous individual. The natural institutions that once provided connection between
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Though they differ on the precise mechanism of these changing notions of sovereignty, I
think Conyers would be able to agree with some of the ethical implications Elshtain draws from selfsovereignty, including a changing understanding of personhood.
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people and provided for social norms and other social goods slowly fade from view because of
their competition with the nation-state.96 Conyers’s history of this crisis includes one more
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The power of the nation-state extends into other areas as well. One such area is that of Bible
translation, which was far from a simple task to put the Bible into vernacular languages, as argued in
Jonathan Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2007). Sheehan traces developments in the Bible from the Reformation on. The main
movements in this argument are the vernacular Bibles birthed in the Reformation, a period of stability,
the birth of the Enlightenment Bible (EB), and the collapse of the EB into the cultural Bible.
The sixteenth century saw many translations into the vernacular. The Bible was unstable and
changing; it had to be taken out of the Catholic superstructure using three tools: scholarship (authority
in finding original text), princely power (kings commissioned versions), and inspiration. Scholarship
and inspiration provided internal legitimation of text, connecting vernacular versions to apostolic
church; princely power ensured connection to authority vested in kings. Why did this period of change
stop? Sheehan lays blame at the feet of the wars of religion. Power interests came into play, and a
desire for a stable text prevailed, leading to a century or so of stability. This period of stabilization
affected the vernacular versions and the original versions (these stabilized as scholars were less
interested in finding variants and changing translations).
The EB was born around 1700 as scholars breached the wall surrounding the Bible. Sheehan traces two
tracts (throughout the book): England and Germany. In England the breach was due more to a desire
to protect the text from deists (show its reliability), while in Germany the breach was due to Pietists
and their interest in making the text relevant and alive for their time. Sheehan himself offers an
excellent summary of Part II, “The Forms of the Enlightenment Bible”:
“Translation and scholarship worked together to produce not a single authoritative text, but
rather a panoply of Bibles. It was an Enlightenment Bible precisely because it no longer was
singular in form, but rather disseminated across a wide spectrum of what I have called media,
across a variety of scholarly, generic, and disciplinary domains whose expansion in the
eighteenth century compensated for the loss of definite centers of meaning, political or
religious. In the (textual) philological Bible, the Bible was made into a document whose study
would perfect the practice of criticism. In the poetic Bible, it was given authority insofar as it
participated in man’s literary heritage, and more specifically as a piece of Germany’s literary
heritage. In the pedagogical Bible, it became significant for its moral content. And the
historical Bible was designed to make it significant as an archive, as infinitely variegated
library of human customs and origins” (217).
In Part III Sheehan shifts to the concept of the “cultural Bible.” He uses this to identify the fact that the
EB collapsed from a diversity of Bibles centered around one project (for the EB was not an object so
much as a diverse project) to a singular cultural influence in both England and Germany. This is where
the story of the nation state comes back in, making more suspicious that this storyline is not more
causatively prevalent in the book. As national identity became more important, cultural Bibles became
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step, in which he turns to John Locke and John Stuart Mill to demonstrate the full extent to
which tolerance could serve to dissolve social bonds.

Tolerance, Dissolver of Mediating Social Bonds
The author of the famous Letter on Toleration, John Locke is the philosopher most
prominently associated with the doctrine of toleration. While some view Locke as a promoter
of toleration when the idea was unpopular, Conyers’s description of toleration in Hobbes and
Bayle allows him to argue that “we find Locke not the lone champion of an unpopular idea but
the respected spokesman for an idea whose time had come, and which by now was being well
received in many communities and in some of the most powerful circles in seventeenthcentury England.”97 Locke has an important place in advancing this trend of linking state
sovereignty and individual rights.
Conyers relies on an alternate interpretation of Locke that challenges Locke’s
liberalism. Locke’s earlier writings serve as an embarrassment to those who view him as a
liberal thinker, and neglecting these earlier writings (or explaining them away in light of his
later “mature” thought) has strengthened the typical view of Locke.98 In order to understand
the differences between Locke’s early (more absolutist) writings and his later (more liberal)
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writings, Conyers turns to an article by political scholar Robert Kraynak entitled “John Locke:
From Absolutism to Toleration.”99 Kraynak demonstrates differences between Locke’s earlier
and later writings,100 but he argues that there is a deeper principle that unites the two. The
background of the Reformation and religious wars situated the problem for Locke. In his mind,
“Orthodoxy was employed by the state to bring order, but now orthodoxy was an uncertain
touchstone. Locke found that this new circumstance called for rethinking the role of the state
in regard to religion.”101 Since one cannot be certain with regard to matters of religion, two
options present themselves: “secular absolutism,” in which the state establishes one religion
without making the claim it is the only true one, or “liberal toleration,” in which “religion is no
less subordinated to the state: it is relegated to the sphere of the private life and prevented
from having meaningful influence.”102 Thus, the change in Locke’s writings is not a change in
purpose or principle, but a change in strategy. It remains within the general principle of
subordinating religion to the state.103
Pushing beyond Kraynak’s analysis of Locke, Conyers argues that the problem with
Locke is not merely some hidden agenda, but a mistaken vision of society. Locke describes a
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non-existent world, a fatally simplified one formed only around the state and the individual.104
Conyers observes a narrowing in Locke’s view of a federation. While thinkers such as
Althusius include families, professional associations, and churches in their theories on
federations, for Locke “‘federation’ occurs only in the contract made among individuals and
between the individual and the state, or between sovereign governments.”105 The organized
state is Locke’s only political body; he fails to see that the role of citizen is not the deepest and
most significant relationship in a person’s life.106 His distorted view of reality leads to a
reductionist understanding of political association.
Locke’s vision of society relies upon a theological point about revelation and reason.
Modern “reason” differs in important ways from premodern “reason.” Both agree that
something is furnished to the mind, to which reason responds. However, premodern reason
had a threefold given: revelation, sense experience, and tradition. Experience gives voice to
the present, tradition connects to the past, and revelation gives the meaning of things, or the
eschatological aim of things. Modern reason, however, has one of two givens: the Rationalists
began with the distinction between the self and the world, and the Empiricists focused on all
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knowledge entering through the senses. Conyers notes that these not only differ in that
modern reason focuses only on experience, but that the type of experience is different as well:
Earlier philosophies, to one extent or another, depend upon experiences that are not
available to everyone, which are in fact available to very few… Revelation is nothing
other than the idea that truths important enough to determine the ordering of the
soul and the culture become known to us through the rare experiences of a very few
members of society over a long period of time. It is a tradition, or a custom, of the
most refined and rare type. But the implication is clear: because of these few and these
rare, the rest of us come closer to understanding the purpose, the nature, and the
shape of life.107
The premodern vision of community was that the community benefitted from the experience
of the few. In the modern view, everyone in the community has at least the access to the raw
stuff by which the community understands itself. Everyone is the same, and all interpretations
of the raw material of experience hold equal weight. Locke’s toleration gives birth to an
undifferentiated, unarticulated society, a mass society. In fact, “Toleration in its modern form
is the solvent that dissolves the bonds of interdependency. It therefore makes society fit for
the ‘new’ ordering and regulating powers of the state.”108 Toleration leads to the dissolving of
social bonds, a dissolution leading to thoroughly individualized and isolated modern people.
While such isolation was not the goal of Locke’s emphasis on toleration, our distance has
given us the perspective to see such long-term consequences of this type of society.
In the last step of his historical genealogy of toleration, Conyers explores one more
shift: the evolution of toleration from Locke into the twentieth century. To do so, he analyzes
the use of “toleration” in Locke and then in John Stuart Mill. Mill demonstrates how the term
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shifts even more. For Conyers, this shift is rooted in the rise and fall of two contrasting beliefs
about the human condition: on the one hand, the classical idea of decorum and the Christian
idea of grace served to imply limits to human powers, limits that should be observed in order
to pursue the good. On the other hand is the contrary sentiment that neither nature nor the
supernatural pose any barriers to the human spirit.109 The former has room and calls for
encounters with the divine; the latter divests previous restraints and seeks progress and power
with no limits: “[Toleration] as it is used in the era of Locke is found in Mill’s time almost freed
of its earlier inhibitions and, like Icarus, winging its way to the sun.”110 Conyers argues that this
shift can be seen in comparing the toleration of Locke to the toleration of Mill.
While Locke paved the way for thinking in distinctively modern ways, he did not fully
forget the earlier sentiment regarding the importance of religious expression.111 Conyers
identifies three arguments in Locke’s famous Letter Concerning Toleration (1689): the care of
souls is not committed to the civil magistrate; the magistrate is ineffective in effecting the
inward persuasion of the mind; and salvation would come by an accident of birth if
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governments imposed religion.112 Conyers highlights the following principal features of
Lockean toleration:
First, toleration stands as a restraint against the misguided use of force. It admits the
ludicrousness of a forced religious faith… Second, it is thereby a defense against
persecution—a matter that is decisive in distinguishing Locke’s variety of toleration.
Third, toleration serves the interest of truth, a truth only apprehended by reason,
assisted by revelation, and attained by faith. Fourth, toleration is made necessary by
the frailty and inadequacy of human reason, clouded and rendered unreliable by sin.
Fifth, toleration is an expression of humility.113
Tolerance arises because of the imperfection of human reason and the incompetence of the
state to choose for each individual. It does not arise from optimism regarding human society
and institutions; rather, it acts fundamentally as a restraint on power, hubris, and the state’s
imagined moral competence. After Locke, “a very different idea of toleration was projected
upon this view.” This projection resulted in “The operative language of toleration embrac[ing]
a concept that acts not as a restraint against moral presumption but actually becomes the
engine for social conformity.”114 This change can be seen in the thought of Mill.
John Stuart Mill brings about the utilitarian virtue of toleration. Conyers highlights
two important differences between Locke’s and Mill’s ideas of toleration. First, Mill sees
toleration as a positive good: “For Locke, the idea of protecting the individual’s rights is
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prophylactic; for Mill, it is generative.”115 Second, Mill appeals to a very particular
understanding of truth as the aim of toleration. Here Mill’s idea of toleration combines with
another aspect of the Enlightenment: the myth of historical progress. Toleration serves the
truth of human progress by opening people up to change rather than adherence to custom.
Conyers describes the distinction between Locke’s and Mill’s ideas on toleration by noting: 1)
Locke’s toleration is a negative thing, a check against ambitions, while Mill’s is an optimistic
unfolding of human possibilities; 2) Locke’s toleration restrains human ambition when values
transcend utilitarian calculations, but Mill’s toleration becomes a strategy for progress; 3)
Locke’s toleration communicates life as an encounter with the divine, but Mill’s toleration
communicates the immanent potentiality of the world; and 4) Locke’s view restrains sin,
while Mill’s view restrains restraint.116 For Mill, progress has become the organizing principle
that toleration serves.
Conyers’s focus on intellectual history is not the only way to address the issue of
toleration in the early modern world. In Divided by Faith, Benjamin Kaplan challenges the
typical story of the rise of toleration. According to this story, “Tolerance, they have suggested,
was first imagined by a visionary few, who offered increasingly robust theoretical justifications
for it, then it was institutionalized by a small number of forward-thinking rulers, who let
themselves be guided by reason. Two genres of historical writing (often combined with one
another) have served as the chief bearers of this story: one traces the genealogy of ideas, the
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other tells a political narrative.”117 Kaplan cites two factors credited for a rise in toleration. On
one hand, early modern Europeans supposedly got tired of all of the religious wars and saw
toleration as a good alternative. This view is not supported by the evidence that, in the vast
majority of the population, the cessation of such conflict did not occur as early as the typical
story claims. On the other hand, early modern Europeans supposedly embraced the
rationality of the Enlightenment and became more tolerant. This interpretation not only
focuses too much on ideas, it oversimplifies the relationship between faith and reason.
Instead, factors like prosperity, a broad civil society, and individualism encouraged the
practice of toleration among the non-elites.118
Kaplan argues instead that “Contrary to the progressive schema of the Whig
interpretation, toleration declined sharply in Europe in the wake of the reformations, and for
the next two centuries, from around the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the
eighteenth, it remained deeply problematic for a majority of Christians.”119 In short, “Religious
violence—popular, official, military—continued in many parts of Europe in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The age of religious wars had not yet ended.”120 This
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fact challenges the rise of toleration not only by questioning whether tolerance was as
widespread as it claims, but it also calls into question the source of that toleration. If such
problems were still occurring so long after the typical story claims ideas changed, then
perhaps the importance of those ideas and thinkers is diminished.
Kaplan also identifies other motivations for persons of different faiths to tolerate one
another, when they did in fact do so. Like Conyers, Kaplan highlights the economic issues at
stake: “Over the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an increasing number came to
believe that the wealth and power of their state was their principal responsibility and that
toleration could increase these. London’s sheriff Slingsby Bethel, for one, condemned
‘imposing upon Conscience, in matters of religion’ as ‘a mischief unto Trade, transcending all
others whatsoever.’”121 The toleration that Kaplan identifies arises out of such decisions to get
along on a practical level for practical purposes, not because of some grand progress in the
history of ideas.
The story of the rise of toleration needs to be debunked because it is part of a larger
construct. According to Kaplan,
The story of the rise of toleration is an ideological construct that perpetuates our
ignorance. It is a myth, not only in being at variance with known facts, but in being a
symbolic story, with heroes and villains and a moral—a story told about the past to
explain or justify a present state of affairs. According to this myth, toleration
triumphed in the eighteenth century because reason triumphed over faith. It
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triumphed because religion lost its hold on people, and hence its importance as a
historical phenomenon.122
The Whig theory of history used the rise of toleration to support Protestantism over
Catholicism. That theory was replaced by the secularization thesis.
According to it, around 1650—or even earlier, by some accounts—Europe began to
undergo a long-term, evolutionary process. Although it took centuries, by some point
in the twentieth century its results were clear: churches lost much of their power and
authority; clergy ceased to play major roles in politics, education, and social welfare;
religious worship grew less universal; people stopped giving religious explanations for
natural phenomena and human events; religious idioms ceased to pervade
communications… This story is controversial among scholars, who disagree first as to
which aspects of it are empirically true, and second, whether as a story it is not
conceptually flawed.”123
In the case of the Whig theory of history and the secularization thesis, the real story of
toleration is neglected in favor of a useful ideological construct.124
But did societies become more tolerant? We do not know enough about whether
relations between people of different faiths really changed in the eighteenth century. Those
who do argue that societies have become more tolerant focus on elite ideas and ignore
popular behavior.125 In fact, Kaplan’s work suggests another possibility:
The history of early modern Europe suggests a different view. It demonstrates that,
even in communities that did not know our modern values, people of different faiths
could live together peacefully. Even in profoundly religious communities where
antagonisms were sharp, religion was not a primitive, untameable force. In the
centuries between Reformation and French Revolution, Europeans discovered that, in
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practice, they could often manage and contain confessional conflict. As limited,
tension-ridden, and discriminatory as their accommodations and arrangements were,
they can open our eyes to the unique qualities of the toleration we practice today and
the possibility of other options.126
These examples of people living together peacefully, even before the Enlightenment, line up
with Conyers’s observations about the “ancient practice of toleration.” Kaplan’s connection of
the “rise of toleration” to Whig and secularization theories, likewise, lends support to
Conyers’s observations about the “doctrine of toleration” and its function in an ideology. For
Conyers, the myth of toleration funds the state.
Kaplan and Conyers disagree on method but agree when it comes to their conclusions.
Conyers uses the sort of “history of ideas” approach that Kaplan critiques in arguing against
the typical story of the rise of toleration. But Kaplan’s focus on lived practices of ordinary
people confirms Conyers’s overall thesis about the way toleration changed in the modern
period, and the ideological nature of the story.
For Conyers, the rise of tolerance is ideologically tied to the idea of progress.127 This
idea of progress is borrowed from Christian and Jewish eschatological hope, but progress
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cannot communicate the concept of order that Christian eschatology does. “Progress” means
simply the continual development of immanent possibilities.128 But which possibilities should
be pursued? In short, it comes down to a power struggle, a contest of wills, because the
concept lacks any notion of order or goal beyond itself.129

The New Goal: Power via the Exercise of the Will
In the place of any agreed upon purpose, power becomes the new goal in the modern
world. Conyers develops this argument in two steps. First, he explains how power becomes
the new goal by looking at a couple of conceptual shifts. Second, he draws on Jürgen
Moltmann in order to show how theological concerns inform this new goal. In his own
analysis and remarks, he demonstrates how toleration plays into the emergence and
maintenance of power.

Power Becomes the Goal
From Hobbes to Dewey, the Aristotelian notion of a “final cause” faded away; purpose
was rejected. Material and efficient causes explain the world. One way to understand this
change is the difference between rest and motion. While the notion of final cause points
characterize our “often concealed tradition” (287). So the story of modernity is not one of the death of
God or the disenchantment of the world, but a story of picking up the pieces from nominalism in a way
that transfers theological themes from God to man, nature, social forces, and history. Conyers
identifies one of these transfers connected to toleration and progress.
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toward rest, a time when motion is complete, the loss of that notion views the world in
constant motion. Hobbes gained this idea from an encounter with Galileo and shifted his view
of the world from the natural state of things as motion rather than rest. If rest is not the
natural state, then the nature of things is not given and discoverable or revealed to humans.
Instead, it is always subject to change, “And if subject to change, it is malleable; and if
malleable, then the world is essentially unstable. In that case, any order that exists does so
either accidentally or because of human action upon things. Order is a product of the human
will or it is projected upon things by the imagination.”130 For Conyers, this change in
orientation characterizes modern thought.131 It is another way of seeing the shift from a
theology of vocation to a theology of choice.
The shift from viewing the natural state of things as motion instead of rest leads to a
shift in posture for engaging the world. If there is a purpose in the world, some goal or rest
that the world is moving toward, then humans can become involved in this by seeking to
understand what this purpose might be and seek to get in line with it. Acting requires
understanding; the intellect is the primary human power needed for this. However, with a
changing and malleable world, engagement does not require understanding a purpose but
proposing one. Understanding is not essential, but acting is: the will is the primary human
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power necessary.132 This shift from intellect to will reflects a change in human engagement
from seeking to understand the world to seeking to control the world.
Conyers recognizes that this shift from intellect to will has roots outside of the
modern world. For example, nominalism’s triumph over realism influenced this shift: “To give
up the task of understanding universals (held to be real by the realists) and to assert that
universals or categories are what they are because we name them as such is really to say that
the intellect is subject to the will.”133 In addition, Conyers briefly treats Kant, Marx, Mill,
Nietzsche, Dewey, and Foucault as contributing to this shift in the understanding of purpose
and goals, making it a product of human will rather than any created order.134 The real goal
comes out of the power of invention, and we must invent some sort of purpose because
humans despair without one. Metaphysics is ruled out of court so as not to distract from the
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task at hand of exerting power via will.135 When the will becomes the authority that sets things
in order, the void that is left by the loss of meaning is filled by the will to power.

Theology and Power
The rise of power as the new goal emerged from theological debates, and the relation
of theology and power in the modern world is an important and complex one. Conyers turns
to the work of Moltmann to explore these connections and implications before setting out his
own critical engagement and interpretation. Moltmann ties the shift in the understanding of
power to the changes of nominalism and the concept of the potentia absoluta of God in his
God in Creation. Nominalism led to a modified picture of God, making potentia absoluta his
preeminent attribute, and the advance of science and technology increased this tendency to
see God’s most prominent attribute as absolute power.136 Conyers notes that this opened the
way for power itself to become the goal of human life,137 because humans sought to be like
God in his power alone rather than in connection to other moral attributes such as goodness.
This shift in the dominant conception of God also leaned toward the oneness of God,
neglecting the Trinity and the way community and harmony of wills impacts our
understanding of power.
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Conyers considers the modern idolatry of power the touchstone issue for Moltmann.138
Moltmann identifies a weakness in Western culture, one that can be traced back to Christian
theology.139 Focusing too much on God’s oneness leads to an overemphasis on power and
neglects other attributes of God. An unselfconscious acceptance of power and all that serves
power results from this overemphasis. Moltmann felt strongly about this because of
experiences in his own lifetime of the idolization of power and of theologians’ affirmation of
leaders such as Hitler as the instrument of God’s power.140
Moltmann turns to two key resources to better diagnose and potentially begin to
remedy these problems. First, he draws on the political insights of Johannes Althusius and the
federalist tradition. Common life should be organized on various levels, which helps to guard
against absolutism and the centralizing power of the state. However, the West’s emphasis on
the oneness of God has actually worked against the insights of federalism, resulting in many
federalist political associations giving way to some form of absolutism.141 Second, he “sees the
doctrine of the Trinity being developed among Christians as an effective resistance against the
centralization of power.”142 In fact, “Trinitarian thought prepares us for thinking of society in
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terms of distributed roles, separation of powers, and a federalist view of social associations.”143
These two resources work together in that trinitarian thought protects federalism from the
absolutizing tendencies of the Western emphasis on the oneness of God.144
After drawing on Moltmann’s insights, Conyers provides a critical reading that allows
him to construct a slightly different interpretation of the problems existing between theology
and power. Pointing back to God, Hope, and History, Conyers repeats his basic criticism of
Moltmann: “The problem I found in his inclusion of hierarchy in his critique of monarchical
monotheism, along with the coercive sorts of power arrangements, is that hierarchy does not
always imply power and oppression. We are ruled in different ways. Besides being ruled more
or less against our wills by some alien power, we are also ruled by our desires and by our
expectations.”145 These desires and expectations are ordered by both love and hope:146 love
constructs a hierarchy of values, and hope arranges the world in a type of hierarchy.147 For
Conyers, Moltmann’s concern to reveal the problems with the abuse of power neglect the way
that hierarchy can serve to orient lives without being abusive. The problem is monotheism
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alone, not monotheism itself. Monotheism cannot be a replacement for trinitarian doctrine,
for the danger lies in the extremes of unity without difference or difference without unity.148
The secular emphasis on power, for Conyers, is rooted in an illusion. While secular
cultures avoid dealing with the problem of telos, the turn to power as the goal problematically
creates an end out of a means. Conyers retrieves Southern Agrarian Allen Tate’s definition of
secularism: “when the ends are replaced by the means.”149 Stated differently, secularism occurs
when the ultimate goal (which is almost inevitably religious in nature) is replaced with the
smaller “goal” of efficient means (which does not necessarily require explicit religious
foundations). Put another way, “It is when much discussion centers around how to do
something and not what to do. A secular culture is one in which the ends are largely
assumed—and are therefore unexamined.”150 Power becomes the object of pursuit, and when
this happens “we are therefore engaging in an illusion. It is rather like the proverbial dog
chasing its tail… The illusion of a grand pursuit allows us to imagine that we are in control of
life and of our destiny.” This pursuit of control is the problem, for “this anxiety for control is a
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form of despair: having found nothing to ‘rest’ our hopes in, we grasp for the lesser things of
the created order.”151 But the modern world pursues power nonetheless, and it is this pursuit of
power that makes toleration so useful. For smaller groups have purposes that compete with
the power arrangement built solely on the individual and the state.152 Toleration serves to
dissolve these barriers to the efficient operation of the central administration and
centralization of authority and power. Conyers compares it to the old struggle between Baal
and Yahweh: “the god of fertility and wealth over against the God of sociability, peace, and
righteousness. The modern tale of an ideology of toleration has, as we have seen, increasingly
served the priests of Baal.”153 When power is the goal, toleration serves to eliminate all other
goals so that they will not serve as hurdles to the state’s power.
This judgment on the shift to power as the primary goal depends on Conyers’s
acceptance of the criticism of nominalism that he largely received from Richard Weaver.154 In
fact, shifts connected to nominalism undergird the theological concept of vocation versus
choice that animates Conyers’s entire approach. His acceptance and modification of the
nominalist critique is not without controversy within evangelical theology. In his work on Carl
F. H. Henry, Baptist theologian Gregory Alan Thornbury mentions Conyers in a group of
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evangelicals critical of nominalism and voluntarism.155 For Thornbury, the issues surrounding
nominalism and voluntarism boil down to a choice between Catholicism and Protestantism.156
But is this the case? Is Conyers a Catholic-in-denial, or at least headed toward Rome?
To some degree, the answer to this question depends entirely on the concerns with
which one approaches this medieval shift. In his treatment of Henry, Thornbury comes from
an epistemological angle. He argues that voluntarism and nominalism were key developments
because they led to the idea that the only way humans can know anything is because of God’s
initiative.157 God chose to create, and God chose to make knowledge possible. He set the
content and the conditions of knowledge. In Thornbury’s mind, voluntarism rightly drew out
that the world depends on God’s will, “in accordance with his own nature.”158
On the other hand, Conyers approaches nominalism and voluntarism through the
work of Richard Weaver and his concerns with the ethical implications. If Thornbury comes
from an epistemological angle to the issue, Conyers acknowledges the epistemological
character of the debate but pushes through to an anthropological or ethical angle relating to
the ontology developed by nominalism.159 Conyers sees that the shift in understanding of God
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toward potentia absoluta had an anthropological effect: it led to a greater focus on human
willing and autonomy that precipitated anthropological shifts in modernity. Most of the shifts
that Conyers identifies can be tied to this nominalist shift. As humans sought to be in God’s
image, they focused more and more on exercising the will and gaining power. Control became
more important. Ultimately, focusing on God’s will so strongly, as nominalism and
voluntarism did as they were inherited and applied, led to a jettisoning of God from the
equation because of the increased emphasis on human willing and making.160 Because
Conyers is focused on these changes, he sees nominalism and voluntarism as dangerous
changes.
Can both Thornbury and Conyers be right? It comes down to how one reads
nominalism and voluntarism. If, as Thornbury contends, voluntarism depends on God’s will
“in accordance with his own nature,” then there is room to accept aspects of nominalism and
voluntarism while still rejecting the reconception of God as absolute power and the resultant

responsibility of the people. The result is a contractarian theory of political order that was not unlike
that of Hobbes, was to be expanded by Rousseau and Kant, and has had a major influence in Western
thought and political practice” (Conyers, The Long Truce, 156).
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growth of autonomy. Conyers would be comfortable with this approach since he is primarily
concerned with the ethical implications. Is God’s will positively understood (“in accordance
with his nature”) or negatively understood (without hindrance; arbitrary)? While this question
can be debated at the level of the original writings of Ockham, at the level of reception and the
development of modernism, the modern world’s emphasis on arbitrary will and autonomy
won the day.161 Whatever Ockham’s intentions in connection to God’s will, nominalism and
voluntarism led to a greater role for human willing and choice instead of responding to a
reality created by God and into which God calls people.
So, while nominalism and voluntarism understood in connection to God’s nature can
provide epistemological aid for those wanting to focus on God’s choice to reveal himself, the
same concepts approached anthropologically or ethically yield dangerous theological results
in the modern period, especially the turn to power as the main goal.

Disorder(s) of Modernity?
Now that we have followed the logic of Conyers’s treatment of modernity through the
crisis, to his treatment of toleration, to the new goal of power, we can begin to draw together
the disorders that he identifies. These disorders of modernity emerge throughout The Long
Truce and also in the beginning stages of The Listening Heart. Understanding his explanation
of the development of toleration provides a necessary context for these disorders, since they
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are all tied to the shifts that he narrates in that treatment. In what follows, I will review
important connections that Conyers makes as well as the shifts that he identifies in the
modern world so that I can set up his basic assessment of the disorders of the modern world
related to these problems.
Conyers identifies significant connections between toleration and other aspects of the
modern world that are influential in developing modern individuals. First, he calls the modern
era a “long crisis,” “a crisis testing religions, especially the Christian religion’s, ecumenical
claims. Early in the modern period, that ecumenical sentiment was tested by the outbreak of
rival visions, each claiming universal validity. Wars in sixteenth and seventeenth century
Europe, inflamed by religious conviction, gave rise to fanaticism, fanaticism gave rise to
cynicism, and cynicism gave rise to secular expediency.”162 While he does not fully develop
each of these connections, he clearly sees them as conceptually and causally related, with the
change in tolerance serving as an important element in the shift. Conyers identifies another
connection between tolerance and two other elements that play a similar role: war and
economics, concerns highlighted by the Southern Agrarians. While tolerance serves to
dissolve mediating social bonds by relativizing and privatizing them, economics has the
tendency of disconnecting commercial operations from personal relationships, thereby
making them more abstract, and war disrupts and dismantles natural social arrangements as
well.163 These two sets of connections are related: the first draws the changes out through
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different historical events and tendencies, and the second shows how different social
elements serve to facilitate the changes that Conyers observes.
In his genealogy of toleration, Conyers points to four significant shifts that
characterize the modern world in opposition to what came before it: (1) a shift from love to
power; (2) a shift from good to rights; (3) a shift from complex to bipolar-vision; and (4) a shift
from intellect to will. In the first, Conyers argues that the modern world sees a shift from the
“power of love” to the “love of power.”164 Whereas groups at one time arose because of
common interests and loves, the rise of the nation-state led to organization occurring on the
basis of power. For this change to happen, toleration served as a substitute for love.
The second shift occurred as “human rights” replaced “the good” as the point of
reference for restraint or toleration. This shift boils down to non-interference between
individuals and groups.165
In the third shift, toleration served to relativize the commitments that once served to
unite mediating groups such as the church and family in order to strengthen the bipolar vision
of society, in which all of political life is understood as a contract between the individual and
the state.166 Related to the role of economics mentioned briefly above, Conyers argues that the
joint-stock company formed the political imagination: the modern failure to take into account
the full range of realities that make up existence of any society “is a failure that was especially
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tempting in a time of the rise of the nation-states and the bourgeois desire to relate to that
entity as individual stock holders in a joint-stock company, without the complications
brought on by other, and less formal, social groupings… The failure occurs instead at the level
of conscious reflection upon the nature and shape of public life.”167 This new economic entity
provided a different way of imagining political relationships, simplifying them and focusing
primary on the contract between individuals and the state rather than the other complex
associations in life.
The fourth and final shift that Conyers identifies relates to a change in understanding
the world: rather than the natural state of things being one of rest, it is one of motion. This
view encouraged humans to view themselves as masters and possessors of nature: “The idea of
limitless and uniform progress and the inexorable technological mastery of nature was hardly
ever questioned. It was until relatively recently, and to a degree remains, our myth.”168 This
shift in political and moral imagination impacted the way individuals relate to one another,
the state, and the natural world. For example, this view implies the exertion of will over
something or someone, and “That thing—so moved by the will—becomes no longer a subject
with which one enjoys companionable mutual relationship. It becomes an object. And the
more perfectly an object obeys the will, the more it becomes a mere extension of the self.”169
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This shift led to the change from engaging with the world through intellect (seeking to
understand) to will (seeking to control).170
While Conyers focuses on toleration as a lens for understanding modern changes in
The Long Truce, in The Listening Heart he provides other diagnostic concepts that approach
modern problems from different angles. He identifies a few specific disorders of modernity
that result from the historical and conceptual changes that he maps. These shifts create a
world in which isolated individuals seek to exert as much of their own will as they can without
overrunning the “rights” of others (no sense of “common good” or “the good”) while perceiving
their responsibilities as primarily contractarian in nature and between themselves as
individuals and the state. Another disorder that Conyers identifies is that the modern world
has caused the disorder of social isolation. Isolation stems from the emphasis on the
autonomous individual in the bipolar vision of society and from the continuing disappearance
of mediating social bonds. While in Bayle’s time it seemed as though the individual needed
the state’s protection from oppressors such as the church, later in the modern age the loss of
these mediating institutions left individuals isolated. Conyers goes so far as to say “It should
not be surprising that modernity has been marked by the exaggeration of the freedoms of the
individual, the alienation of the person, the dissolution of families, and a culture of
pathological loneliness: for these features are in the very design of the organized society which
replaces the organic society.”171 The move from organic society to organized society (by which
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Conyers means the modern nation state) was facilitated by concepts such as “tolerance” and
has produced these modern disorders related to individualism.
Conyers refers to this idea as the development of the “imperialistic self.” This self
arises out of three modern trends: rejection of absolutes in nominalism, pursuit of power in
science, and the loss of distinction in pantheism. Because of this, “theology becomes
psychology. Talk of ultimate ends becomes meaningless, for the horizon beyond the limited
self has disappeared. We can only speak of operations, of practice, of techniques… Under such
circumstances, secularism has become complete. The world must discover all over again how
to speak about ends. And once again the gospel becomes required reading.”172 The shifts in the
modern world have created a new conception of the self, the imperialistic self, an
impoverished self.
Pushing further into a diagnosis of modernity, Conyers draws out various aspects of a
process that leads to problems. The modern emphasis on choice and freedom leads to a desire
for control and mastery that ultimately yields distraction. “Choice,” Conyers observes, “when it
is the first in our ethical vocabulary… pulls us apart.”173 Freedom, in this view, is understood as
the freedom of self-determination, the capacity to use one’s intelligence without being guided
by another; self-determination has become “a primary virtue.”174 Conyers calls this the
“Invictus” principle: “This distinctly modern prejudice might be called the ‘Invictus’ principle.
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We think for ourselves; we are the masters of our souls. In ancient texts, such as the Old
Testament book of Judges, such a characteristic in society was thought to be the sign of
profound disorder rather than a sign of freedom.”175 In the modern world, this sign of disorder
has become the hallmark of freedom.
The modern emphasis on choice leads to a desire for control and mastery, both of the
natural world and fellow human beings. Conyers points to a change in the conception of
knowledge to demonstrate this desire for control.176 The Enlightenment approach to reason “is
rather a means of setting out sights on the uses and behavior of specific things so that we
might control them. Its earlier aim was knowledge, and its later aim was power.”177 Viewing the
human primarily as subject, as possessive of a will that shapes and determines reality, causes a
shift from seeking to know in order to participate in a reality not of one’s own making to
desiring to know in order to control, to master. “Reason and the idea of ‘humanity as subject,’”
Conyers argues, “give us a sense of mastery over nature and reality, but also draw us apart
from nature and reality, so that we understand ourselves no longer as participants, but as
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observers and as manipulators.”178 When human willing is emphasized, humanity’s relation to
nature is more closely tied to controlling, manipulating, and mastering.
Finally, the quest for mastery and control leads to distraction because it is based on a
misunderstanding of the proper way humans should relate to God’s world. Conyers connects
knowledge for mastery with distraction.179 In describing modern people he states: “We are
distracted. To be modern is to exist increasingly in a state of distraction. Our attention is
drawn away from those things that have been placed in our care, away from the center of our
apparent concern to something abstractly related to that concern, and thus away from God
himself who is the center of all things. To be modern is not only to find ourselves thus
distracted, but to justify that life of distraction.”180 This problem of modernity is more than
intellectual: “it is rather a moral problem and a problem of the affections. We have failed to
love properly what we ought to love and we fall away from that love which draws us toward
God. Instead we fasten upon that which draws us away from God.”181 While one of the marks of
modernity is a spirit of freedom from objects, Conyers views this freedom from objects as a
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form of distraction from the object.182 Modernity pulls apart what belongs together. Drawing
on Augustine’s distinction between use and enjoyment, Conyers argues that modern
distraction leads to the enjoyment of what should be used and a lack of an aim in life.183
Beyond using this progression to highlight the disorders of modernity, Conyers also
paints a picture of modern slavery and an oppressive “submodernity” lurking beneath the
surface and derivative of free-market economics. He makes the provocative argument that
slavery is the eldest child of modernity, not something finally overcome in modernity. Since
the slavery terminology is highly offensive, modern people tend to reject it when it is visibly
evident and instead submerge it in less visible forms. For example, he names trade
arrangements with China in which slave labor is employed, or the public worship of the rich,
famous, and powerful. Slavery was more the product of modernity than ancient or medieval
Christendom. The modern human being often feels like she “belongs” to the state or the
company, finding it difficult to develop this sense of belonging with other associations.184
Indeed, the sense of belonging to the state or to the company can overwhelm any sense
Christians have of belonging to the body of Christ.185
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Two features of slavery require highlighting because of their clear parallels with views
of the human in modern thought: on the one hand, the transformation of the human into an
instrument and on the other hand the decimation of relations within natural groups such as
the family or clan in order to isolate the individual. With the former, the
rich blessings of modern technology inevitably brought with them a new sentiment,
new way in which the increasingly urbanized man could begin to think about
himself…man had become increasingly an instrument for production, profit, and
warfare. Rather than a participant in a creation that embraced all men equally, and
that required a common seeking after the good of a community, this new relationship
implied something else. It implied that the naked purpose of existence was
production, conquest, and material acquisition—a purpose that indeed sanctified
power and possession, rooted somehow in the mystery of pleasure—but a purpose
expressive of the human will and its capacity for acquisition and domination.186
This view of the human, shifting to an instrumentalization, fits within the concept of slavery,
because it emphasizes the use of humans for particular ends.
The decimation of natural groups resulted in the instrumentalization and the isolation
of the individual. Conyers notes, “With the second feature—the individualizing of human
existence—we have made the full descent. It has been a descent from an idea of vocation that
evokes the human person in his full connectedness, as a social being with responsibilities,
loves, and a fully social understanding of himself not as mere free agent with an isolated and
unhindered will, but as father, mother, brother, daughter, colleague, neighbor, and friend,
each with its peculiar role, obligations, and sentiments.”187 The idea was to free the individual
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from such “petty obligations” so that she might be more useful to the interests of nation-states
and international corporations. She becomes an instrument even more so in her isolation.
At root, Conyers wants to redefine slavery so that we can understand that the fate of
the modern worker is not all that different from the agrarian slave; in a way slavery has simply
gone “underground.” (He is not speaking about things like human trafficking and sex slavery,
though those forms support the idea that invisible slavery is less troubling to people.) The
average worker is like a slave because he has become an instrument, a piece that has been
severed from its local community and bonds to such a degree that it can be moved around or
interchanged with others with little resistance. Thus it is an issue of the social imaginary:
individuals are willing to sever community relationships in order to relocate for the company.
Once slavery is seen as not merely bondage to something (a master) but also the opposition to
belonging to a community in any real way, it becomes clearer how modern economic
arrangements have not actually removed slavery, but simply changed its form. Once slavery is
seen in these ways, related to instrumentalization and social isolation, “this might just as well
describe the modern middle class worker and bureaucrat as it does the nineteenth century
agrarian slave.”188
We may be skeptical about such an analysis, for the institution of slavery has been
formally outlawed, though human trafficking is again gaining attention. But as Conyers
counters, “It is true that we no longer have the visible institution of domestic slavery such as
existed in the nineteenth century, especially but not exclusively in the American South. But

188

Ibid., 48.

178
when some populations are living sumptuously at the expense of others who are barely able to
feed their young, is that not also slavery, one might ask?” This modern slave system remains
out of sight and is thus less offensive.189
By “submodernity,” Conyers refers to the oppressed and suffering who are often
ignored, whose suffering is the unintended consequence of modern actions. Drawing on the
work of Moltmann again, Conyers argues that all along, an “underside” accompanied the
optimistic estimation of human progress in the modern age.190 This underside includes
problems like slavery (“the genuine fruit of modern developments that called for the mastery
and organization of the world”)191 and the killing of native peoples: “Thus progress looked very
different to the black slave, to the American Indian, and to the Filipino than it might to those
who occupied the new nineteenth-century suburbs and road [sic] the trains that spanned the
North American continent, or to the British and American shipping magnates or industrial
barons who were on the ‘receiving end’ of ‘progress.’”192 This “underside” of modernity is often
portrayed as the exception to the progress of modernity or the lingering results of a previous,
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less-enlightened age, but Conyers holds it as a necessary and incriminating part of the modern
idea of “progress.”
As we have seen, Conyers identifies various disorders of modernity. For him, the
disorders are rooted in conceptual shifts such as that mapped with toleration that have led to
an individualistic, control-oriented view of human living that has led to distraction and
violent assertions of power. Those on the “receiving end” of progress are distracted from God,
and those on the “underside” have suffered and continue to suffer in myriad ways. However, it
is more illuminating to see Conyers as identifying one disorder of modernity that manifests
itself in all of these various ways that he identifies as disorders. For Conyers, the root disorder
is the shift from vocation to choice. The fallout from nominalism has led to an anthropological
shift. Instead of seeing the job of humans to listen to and obey God, the task is to choose, to
construct, to control. All of the disorders identified by Conyers are genetically related to this
one disorder. It has caused the four shifts, and the emphasis on control and mastery that leads
to distraction, isolation, and the instrumentalization of the human. These aspects that
Conyers labels as “disorders” are more consistently understood as manifestations of the
disorder rooted in the shift to choice, to the will, as the way to be human in the world.

Conclusion
Conyers’s diagnosis of modernity can be summarized as follows. Various shifts,
facilitated in many ways by a changing notion of “toleration,” served to produce a bipolar
vision of society focusing on individuals and the state, dissolving mediating social bonds that
once served to provide meaning and purpose. In addition, a different view of the natural
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world led to the belief that meaning and purpose must be imposed by human willing, which
leads to power and conflict.193 This root disorder of individualism and a lack of meaning gives
rise to other disorders (or other symptoms of this one disorder) such as violence, in which
individuals and states seek to use power to gain more power since power has become the new
goal in the absence of other meaning. Evangelical theopolitical imagination that finds a stake
in promoting the democratic nation-state or free-market capitalism is not only blind to such
dangers and disorders but can actually serve to promote them and the way they shape social
imaginaries.
Conyers’s genealogy of toleration and its relation to modernity must be properly
situated within his broader theological concerns in relation to the modern world, theological
concerns that I first addressed in the previous chapters. He sets up a contrast for Christian
theology. There are two modes for of approaching theology: “first, ‘vocational’ in form and
content, or, second, one that is formed by the primacy of ‘choice’ in all human endeavors,
even theology.”194 To expand, he explains, “Until the modern period, advances in philosophy
and theology borrowed heavily from the sentiment of vocation. Ideas were not true because
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they captured the imagination, but they captured the imagination because they were true.”195
While previous thinkers sought to discover and conform to a truth independent of themselves
(vocation), modern thinkers are pressured to be resourceful and inventive, ultimately
responsible for coming up with the truth they espouse (choice).196 This simple distinction,
between vocation and choice, serves to frame the way Conyers views all of modernity,
including the relationship between the state and the individual.
Toleration, then, serves to facilitate the shift from an emphasis on the truth of
theological concerns to an emphasis on jettisoning such disagreements in favor of a strong
state. Once disagreements are demoted to issues to be “tolerated,” they slowly lose their power
and ultimate significance. Toleration is a sinister doctrine because it promises protection from
danger, but its price is a notion of truth. Conyers’s diagnosis of modernity, then, flows out of
this theological distinction between truth as given or truth as made.197
While Conyers unpacks this diagnosis in his final two books, he leaves the remedies
primarily in the final book, The Listening Heart. It is to these remedies that we now turn, in
order to evaluate whether Conyers has the resources for an evangelical theopolitical
imagination, resources that can avoid an oversimplified use of Scripture and inspire
consistent and faithful Christian discipleship.
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4
BIBLICAL BUT NOT SIMPLE: CONYERS AND VOCATIONAL THEOLOGY

Introduction
Conyers’s work confronts modern disorders with a recovery of the theological concept
of vocation, which reopens a proper Christian worldview and reestablishes important
Christian practices for resisting sin and being the church, thus aiding in the reimagination of
space and time. His work on vocation demonstrates how evangelicals can remain committed
to the Bible while moving into more nuanced and careful readings of Scripture than can help
overcome the oversimplified readings that are often offered.1 Conyers not only paints a picture
of the crisis of modern culture, he also proposes a theocentric, constructive project for
navigating the modern world. He connects various other constructive themes to vocation in
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The Southern Partisan published an essay by Conyers on the topic of religion in the South: A. J.
Conyers, “The Real Old Time Religion,” Southern Partisan 23, no. 3 (2004): 16–20, 26. Conyers’s overall
argument was that religion in the South was becoming more like religion in the North, but that
southern religious communities used to be able to resist certain disorders that plagued their northern
counterparts, such as Puritanism, fundamentalism, and paganism. Of particular interest here is the fact
that Conyers’s drew approvingly on examples from southern religious leaders on how to read the Bible:
“The Church, however, has traditionally understood its teaching as rooted in the historical and literal,
but not confined to it. And the South, as it has been represented in the leaders of her churches, has
successfully resisted an extreme preoccupation with the mere ‘facts’ of the Bible, and instead saw in
these facts a more comprehensive truth” (17). He cited the work of prominent religious leaders,
including B. H. Carroll and James Boyce, both prominent founders of Southern Baptist seminaries, to
show that “there was evidently little dissatisfaction with a less-than-literal reading of the Bible. For
Southerners, there was still no problem in believing that truth is conveyed by poetry, parable, and
rhetoric, as well as by straight, hard data” (18). In this essay, Conyers discusses the interpretation of
Scripture explicitly, especially in opposition to biblicism. His work on modernity, as we will see in this
chapter, puts this way of reading Scripture to practice by moving beyond simply translating “hard data”
found in Scripture, but seeking to be formed by the way Scripture informs ideas like vocation and
community. He rejects fundamentalism, which “fails to appreciate the subtlety of the intellect,
thinking that truth presents itself in univocal and transparent ways to a mind innocent of paradox or
metaphor” (19).
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order to begin to build a response, one cut short by his death. To understand his response fully,
and to extend it where it is undeveloped, we must turn to its roots. I argue that there are three
primary roots. I have already explored the first root: Conyers’s concern for highlighting the
theological binary between vocation and choice guides his response. The second root is
William Gilmore Simms, a nineteenth-century literary figure who provides some of the
content for the practice-centered constructive themes that Conyers begins to develop. The
third root of Conyers’s response is a group of constructive themes—both practice-centered
and more explicitly theological—that he turns to in developing his remedies to modernity. I
argue that while some of these resources are no longer usable, others show promise. Since we
dealt with the first root in previous chapters, we will turn to the second and third roots.

Conyers and William Gilmore Simms
Conyers’s diagnosis and remedy of modern ills depends on his encounter with the
work of William Gilmore Simms (1806–1870), though this fact is not immediately apparent. A
prestigious man of letters in the mid-nineteenth century, Simms lived in Charleston, SC. 2 His
literary output was astounding: “one poem and one review a week, on average, over forty-plus
years,”3 and scholars argue that the roots of great Southern writers such as William Faulkner
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For biographical information on Simms, see John Caldwell Guilds, “Introduction,” in The
Simms Reader: Selections from the Writings of William Gilmore Simms, ed. John Caldwell Guilds
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001), 1–35. Edgar Allen Poe once called Simms “the best
novelist which this country has, upon the whole, produced.” See ibid., 26.
3
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and Robert Penn Warren are to be found in Simms.4 He left behind a large amount of
correspondence, and he excelled in fiction, nonfiction, and poetry. He was not only important
because of his literary contributions, but also “as an editor of periodicals; as a molder of
political strategy; as an articulate spokesman for causes; as an early exponent of
environmental protection and agricultural reform; as an antiquarian enamored of history,
books, and art.”5 There is now an active scholarly journal, Simms Review, devoted to his life
and work. Simms’s basic social theories “center upon the importance of home, the need for
stability, the value of work, the requirements of leadership, the protection of the environment,
and reverence for the past—all consistent with the philosophy of the Southern planter class:
noblesse oblige.”6 Identified with the Old South and himself a slaveholder,7 Simms’s
reputation and significance did not survive the Civil War, and it was not until the 1970s and
1980s that he again began to receive scholarly attention.8

4

Ibid., 18.

5

Ibid., 13.

6

Ibid., 24.

7

Ibid., 29.

8

For another theological analysis of some of Simms’s work, see Colin D. Pearce, “Words Upon
a Monument: The Liberalism of Simms’s Public Theology,” Simms Review 16, no. 1 (2008): 24–30. In this
article, Pearce analyzes some comments that Simms made regarding a theological inscription on a
monument. He argues that Simms’s emphasis on the mercy of God demonstrates the influence of
liberalism and Simms’s concern to head off the scorn of Christianity that he saw in other countries
such as France. Pearce argues that Simms was influenced by a strain of theological liberalism and
feared the skepticism he saw in other places. Pearce’s reading of Simms, at least in the case of the letter
he analyzes, contrasts with Conyers’s reading. Conyers clearly views Simms as a conservative
theological voice challenging modernity, while Pearce sees elements of liberalism that would lead
Simms in a different direction. I do not have the expertise or space to adjudicate these readings of
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In 2000, Conyers published an essay in the Simms Review approaching some of
Simms’s poetry and social criticism from a theological perspective. The article’s main task was
to interpret Simms’s Sabbath Lyrics, and Conyers draws on poetry and social criticism in his
treatment. He argues that Simms’s thesis in the Sabbath Lyrics is “A restless society is a more
or less barbarous society, and a more or less violent society.”9 Simms sees (even his 1840s–
1850s version of) the modern world as a restless society that has lost any sense of purpose and
therefore resorts to barbarism and violence. His poetry and social criticism expose this aspect
of society and hold out Christian notions such as purpose and rest as important remedies. In
this poetry, Conyers finds both incisive diagnosis and hope for society because of the
Scriptural imagination that saturates Simms’s work.
Tucked in a short chapter in The Listening Heart, one central passage of Conyers’s final
book shows him drawing on Simms again. (And it should be noted that this chapter is a
reworking of part of the 2000 Simms Review piece.10) While we will deal with the specific
content of this particular chapter below when explaining how “rest” plays into Conyers’s
treatment, the chapter merits brief mention here because Conyers provides some insight into
the influence of Simms on his entire project. Conyers begins the chapter noting the way that

Simms, but the difference merits mention and consideration. Conyers’s theological reading of Simms is
not without challenge.
9

A. J. Conyers, “Simms’s Sabbath Lyrics and the Reclaiming of Sacred Time in the Religious
Imagination,” Simms Review 8, no. 1 (2000): 15.
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The book chapter focuses less on Sabbath Lyrics but employs the work Conyers did on
Simms’s social criticism. In the article, the primary focus is Sabbath Lyrics, while in the book Conyers
shifts his attention to the rootlessness of modernity, the emphasis on motion, and the need for rest
that Simms identifies.
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Hobbes helped facilitate a shift from seeing human life as pursuing purpose and rest to human
life as motion dependent upon will. He then states:
My own awakening to the importance of these matters in the lives of families and
communities, however, did not come from the philosophy of Aristotle or the theology
of Thomas Aquinas. And it did not come from the numbers of thinkers in this century,
capable as they are, who are showing clearly the dangerous fissures in the modern
edifice. Nor did it come from even those who, like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, have helped to
point the way to a better life in community. My awakening came instead with the
almost accidental acquaintance that I made with the writings of [Simms].11
He goes on to note that Simms’s social criticism is “a kind of theology, for he understands
society always in the light of its being called into being by God, the creator and redeemer.”12
One of Simms’s themes is that “while life is effectively wounded by the powerful ravages of
change, it is continually shaped by the promise of that which is its constant goal. The
wounding and the healing take place simultaneously and in the same present world.” But a
difference is found “between those who believe that the wounding is always mortal, and those
who trust that the healing of persons and communities will always prevail in the end.”13
Simms advances these themes through a deep, Scripture-formed imagination,
especially in Sabbath Lyrics, which was the first piece Conyers wrote about. Each of the poems
contains a Scripture reference under the title, and the theme of the individual poem is
informed by that passage. Simms’s Scripture-saturated imagination is not one of simple proof-
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texting, but of deep meditation on passages. Simms’s work was not simply informed but
formed by the text of Scripture.
Conyers’s short portions dealing with Simms reveal that Simms is one source for the
major theme that orients Conyers: the concept that he would later articulate as “vocational
theology,” an insistence on the calling of God being primary over the choice of humans. At the
same time, Conyers links this theme to his eschatological orientation: part of the purpose that
Christians cling to is rooted in hope that God prevails in the end.

Constructive Themes in Conyers’s Work
Now that we understand the guiding role of Simms, I turn to explaining Conyers’s
constructive themes for resisting problems in modernity. Conyers provides a helpful
foundation by not only pointing to the role tolerance plays in modernity but also in the
change that occurred in the use of tolerance. The most value from his work, however, comes
from his constructive themes, from what he has to say when he turns to the question of what
Christian communities can do to resist modernity’s problems. In what follows, I explore these
constructive themes in two stages. First, I analyze “practice-centered themes,” focusing on
what Conyers proposes to do in light of modern problems. Second, I analyze “traditional
doctrinal themes,” seeking to understand the role that theology plays in Conyers’s
constructive moves. These two stages of exploration assume one another and are intertwined,
though it is helpful to separate them to understand each better.
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Practice-Centered Themes
Vocation. Conyers builds his response to modernity on the Christian idea of vocation.
Vocation is
a view in which human life is drawn toward some purpose that is greater than the
individual, one that stands above national interests, that invests life with nobility and
beauty, and that creates “room” for the common life. More than “work” and more than
a “religious identity” or membership in a religious community, it is the notion that
being human means one is drawn toward a destiny—and not simply as a worker or as
a religionist, but as a soul that properly belongs to that which is yet dimly seen, but
which already lays claim to one’s very existence.14
This concept has four distinguishing features that are non-modern. First, the concept of the
call implies an external agent outside of the one being called. Second, this summons is often
against the will of the one being called.15 Third, the calling almost always involves hardships
that must be overcome to answer the call. Finally, the greatest danger lies in the possibility of
being diverted or distracted from the call.16 Christians must recover the idea of vocation in
order to counter modern problems.
Vocation points to the fact that we respond to a reality that is greater than ourselves,
that is not of our own construction. It includes an attractional component: beauty is
experienced in a way similar to vocation, because beauty “beckons us further and whets our
appetite for more and beauty as mere taste and personal preference mirrors the tension
between two competing visions of community life, and two contrary ideas of what forms
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community.”17 The greater reality to which we respond is personal in nature.18 For Conyers,
“The generating influence of this sentiment that lies so deeply within us, and which we call
‘vocation’ out of a certain loss for knowing quite what to call it, is a constant reminder that
something besides human choice defines the true nature of those ties that bind a people
together and to their world.”19 Vocation is about more than just an individual call to do
something; it is about an entire context in which people exist.
The loss of community in the modern world has become a common observation, but
Conyers goes beyond this observation and ties the loss of community in the modern world to
a loss of vocation.20 In the Enlightenment, the human will became the substitute for listening
for a call.21 Vocation was replaced by choice.22 In this reading, modern secular society has been
a long experiment in elevating choice to the level of a basic social principle.23 Conyers draws
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out this contrast further by setting up two views of society. In the natural view, “the main task
of human life together is to cultivate those habits and practices that allow us to ‘connect’ with
a purpose already inherent in the world.” However, in the Enlightenment view, “the point is to
liberate individuals and voluntary associations for the pursuit of ‘happiness’ defined largely in
market terms of private comfort, safety, and material or physical satisfaction.”24 Focusing on
vocation shifts the way life is conceived. The life-forming question is not “What shall I make of
myself?” but “How shall I enter wisely and profitably into the life in which I find myself?”25
Conyers also ties this loss of vocation to the increasing presence of violence in the
modern world. He charts three theories on violence: Hannah Arendt suggests that where
power in the sense of effective action is missing in a community, violence takes its place; René
Girard claims that violence provides focus and strengthens the community by helping it turn
against a scapegoat or enemy; and Eric Voegelin teaches that once society is closed to
transcendent meaning and instead focuses on worldly goods, only violence and revolution
satisfies the competing demands.26 While these theories differ, Conyers sees them overlap at a
critical point: “human beings naturally reach for meaningful action, and not finding it, resort
to irrational and destructive action.”27 When vocation is lost, the only calculus left is an
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instrumental calculus, seeking what works or what is useful for advancing the ends chosen by
the individual will.28
Vocation illuminates a conflict between power and love in the modern world. Love
and power compete as ways for motivating community and relationship. Societies—and
human relationships and actions in general—are dominated either by the strength of love
(attraction to one another, to beauty, to justice, etc.) or by the will, power, and choice invested
in another and represented in law. Actions are determined by love or force.29 Love draws
people toward one another; power forces people apart. In fact, “It is the rivalry between power
in the sense of force as the means of social organization, and affection as the tie that binds
people together, that binds them to their proper tasks, that binds them in creative and loving
ways to their places and their things.”30 Both ways are necessary, but it is the Christian hope
that love will win out and bind everything together in a web of divine calling.31 Conyers argues
that power became an end in itself because nominalist thought led theology to identify God
with absolute power. This identification changes the imitation of God from participating in
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his goodness or love to emulating his power.32 And power itself imitates love in a tempting
way: “Since power (in terms of obligation, law, coercion, rule, organization) imitates the works
of love, and indeed has a role in giving them a ‘place’ in which to work, we are tempted to
think it is a worthy substitute for love… It short-circuits the cultivation of the human spirit,
and compels instead the cooperation of people through the agency (at one level or another) of
fear.”33 Power offers relief from the suffering that love requires; “it tempts us to believe that it
can accomplish quickly what love does only through patience and only fully accomplishes at
the End of All Things.”34 Where the modern world has chosen power over love, it has lost
something valuable for community.
In contrast to power, love draws people together and provides a better foundation for
community. 35 Love surpasses the obligation that power forces: “Through love the person is not
driven but drives, for love has no need of rules; it has outstripped obligation already.”36
Vocation connects to the power of love, because “Vocation appeals but does not intrude; it
points the way but does not compel; its power consists in that it attracts, not that it drives. It is
attractive rather than coercive. It moves us as does a beautiful poem or painting, not as a
threat or an obligation can move us. It is love, not law. In philosophical language, it has to do
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with the final cause of things, not with the efficient cause.”37 True community requires
vocation and its concept of the binding power of love rather than arbitrary force.
Vocation stands for an entire way of viewing the world. It acknowledges that the world
precedes humans and is dependent on Another, a personal being who calls humans into
community and into fellowship. This concept coincides with the theme of piety developed by
Richard Weaver. Vocation aligns with the power of love, for vocation works by its attractive
properties, not coercive properties. When the modern world turned away from vocation, it
turned toward a conception of the world dependent upon power and force, which are
detrimental to true community. In a sense, Conyers diagnoses modernity’s problems as in part
fostering an antipathy toward vocation. Thus, the remedy for this antipathy is to reverse it
through specific practices centered on themes. He identifies five such themes: attention,
tolerance, place, rest, and imitation. These five themes show what it means to nurture
practices that strengthen individuals’ and communities’ sense of vocation. Conyers begins
with attention in general before directing that attention toward others (tolerance), toward
that from whence we come (place), and toward that which calls us to our destiny (rest).38 This
series leads to the concept of imitation, which Conyers employs to describe the way the
Christian community functions.
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Attention. By attention, Conyers means something fairly simple: “to contemplate [an
object] along with its purpose, its highest good, its telos.”39 Its opposite is the distraction that
plagues the modern world. Conyers argues that modern people are distracted because we do
not attend to the objects with which we deal. In the modern world “a thing becomes of value
in a way that is rationally divorced from the thing itself, while in the traditional society the
value is worked into the object and becomes identified with the object itself.”40 We are
distracted because we shift from thinking of objects in their full sense (including teleology)
and instead think of them via an abstract category such as money. This abstraction moves us
away from God as the center because it denies the broader, God-constructed and Godsustained reality of which all objects are a part.41
Attention is the appropriate response to vocation.42 To develop this concept, Conyers
turns to the thought of Simone Weil, specifically an essay entitled “Reflections on the Right
Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of God.”43 In it, she argues that studies develop
the practice of attention and that attention always ultimately turns us toward God. As
Conyers observes, “No matter what the attention first turns us toward, it is in its highest and
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purest form always a reaching toward God, or more to the point, a waiting for God.”44
Attention means overthrowing “vain imaginations” and disposing of a self-centered view of
existence.45
Conyers finds the concept of attention in the eschatological teaching of Jesus,
especially in Matthew 24 and 25. Here he identifies seven parables that prescribe alertness and
watchfulness, an awareness extending beyond the present time to when the master returns; “it
is the kind of awareness that sees even in the present the coming of the Lord.”46 Conyers relates
attention to vision, noting that oftentimes in the Gospels the sign that the Messiah has come
is that the blind recover their sight: “It announces the end of the inattentiveness that Isaiah
described as the fundamental disorder of Israel, an inattentiveness occasioned by the
unwillingness to listen or look.”47 These concepts do not center on the self, but on something
external and greater.
Attention focuses on the truth of reality rather than the anesthetizing power of wishes.
It acknowledges that we are called into a journey with and toward God, a journey that
requires pain because any true, deep, and lasting change or growth requires pain. The danger
is not pain, but distraction from the true way that things are. We become conformed to the
things to which we attend, and the things to which we attend also influence the types of
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communities we form together.48 Rather than seek the supposedly inevitable progress that the
modern world advertises, we must truly attend to the world as God created it and seek to be
conformed to what God calls us to be. Only then will we understand properly how to relate to
others in community. Attending involves us in “that which it means to live in the promised
and anticipated image of God, and that which is the concrete reality of the moment.”49
Attending focuses on concrete reality illuminated by the high purpose toward which God is
calling people.

Tolerance. Next Conyers applies the concept of attention to interaction between
people, especially with regard to differing ideas. He returns to the concept of tolerance,
covering the ground from his book The Long Truce: “For more than three hundred years now,
the term ‘toleration’ or ‘tolerance’ has served the purpose of disguising the agenda of powerful
states and centralized bureaucracies—the great engines that help to produce a mass
society.”50 After briefly covering the thesis of the previous book, he connects it to vocation and
argues, “the lure of power and wealth in early modernity served as a highly potent distraction,”
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because it theoretically justified setting aside the central vocation of humanity for the sake of
power and wealth.51
In opposition to this false toleration, Conyers suggests the practice of toleration as a
key aspect of recovering good habits necessary for vocation and life together. He explains that
toleration “has more akin to silence than to discourse. It is the habit of not cutting off your
interlocutor before listening to what he or she has to say.”52 Rooted in the “idea of truth that
can be common to everyone because it is real for everyone,”53 tolerance opens to the truth and
recognizes that the truth is true for all people. Recovering a true sense of vocation requires the
habit of carefully listening to others for the sake of discerning real truth rather than smoothing
over differences using various modern strategies. Truly attending to people requires the
genuine practice of toleration.54
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This “return” to the practice of toleration is the weakest of Conyers’s practice-centered
themes. Since he has gone to such great lengths to problematize toleration in connection with the
modern world, it is wiser to turn to other Christian virtues rather than trying to rehabilitate a lost
practice that can be confusing in connection with modern abuses. Instead of proposing right toleration,
Conyers would be better served to focus on virtues such as humility, hospitality, forgiveness, and love.
He sees these as undergirding the practice of toleration, but by turning again to that language he
produces more confusion rather than clarity and a path forward.
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Place.55 Next Conyers turns to the notion of place, for “the concreteness of vocation
depends upon the fact that it is addressed to real people who reside in real places; and apart
from real places, there are no real people.”56 He first shows this concern for “place” and its
importance for theology in a 1983 article on liberation theology. There he argues that speaking
on the concrete level of real individuals in real places connects to people of any age and place:
“No matter how concrete and particular we get, there is something so common, so inalienable,
in humanity that we can each view that bit of experience with sympathy and profit.”57 This
view provided him with a critique of liberation theology, which while claiming to deal in the
concrete actually dealt more in the “middle” at the level of categories of people, not with real,
actual people. The idea of “place” and concreteness continued to play a role in his thought on
modernity, and it ties in clearly with the thought of the Southern Agrarians and Richard
Weaver.
Conyers notes that in modern times, the tendency to abstraction weakens the
importance of place, and the modern spirit of conquest changes the way people relate to real
places.58 However, people are not called to be conquerors of places but stewards of places. The
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modern world “is about the dream of always transcending limits. ‘Place’ always ties us to earth,
to the land, to the dust from which we came, and to the good creation that is not our own
creation but is made by Another. ‘Place’ humbles us, but it also causes us to think (as Gerhart
Niemeyer used to say) about real possibilities instead of possible realities.”59 In an earlier work
Conyers’s relayed the sentiment well: “The realm that moves beyond actually existing people
and things necessarily moves beyond love.”60 Place provides the real context for human living.
Place is significant not only in being particular but also in the way that it connects
individuals to universal reality. “A place is significant, and we speak and sing of it, because it
offers to us a door by which we know what is true for all people, everywhere. It doesn’t just
speak of itself—though it never ceases to speak of itself—but it speaks of that which is truly
catholic, truly universal—not bound by, but prior to, time and space.”61 Conyers ties this way
that place ties us to the universal to the incarnation. The way that the incarnation as a
doctrine functions in Conyers’s argument will be dealt with in more detail in the next section.
He turns to Eudora Welty to argue that place is important because it is where people put
down roots, roots that reach a deep and running vein that is eternal and consistent.62
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Rest. In turning to the practice of rest, Conyers draws on the idea of purpose that
orients life. He briefly covers ground from his diagnosis of modernity, pointing out the fact
that the modern world shifted from viewing reality as pursuing rest or purpose to constant
motion. This diagnosis critiques the loss of final causation and the exaltation of the material
and efficient causes as the only causes worth considering.63 In this conception of the world,
human willing imposes any meaning or purpose. Meaning is not something already put there
by Another.
To draw out the concept of rest, Conyers turns specifically to the work of Simms.64
Reflecting on some of Simms’s poetry, Conyers notes that the theme “underscored the
remarkable difference between a society whose aim is a settled and harmonious life, and one
whose aim is pressing toward the limits of industry and dynamism.”65 Conyers views Simms’s
social criticism as a kind of theology, “for he understands society always in the light of its
being called into being by God, the creator and redeemer.”66 Three themes emerge in Simms’s
social criticism: “domesticity and civilization, the sirens of money and commerce, and the
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idea of vocation or purpose in life.”67 The concept of “domesticity” refers to the intention to be
in a place long term. Mobility and transitoriness decrease people’s power to develop civilizing
institutions because they do not think about long-term needs. Money and commerce tempt
people to reductionism, because they subordinate social goals to money and social life to
commerce. This reduction has the same effect that rootlessness has, working against the
cultivation of life-sustaining institutions that cultivate a broader perspective, vocation, and
purpose. Simms’s primary concern is to cultivate permanence in order to better achieve a
sense of vocation and purpose.68 He “uses terms such as permanence, purpose, ‘rest,’ stability,
eternity, and ‘place’ as the fundamentals of civilization. This contradicts the modern
preference for movement, change, dynamism, progress, and revolution, as indicators of health
and prosperity.”69 Rest is an ancient idea: “In the ancient and medieval mind, the contrary of
this inexorable ruin to which all things run in time is the notion of ‘rest,’ which means that
time runs toward a goal or purpose—an eschatological goal, a telos—that is secure against
the ravages of Chronos.”70 Simms’s work develops the importance of both place and rest, but
especially the overarching importance of purpose and vocation in giving order to human life
and human communities.
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Morality itself is at stake in the theme of rest. For “if motion is simply motion and
there is no purpose in any motion, then the world itself is without any possible moral
structure and our lives have no moral existence in which to participate.”71 In order to shape
communities that have humane and generous expectations, we must see life itself as bearing
moral purpose and the world “as a place in which the hardships, the suffering, and the
uncertainties are but stations on the way to that for which each of us is cast into the world.”72
Without this sense, communities become places for individual wills to be brought into
conflict, and power and violence serve as the only arbiters. While Conyers draws on Simms
explicitly in connection with rest, Simms’s shadow lurks in much of Conyers’s response,
especially in connection with vocation as an overarching theme.

Imitation. Conyers turns to the concept of imitation to draw vocation-centered
practices together to propose a return to community. Ultimately, the vocation of the Christian
is imitation of God facilitated by the body of Christ, the church.73 Imitation is participation, a
holistic following of a way.74 Conyers situates this theme in the mimetic theory of René Girard.
Girard explains violence by arguing that human desires are mimetic (drawn from others), and
they thus lead to violent rivalry. Violence taken out on a scapegoat brings temporary peace.
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Conyers argues that the gospel, in contrast, disarms the scapegoat mechanism by taking the
point of view of the victim and promoting self-giving. The power of imitation then is
transferred to imitating Jesus, to the following of a way. Imitation works on the power of
attraction, not the power of coercion.75
Though Conyers is obviously not the only theologian to deal with Girard, extensively
comparing him to others falls beyond the scope of this chapter because Conyers does not
develop a Girardian theory. Instead, he uses a basic understanding of mimetic theory as a
basis for imitation of God. Two works prove useful in providing more theological context to
this discussion: Michael Kirwan's Discovering Girard76 and Girard and Theology.77 Put simply,
mimetic theory “is a theory which seeks to elucidate the relationships—one might say the
complicity—between religion, culture and violence.” The theory has three parts: “the mimetic
nature of desire; the scapegoat mechanism as the way in which societies regulate the violence
generated by mimetic competition; and the importance of the Gospel revelation as the way in
which the scapegoat mechanism is exposed and rendered ineffective.”78 Kirwan divides
Girard’s work into three groups: (1) three classic texts in which mimetic theory takes shape
(Deceit, Desire and the Novel; Violence and the Sacred; Things Hidden since the Foundation of the
World); (2) other books in which mimetic theory is applied; and (3) important but less
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accessible sources such as interviews, journals, or books not translated into English.79 In
Conyers’s treatment of Girard in The Listening Heart, he cites The Scapegoat.80 While it is
judged to be a good introduction to Girard, it would fall in Kirwan’s second group of texts,
“other books in which mimetic theory is applied.” It was written in 1982, almost five years after
the last of Kirwan’s “classic texts.” While Conyers’s use of Girard alludes to an acquaintance
with other texts as well, The Scapegoat is what he uses.
While Kirwan’s Discovering God provides a basic outline of mimetic theory, his Girard
and Theology provides helpful connections between Girard’s work and its reception among
theologians: “What cannot be denied… is the extraordinary generative power of Girard’s
mimetic theory: its capacity to generate or provoke additional theoretical work of enormous
range and calibre, which is relatively independent of Girard’s own intellectual
commitments.”81 Kirwan explores the influence of Girard on Dramatic Theology associated
with University of Innsbruck and Raymund Schwager and the convergence of Girard’s thought
with Karl Rahner’s “theological anthropology.” Finally, he explores the impact of Girard on
theories of sacrifice and atonement, biblical criticism, and political and liberation theologies.
Kirwan shows that theological uses of Girard are diverse.
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This brief foray into Kirwan’s work leads to a guarded assessment of Conyers’s use of
Girard. Conyers is quite brief and basic: he takes Girard at face value and then draws
conclusions from what Girard says. He does not develop it but uses it as a basis for arguing for
the imitation of God. He is focused not on the mechanism as related to explaining violence,
but as related to imitation, which he traces back into early Christianity.
The early church encouraged imitation through the teaching of Jesus and the apostles
and through the use of imitation in cultivating Christian lives. On one hand, Conyers makes
room for violent power, acknowledging that it will stand alongside the new order of the gospel
as long as the fallen world exists. Violent power is meant to restrain evil while the gospel
works positive good in the world.82 However, Christian community is built around a calling to
imitate Christ’s generosity, what Conyers calls “the mimetic rivalry of giving” built around a
pattern of serving, giving to, and loving others.83 This notion leads to the concept that all
members of the community are one—not equal—in that they receive different gifts that
contribute to the overall unity.84 In this way, “the church itself is an imitative community, one
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devoted to learning the pattern of life found in Christ and practiced by those in the church.”85
This mimetic pattern flows from God and continues into the life of every believer.
The recovery of vocation via these practices has at least three important features that
Conyers identifies. First, the sense of divine vocation is communal: the call of God embraces
the world and all who are in it, drawing people not into a mimetic rivalry of violence but a
mimetic rivalry of generosity. Second, the virtues of generosity, kindness, mercy, and
forgiveness fit better in this view of life. Third, this concept of vocation has more room for true
difference, for
Races, genders, language groupings, and the like, are classically points of
misunderstanding and conflict. But they also represent ways in which we grasp the
world differently, through different cultures and sentiments, through various
metaphors and syntax. As such, each of these human differences can be the basis for
understanding existence in a valid, albeit partial, way. Thus our insights, shaded
toward different emphases, enjoying and using the world in our slightly different ways,
we are enabled to enrich the greater community.86
In fact, “While giving expression to what is temporally divided, we begin together to give
witness to what is finally united. For the end of all things is the God who calls us, in whom we
find rest, by whose one light we find our separate ways toward that city ‘not made with hands,
eternal, in heaven.’”87 For Conyers, it all boils down to an essential argument: “Only when
members of a community understand life as a response to a large and generous world, created
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by a great and merciful Providence, will the possibilities of life together become more fully
realized.”88
Conyers’s “practice-centered themes” serve as a foothold for developing healthy
communities, the bonds of which help counteract the modern tendency to isolate existence
between the twin poles of the sovereign centralized power and the autonomous individual.
They are focused on recovering and sustaining the Christian idea of vocation. In order to
better understand what undergirds this turn to vocation and the associated themes, we will
turn to the role that traditional doctrinal themes play in Conyers’s work.

Traditional Doctrinal Themes
While most of Conyers’s constructive work on navigating modernity focuses on the
idea of vocation, traditional doctrinal themes play two roles: he often brings doctrines
explicitly into the discussion, and doctrines also implicitly support other themes. Two in
particular are important: the Trinity and the Incarnation. For Conyers, a proper
understanding of the Trinity impacts our understanding of what the imago Dei is and what it
means to imitate God. The Incarnation provides the logic for the importance of the particular,
especially with regard to place, as hinted at above. I will deal with each of these doctrines in
turn.

Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity corrects inappropriate conceptions of power in the
modern world. After the shift to nominalism, God became more identified with absolute
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power, and thus imitating God meant exercising power over the world.89 This change fed into
the modern desire for control and the emphasis on the human will as the creator of meaning
and significance:90 “God, therefore, whose reality ultimately expresses the end of all existence,
is identified with power.”91 However, Conyers, drawing partly on the work of Moltmann,
points to the Trinity as a helpful corrective to this tendency.
Focusing on the Trinity redefines the way we understand God, moving away from
identifying God with power through the asserting of the divine will and toward a concept of
love. God’s unity in diversity opens up better possibilities: “For, by virtue of the Trinitarian
nature of God, the significance of God’s unity is shared with his diversity. In answer to the
question, ‘What is real, the unity of things or the diversity of things?’ the Trinity answers
both.”92 This idea helps Conyers accept the critique of power of someone like Moltmann
without entirely rejecting hierarchy. Monotheism taken as a replacement for trinitarian
doctrine is dangerous because it irons out difference and emphasizes power, but a proper
trinitarian view of God opens up space for difference while still being oriented to a hierarchy
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of love and goodness.93 For “love itself constructs a hierarchy of values: we love, or should love,
those things most valuable more than those things that are of less value. We make judgments
on the basis of that hierarchy of values. We anticipate or hope for things that are of proximate
and immediate importance, or of ultimate importance.”94
The function of the Trinity in Conyers’s thought becomes clearer when brought into
conversation with contemporary work on the Trinity, specifically social trinitarianism (ST).
ST of various sorts uses the Trinity as a model for social relations, and this approach has fallen
victim to a significant amount of criticism.95 ST is situated within a trend in contemporary
systematic theology to reclaim the doctrine of the Trinity, which by many accounts was
neglected in the theological writings of the preceding several centuries. In an essay promoting
the ST viewpoint, John Franke ties various thinkers to ST: John Zizioulas, Jürgen Moltmann,
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Leonardo Buff, Colin Gunton, Alan Torrance, Millard Erickson, and
Stanley Grenz.96 In essence, ST argues that there was a divide between the way the Eastern
and Western churches understood the Trinity. The Western emphasis on oneness, channeled
particularly through Augustine, came to negatively impact the modern world. On the other
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hand, the Eastern emphasis on relationality among the persons provides a corrective to these
Western problems.
This use of the Trinity has come under significant criticism recently. In an essay
analyzing the problems of ST, Mark Husbands notes two primary issues. First, he argues that
ST fails to preserve an ontological distinction between God and humanity, a distinction
needed to maintain an order consistent with their distinct natures. For Husbands, “The
inherent danger in failing to maintain this ontological distinction is the possibility that one’s
doctrine of God will be eclipsed by any number of contemporary social, cultural or political
concerns.”97 Second, he argues that while STs claim to hearken back to an Eastern
understanding of the Trinity, especially in the work of the Cappadocian fathers, they in fact
fail to read these sources correctly. Husbands provides a helpful overview of contemporary
historical work on these issues, done primarily by Lewis Ayres and Michel René Barnes,98 and
he also gives his own reading of Gregory of Nyssa that shows the problems with ST.
Beyond the question of whether ST uses the doctrine of the Trinity correctly—
especially as received from the early church—is the question of whether Christians are to use
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the doctrine of the Trinity at all. Kathryn Tanner broaches this idea in an article on the Trinity
in particular connection to political theology. She argues that we should not focus on the
Trinity simply to apply what we learn to ourselves; instead, we should learn from the Trinity
what God is doing for humans, which then has implications for how humans relate to one
another.99 As Daniel Treier and David Lauber explain it, “We learn about the Father, Son and
Holy Spirit not to reproduce trinitarian relations, but to participate in appropriate human
relations with the triune God and accordingly with each other.”100 The trend in contemporary
theology is away from ST and its use of the Trinity.
The issue of ST brings up two questions related to Conyers’s treatment of the Trinity.
First, where does Conyers fit with regard to ST? Second, how exactly does the turn to the
Trinity function in Conyers’s work, and if he uses the Trinity inappropriately, is his project
marred beyond repair?
Conyers draws on the diversity within the Trinity to counter the emphasis on absolute
power seen in modern politics, following the work of Moltmann, whom some consider the
leading figure in ST. A close examination of what Conyers is doing with the Trinity and the
social implications he draws distinguishes him from a “hard” ST: he does not argue that the
various roles within the Trinity correspond to various roles within society, and he does not
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explicitly argue that individual Christians are called into the trinitarian relations. Instead,
Conyers proposes what I will call a “soft” ST: he argues that the existence of threeness in God
short-circuits any attempt to identify God with absolute power and instead tends Christians
toward forms of order that recognize difference. This in turn weakens the tendency to seek
power and control in the world, but it does not equate certain aspects with certain Persons of
the Trinity. Conyers turns to the Trinity to counteract the potentia absoluta of nominalism
more than he seeks to make the Trinity a social program.
Approaching the question of Conyers’s relation to ST from another angle, we turn to
his teaching on the Trinity in his Basic Christian Theology. In trying to explain the concept of
“person” in a way that avoids modern notions of individualism, Conyers turns to the idea of
relationality. He says, “This brings us to the heart of what is meant by the persons of the
Godhead. It is seen in this, in fact, that God—and, by extension, reality itself—is profoundly
and even essentially relational.”101 In this work he does not make the typical ST moves from the
Trinity to social programs, but his reliance on relationality clearly connects him to the
dominant thought of ST.
Next we turn to the second question, regarding the viability of Conyers’s project in
light of what, in the eyes of some, would be termed trinitarian missteps. Assessing this
requires understanding the role that the Trinity plays, what “work” it does. While Conyers’s
use of Moltmann and his emphasis on the diversity in the Trinity certainly connects him to ST
in some way, the Trinity functions merely to counter absolute power in his argument, not as
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the major foundation for any particular social ordering. The connection to the influence of ST
cannot be denied due to the connection to Moltmann and the language Conyers often
employs, but his project is not tied to the fate of ST because Conyers’s “use” of the Trinity plays
a minor role in the entire project. For Conyers, the doctrine of the Trinity does not provide a
specific pattern for social relationships so much as it shifts our emphasis from power to love
and prepares us for different conceptions of power.102 Conyers demonstrates a similar move
from trinitarian doctrine in an earlier work on cloning. He says, “The questions raised,
coincidentally, correspond to three values inherent in the Christian view of life: the
distinction within life, the unity of life, and the givenness of life. As the Trinity combines
distinction, unity, and self-giving, mutually receiving love, so the natural experience of birth
seems to give daily witness to those same three qualities. The ethical must come to grips with
those three.”103 Here he is not proposing the Trinity as a pattern for social relationships but
shows how qualities related to the Trinity connect to modern concerns. He does not so much
use the doctrine of the Trinity for certain social ends as he shows how the logic of the Trinity
promotes certain values and counters abuses in modern life. Just as Conyers saw the Trinity
serving to form the moral imagination in relation to cloning, here he draws on it to form the
theopolitical imagination. The Trinity protects against the modern quest for power and
control by preventing monotheism from being used to legitimate forms of power.
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In the end, Conyers’s use of the Trinity does fall victim in some ways to the critiques of
ST. However, this problem does not devastate the entire project. For the most part, Conyers
uses the Trinity to reject the conception of God as pure power that occurred after the rise of
nominalism; such resistance could be made from other theological quarters as well. ST
explanations of the Trinity are not vital to this move, because Conyers could just have simply
rejected the nominalist turn that exacerbated this problem with power. This argument would
work the same way in his overall project. Thus, while Conyers’s connections to ST are rightly
questioned and criticized, it does not negate his contribution. In fact, as Stephen Holmes
notes, “social trinitarianism uses the doctrine of the Trinity to answer questions the fathers
answered by Christology,”104 for while Christians are not told to imitate the Trinity, we are told
to imitate Christ. Conyers makes this move as well. His positive work is more dependent upon
other doctrines, such as the incarnation, which connects more clearly to the practice of
imitation that he highlights in his work.

Incarnation. The incarnation is the second doctrine that plays an important role in
Conyers’s arguments. Conyers’s rightly holds the incarnation central to Christian theology.105
This focus starts with his treatment of toleration. The doctrinal basis for this practice of
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toleration is the incarnation.106 Conyers founds toleration not with speculation or abstract
principles, but by calling attention to an historical fact “that here is a pervasive belief that has
had enormous impact upon the traditions of the West, is at the same time not confined to the
West, and offers a basis for practice. And the practice it engenders is, by the force of its own
internal logic, one of tolerance and openness toward other human beings.”107 The incarnation
is a resource for a certain level of humility that allows for listening to others: “to listen in
expectation of hearing truth from others whose doctrine differs from our own—is the highest
form of loyalty to the insight that we all rely upon a common reality, created by the One God
who makes himself known in human flesh.”108 The incarnation provides a path forward in
three ways. First, it asserts that there is meaning in existence without reducing meaning to a
set of given propositions. Instead, the meaning of existence is seeking the telos that can only
be found in God.109 Second, the incarnation reveals the paradoxical relationship of authority
and humility. The humiliation of God becoming human in the incarnation is at the same time
the exaltation of humans in God. “Power is truly exercised as it is given up. Humiliation and
exaltation go together.”110 And third, the incarnation opens the way toward trust rather than
fear as the key to relationships between humans and between humans and the world. The
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incarnation “asserts that though the world is full of suffering, and often warrants fear and
mistrust, it is nevertheless not destined to remain that way, and it is therefore not essentially a
reality to be feared and distrusted.”111 The incarnation turns from fear and points to trust.
The theme of “place” and its importance for vocation also rests to a degree on the
doctrine of the incarnation. The incarnation ties together the particular and the universal.112
Conyers states, “The ‘incarnational’ truth of place is that particular places, with their own
regional characteristics, and their own kind of community, nevertheless speak of that which is
true for all people everywhere, and for all time.”113 In fact, the importance of place is “a
reflection of the Mystery of the Incarnation. That is, God himself made himself known, in a
particular man, of a particular people, in a particular place. And he did so not in order to lead
men to that place (as thousands of pilgrims thought), but in order to lead them to their own
place—and through that place to the God who made them and placed them there.”114 In this
case, the particular nature of the incarnation combats the abstracting tendencies of the
modern world in order to strengthen the importance of particular people in their particular
places. This is not because there is no universal, but because access to the universal comes
through rootedness in the particular. Conyers uses the incarnation to combat the
universalizing tendencies of modernity, as well as the tendencies of nominalism, which holds
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that only individual things truly exist. The incarnation helps us understand that place is
particular but it connects to the universal.115
Conyers’s reflections on modernity are theologically guided and determined, although
the various doctrines in play tend to exist below the surface of other themes that he draws on.
This treatment of Trinity and incarnation demonstrates how these two particular doctrines
undergird and provide substance for his project.

Conclusion
Conyers’s response to modern problems can be summarized by the concept of
vocation. It forms his critique of modernity and postmodernity (vocational theology versus
theology of choice), and it informs his vision for navigating the modern world. For him this
idea includes choices of theological method and visions of the world generated by figures such
as William Gilmore Simms but also firmly rooted in a biblically formed imagination. It yields
important related themes that can serve as resources for resisting modern ills. His work also
resists easy conservative-liberal categorization, exposes problems in modern institutions, and
uses the Bible as a nuanced and powerful resource without resorting to oversimplification by
using the Bible to shape vision, imagination, and themes more than simple proof-texting. But
there is one more way that Conyers work addresses the weaknesses earlier identified in
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evangelical theopolitical imagination: he also serves as a bridge to dialogue with the wider
world of Christian political theology. To this we now turn.
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5
BUILDING A BRIDGE TO POLITICAL THEOLOGY: WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH
AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONYERS

Introduction
The works of Baptist theologian A. J. Conyers and the work of Roman Catholic
theologian William Cavanaugh provide an opportunity for drawing together evangelical and
Catholic thought on questions of political theology. Their work is analogous in many ways,
and they can strengthen one another while also leading to a common social imagination for
navigating the modern world, especially with regard to the state,1 consumerism, and
globalization. Over the last twenty years, Cavanaugh has become a leading voice in Christian
political theology,2 seeking to influence Christian moral imagination.3 He provides a
compelling description of the faithful church with reference to the nation-state, consumerism,
and globalization and develops important ways to re-conceptualize the Christian
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insufficient attention to the role of nationalism outside of the state’s purview. See Braden P. Anderson,
Chosen Nation: Scripture, Theopolitics, and the Project of National Identity (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books,
2012).
2

Cavanaugh situates his own project thus: “I am a Christian theologian, and I write in the first
instance for other Christians. My principal concern is to help Christians to be realistic about what they
can expect from the powers and principalities of the present day, especially the nation-state and the
market, and to urge Christians not to invest the entirety of their social and political presence in these
institutions. My goal as a Christian theologian is to help the church be more faithful to God in Jesus
Christ. In the present day, I think that faithfulness means taking a hard look at political and economic
structures many Christians take for granted” (see William T. Cavanaugh, “If You Render Unto God
What Is God’s, What Is Left for Caesar?,” Review of Politics 71 [2009]: 607).
3

Cavanaugh relies on thinkers such as Benedict Anderson and Charles Taylor for this concept
of moral imagination.
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understanding of space and time. He deconstructs the way that the modern world determines
and shapes Christian imagination in directions that are counter to Christian theology—
Christian soteriology in particular—and he draws on theology as a source for resisting these
conceptions.
I group Cavanaugh’s work into four clusters: three related to his diagnosis (the nationstate, capitalism and consumerism, and globalization) and one related to his remedy (the
Eucharist). For Cavanaugh, the Eucharist serves as the remedy because it provides an
explicitly Christian formation that corrects the problematic formation he identifies in
modernity. We will consider how the Eucharist informs his view of the nation-state,
consumerism, and globalization and forms his solutions while also informing his very
diagnosis of modernity’s problems. The Eucharist “brackets” Cavanaugh’s treatment of
modernity; it serves as his standard for evaluating modernity and his basis for remedying the
problems he identifies.4
Conyers’s “vocational theology” serves a similar function, bracketing the diagnosis and
remedy. As I progress through these clusters of Cavanaugh’s work, I will bring Conyers and
Cavanaugh into dialogue in order to show how each strengthens and challenges the other.5

4

I must thank Nathan Willowby for pointing this “bracketing” out to me in one of our many
conversations on the development of this dissertation.
5

While no reference to Cavanaugh exists in Conyers’s corpus to my knowledge, Cavanaugh
does demonstrate at least some exposure to Conyers. In his “Killing for the Telephone Company,”
Cavanaugh cites Conyers’s Long Truce. However, he does not interact with Conyers’s overarching
thesis in the book; instead he merely employs a minor portion, Conyers’s treatment of Locke and the
common good. See William T. Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State
Is Not the Keeper of the Common Good,” Modern Theology 20, no. 2 (April 2004): 253–54. Alternatively,
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Conyers’s work contributes depth in diagnosing what modernity is and provides an ecclesially
broad response that I argue Cavanaugh lacks, a response motivated by Conyers’s desire for
evangelical theology to develop a “truly catholic vision.” Making such a comparison will
demonstrate the constructive potential that Conyers’s work provides for a new wave of
evangelical political theology, a wave that takes the nation-state more seriously and seeks
more nuanced approaches to forming Christian moral imagination in relation to navigating
the modern world.

Cavanaugh’s Diagnosis of Modernity
Cavanaugh’s diagnosis of the modern world clusters into three frames. First, his work
on the emergence and dominance of the nation-state shows that the nation-state employs
various types of liturgies that discipline Christians to see the world and serve the state in a
certain way. Christians then often fail to consider the full implications of the state’s project or
its origin. Second, his work on consumerism shows how the logic of the market has come to
influence Christians’ lives. Third, his analysis of globalization and the way he connects it to
both consumerism and the nation-state challenges the optimism with which many Christians
view the world. We will explore each of these in turn to better understand Cavanaugh’s vision
of modernity’s problems.6

see the reprinted version of this essay, in Theopolitical Imagination: Christian Practices of Space and
Time (New York: T&T Clark, 2003), 21–22.
6

In this analysis, I rely primarily on Cavanaugh’s published books because in most cases they
serve as the most developed version of his ideas expressed in earlier essays. For instance, three of the
books are collections of previous essays, which demonstrates Cavanaugh’s own perception of those
essays as important enough to his project to merit republication in book form. In the case of his The
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Nation-State
Cavanaugh’s attention to the nation-state’s power has spanned his theological career,
from his dissertation on torture (Duke University, 1996),7 to his book The Myth of Religious
Violence (2009),8 and beyond.9 It has also garnered him attention in the field of political
theology. At the root of his various arguments about the nation-state, Cavanaugh shows that
the nation-state operates soteriologically: it has become a simulacrum, offering the definitive
solutions to humanity’s problems. As he states: “public devotion formerly associated with
Christianity in the West never did go away, but largely migrated to a new realm defined by the
nation-state.”10 The nation-state has come to shape the way Christians perceive reality, both
what is real and what is possible. In what follows I will expound Cavanaugh’s work on the
nation-state by first explaining his exposure of the nation-state’s creation myth, and second

Myth of Religious Violence, he worked on the themes from the publication of his 1995 “A Fire Strong
Enough to Consume the House” to the publication of the book in 2009. While I will turn to other essays
at times, the books will be the central component for these reasons.
7

Published as William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of
Christ (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998).
8

William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of
Modern Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
9

For instance, see William T. Cavanaugh, “The Invention of Fanaticism,” Modern Theology 27,
no. 2 (April 2011): 226–37.
10

William T. Cavanaugh, Migrations of the Holy: God, State, and the Political Meaning of the
Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 1. The “migration” terminology comes from the work of
Sheldon Wolin, whose 1960 Politics and Vision has recently been expanded as Politics and Vision:
Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, exp. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2006). For an analysis of Wolin’s use of migration and its relation to the work of Henri de Lubac,
see C. C. Pecknold, “Migrations of the Host: Fugitive Democracy and the Corpus Mysticum,” Political
Theology 11, no. 1 (2010): 77–101.
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exploring the way the nation-state frames reality and posits an alternative soteriology.11
Setting up this foundation will allow us to move on to Cavanaugh’s treatment of consumerism
and globalization, which are connected to the work he does on the nation-state.
The nation-state maintains its relatively unquestioned power by telling a tale of its
origins that sets up a problem for which the state is the only solution. In The Myth of Religious
Violence, Cavanaugh dismantles the idea that religion is a feature of human life that
transcends historical or cultural considerations, a feature essentially distinct from “secular”
features such as politics and economics, which has a particularly dangerous inclination to
violence.12 He calls this idea the “myth of religious violence,” and it is a “myth” not (only)
because it is untrue but because it wields power in forming a particular view of reality. Once
the myth is accepted, something is required to tame religion by restricting its access to public
power. The nation-state then appears as natural, because it corresponds to the universal
category of “religion” and protects citizens from religions’ excesses.
Cavanaugh dismantles this myth in four stages. First, he challenges the definition of
the term “religion” in its contemporary use. Academic arguments that view religion as
absolutist, divisive, and non-rational fail because they cannot find a coherent way to separate

11

Cavanaugh’s development of these ideas does not follow this order, since he began with his
dissertation work on Pinochet in Chile. In that work, Cavanaugh argued that torture serves as the
nation-state’s anti-liturgy, disciplining and forming a social body, and that the church’s main resource
for counter-formation is the Eucharist. See Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist.
12

Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, 3.
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religious violence from secular violence.13 This confusion is due to the way we understand
religion as a result of the modern nation-state and its constitution of power. The older term
“religio” was used to refer to clergy in orders rather than diocesan clergy, or to a virtue, not to a
category like the modern term “religion” does.14 In modern times, “religion” is used to describe
a concept that is much broader: a universal genus of which the various religions are species.
Each religion is demarcated by a system of propositions, and religion is identified with interior
impulse. It is thus seen as distinct from secular pursuits like politics and economics. The
functionalist definition of religion (focusing on how people behave and what provides
meaning to that behavior) is better than the substantivist one (focusing on religions as certain
types of belief systems), but really the functionalist approach just ends up being tautological:
people do violence on behalf of those things they take seriously enough to do violence for. It
also clings to essentialism, thinking there really is something called religion out there. By
drawing out these problems with the term religion, Cavanaugh shows that it is not as stable as
it first appears.
Second, Cavanaugh shows that what counts as religion depends on who is in power
and what it is advantageous for those in power to do:15

13

“The arguments I examine attempt to separate a category called religion, which is prone to
violence because it is absolutist (Hick), divisive (Marty), and nonrational (Appleby), from a secular, or
nonreligious, reality that is less prone to violence, presumably because it is less absolutist, more unitive,
and more rational. As we shall see, such arguments do not stand up to scrutiny, because they cannot
find any coherent way to separate religious from secular violence” (ibid., 16).
14

Ibid., 60–69.
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Ibid., 59.
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Within the West, religion was invented as a transhistorical and transcultural impulse
embedded in the human heart, essentially distinct from the public business of
government and economic life… Outside the West, the creation of religion and its
secular twin accompanied the attempts of colonial powers and indigenous
modernizing elites to marginalize certain aspects of non-Western cultures and create
public space for the smooth functioning of state and market interests.16
In order for the state to exercise power and for the market to run smoothly, differences such
as religion had to be neutralized. For the state and the market to gain power, religion had to
be defined in a way that would eliminate or privatize differences problematic to the state’s
and market’s functioning.
Third, Cavanaugh recasts the common narrative about the wars of religion as the
“creation myth” for the modern nation-state because it describes why the nation-state came to
be and secures its continued necessity. Cavanaugh identifies four features of this creation
myth: (1) combatants opposed each other based on religious difference;17 (2) the primary cause
of the wars was religion, as opposed to merely political, economic, or social causes;18 (3)
religious causes must be at least analytically separable from political, economic, and social
causes at the time of the wars;19 and (4) the rise of the modern state was not a cause of the

16

Ibid., 120–21.

17

Ibid., 142.

18

Ibid., 151.

19

Ibid., 156.
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wars, but rather provided a solution to the wars.20 These features describe the “wars of religion”
as they are customarily understood in history and social science.
Cavanaugh questions these accepted features. In the wars of religion, a significant
portion of the violence was between members of the same church, and members of different
churches often collaborated. It is impossible to separate religious motives from political,
economic, and social causes. And the idea that the advent of the state solved the violence
ignores abundant evidence that state building was perhaps the most significant cause of
violence.21 So, while the traditional version of the wars of religion makes the nation-state seem
necessary to curb violence, Cavanaugh exposes this interpretation as problematic at best and
shows that it masks the nation-state’s own complicity in and instigation of violence.
Fourth, Cavanaugh analyzes the way this myth functions in contemporary society,
focusing on separation between church and state, international relations, and the justification
of violence against non-Western Others, especially Muslims. His point is not to deny that
violence sometimes occurs because of religious motives, but to broaden the scrutiny of
violence: “We must restore the full and complete picture of violence in our world, to level the
playing field so that violence of all kinds is subject to the same scrutiny.”22 Cavanaugh argues
that the myth of religious violence allows critics to label state violence as “rational” versus the
“irrational” violence of religion. The myth, then, legitimates some forms of violence and
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Ibid., 160.
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Ibid., 177.
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Ibid., 230.
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delegitimizes others, resulting in a phenomenon in which American Christians would never
kill for their God, but would take killing and dying for country for granted, without
questioning the challenges this might make to the supremacy of the Christian God.
This myth advanced by the nation-state establishes the state itself as the necessary
savior in the face of “violent” religions. In fact, Cavanaugh argues that the modern state is best
understood as an alternative soteriology to that of the Church.23 The state serves as a
simulacrum, a false copy, of the Body of Christ.24 In the state’s conception of reality, all
individuals are related to the sovereign head, the state. Individuals are in danger of having
their rights interfered with by other individuals and institutions, so the state serves to
safeguard individuals and their rights.25 This relationship of the state and the individual
replaces an earlier understanding of social relations rooted in participation with an
understanding rooted in individualism:
The state mythos is based on a ‘theological’ anthropology that precludes any truly
social process. The recognition of our participation in one another through our
creation in the image of God is replaced by the recognition of the other as the bearer
of individual rights, which may or may not be given by God, but which serve only to
separate what is mine from what is thine. Participation in God and in one another is a
threat to the formal mechanism of contract, which assumes that we are essentially
individuals who enter into relationship with one another only when it is to one’s
individual advantage to do so.26
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Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 9. This chapter, “The Myth of the State as Saviour,” is
a revision of “‘A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House’: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the
State,” Modern Theology 11, no. 4 (October 1995): 397–420.
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And when each individual relies directly on the state, older forms of social solidarity are
weakened and replaced.27 In fact, “The main conflict of modern politics is not state versus
individual, but state versus intermediate social group. The main actors today are the state and
the individual. To protect the individual from interference, the state has had to overcome the
power of other social groups.”28 The individual and the state are the supreme realities, and all
other groups are evaluated by how they function in connecting these two.
Cavanaugh argues that Christians unwittingly accept the way that the state frames
reality and thus view religion as a private matter. He likens the nation-state to a liturgy, which
“can come to rival the church’s liturgy for our bodies and our minds.”29 The state claims to be
the keeper of the common good,30 and the state and civil society “have become increasingly
fused, such that little significant social action takes place wholly outside the funding, direct
implementation, or regulation of the state.”31 So the state has become all-encompassing by
fusing with civil society and absorbing “mediating institutions” to further its own project. In
many ways, Christianity then becomes a servant of the state, meant to shape good citizens but
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William T. Cavanaugh, “Separation and Wholeness: Notes on the Unsettling Political
Presence of the Body of Christ,” in For the Sake of the World: Swedish Ecclesiology in Dialogue with
William T. Cavanaugh, ed. Jonas Idestrom (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 27–28.
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William T. Cavanaugh, “The Body of Christ: The Eucharist and Politics,” Word & World 22, no.
2 (2002): 173.
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Cavanaugh, Migrations of the Holy, 115. This chapter was originally published as “The
Liturgies of Church and State,” Liturgy 20, no. 1 (2005): 25–30.
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not to challenge the state as the broader, orienting reality. The church and its operations take
place on the stage set by the state.32
Cavanaugh’s work would strengthen Conyers’s by providing additional explanatory
power that Conyers’s position needs in two different areas. First, Cavanaugh’s myth of
religious violence provides an understanding of the development of the nation-state that
harmonizes with Conyers’s treatment of tolerance and can serve as an example of how the
logic of toleration extended into other terminologies and concepts. Employing the insights
from Cavanaugh’s myth deepens Conyers’s diagnosis of modernity while maintaining a similar
trajectory. In addition to extending Conyers’s diagnosis, taking into account Cavanaugh’s
myth helps Conyers to deal with the rise of the nation-state in a more nuanced fashion. While
Conyers acknowledges that the wars of religion had complicated issues as their cause, he still
repeatedly accepts the basic version of the wars of religion, seeing them as an important step
in the shift of the use of the term toleration, one of the central explorations of his political
theology. The problem is that if one accepts the traditional understanding of the wars of
religion, it could be argued that the idea of toleration needed to shift in order to promote the
protection that the state provided against religious passions. So while Conyers’s work does
demonstrate how the term shifted and was used, taking into account the strengths of
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Instead, Cavanaugh thinks that Augustine’s concept of two cities is relevant here. The state
and the church are like two different plays being enacted on the same stage with the same props. The
state is not the larger reality that situates the church. For more, see William T. Cavanaugh, “From One
City to Two: Christian Reimagining of Political Space,” Political Theology 7, no. 3 (2006): 299–321. This
essay was republished as the second chapter of Cavanaugh, Migrations of the Holy.
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Cavanaugh’s position would lead to a fuller concept of the development of the nation-state
and other features of modernity.
Second and more significantly, Cavanaugh’s work on intermediate associations
identifies and remedies a limitation in Conyers’s treatment of the same topic. In Conyers’s
diagnosis of modernity and proposals for remedies, he focuses on the idea of vocation. As he
develops this concept, he emphasizes that God calls particular people to particular places, and
that a sense of place and community are significant. The strengthening of intermediate
associations flows from this conviction, corresponding to his critique of the increasing
bipolarity of life between isolated individuals and the strong, centralized state, which he
develops in his diagnosis. For Conyers, one can begin with a commitment to calling and local
situatedness and work from there to challenge the problematic bipolarity that he identifies in
modern politics.
Cavanaugh’s work, on the other hand, problematizes this approach. Like Conyers,
Cavanaugh recognizes that the development of the nation-state in modernity demolished the
sense of intermediate groups and associations that once provided security and guided people
in their understanding and experience of life. Conyers uses languages such as “dissolving” of
intermediate associations and of their loss. However, Cavanaugh observes that these
associations did not simply diminish; instead, they took up a different role, one subservient to
the state.33 So, intermediate associations—where they do still exist and provide meaning and

33

Other scholars note this subservient role as well. The church cannot simply accept an
intermediate role on the state’s stage. Once the church accepts the role of intermediate association
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structure to individuals—usually take up their place on the stage as set by the nation-state. In
other words, they promote the nation-state’s picture of reality and serve to better assimilate
individuals into it. The answer then cannot merely be to strengthen these intermediate
associations, for this would be to strengthen the role of the state. Without Cavanaugh’s more
thorough critique of intermediate associations and the way that they serve the state’s
conception of reality, Conyers’s focus on vocation can also be co-opted into the state’s project.
The problem with intermediate associations can be clarified by drawing a recent critic
of Cavanaugh into the conversation. In Chosen Nation, Brad Anderson seeks to articulate how
nationalism emanates from within church communities when Scripture is co-opted and
altered to shape American identity. In setting up his project, he argues that theopolitical
scholars, in particular Cavanaugh, fail to see how nationalism can sprout up in places that are
not controlled by the state. Thus, because Cavanaugh focuses so much on the state, Anderson
charges that he fails to account for other sources of nationalism, such as the church.
Cavanaugh’s work “falters at crucial points in accurately discerning the church’s own direct
and even primary agency in the problem of nationalism. This is not to say that Cavanaugh
ignores or rejects church complicity, but rather that he provides an incomplete account of the
nature of the relationship between theology and nationalism, and hence of the church’s

comparable to a nonprofit organization, it has fundamentally changed what it actually is and the way
it will form people. As Michael Budde argues, “A Church that willfully redefines itself as a nonprofit
entity created by the state and in business to serve society as a source of cohesion, trust, and fellowfeeling, I would suggest, is not a Church but a chaplaincy.” See Michael L. Budde, The Borders of
Baptism: Identities, Allegiances, and the Church (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011), 158.
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role.”34 Cavanaugh fails to address the church’s role because of his supposed failure to see
church complicity.
For Anderson, the church is an example of a “non-state actor” that fuels nationalism
via syncretism of particular theological and national narratives.35 According to this
perspective, Cavanaugh cannot account for the fact that “many nationalist movements are
born and catalyzed apart from the state, led by a different set of elites quite apart from state
operations, and driven by independently derived goals that are sometimes even a threat to the
state establishment.”36 These movements rely on “prior elements of identity,” demonstrating
that the state is not the only driver of nationalism.37 In fact, “it is key to an understanding of
Christian nationalism as a process, not of departicularizing faith communities into an
amorphous religious impulse, but rather of reparticularizing specific narratives of salvation
history in new contexts for nationalist purposes.”38 In Anderson’s assessment, Cavanaugh’s
argument cannot adequately account for this type of discourse, because Cavanaugh focuses
on how the nation-state universalizes “religion” in order to marginalize it.
Anderson identifies a problem in Cavanaugh’s thought, but the problem is actually
solved by another aspect of the latter’s work. On one hand, Anderson is correct that
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Cavanaugh’s analysis does not account for the very particular way that Christian nationalism
reparticularizes salvation narratives. On the other hand, Anderson does not clearly see how
another element of Cavanaugh’s work does in fact account for the phenomena Anderson
observes in Christian nationalism. Cavanaugh argues that intermediate associations (which
the church has unwittingly become in many ways) are not the same today as they were in the
medieval period. While they once were able to challenge the state’s power, they have become
mediators of the nation-state’s project. They serve the function of facilitating the relationship
between the autonomous individual and the strong, centralized power. Thus, everything that
Anderson observes about church complicity in Christian nationalism fits with this
observation: the church in these cases has taken up a role as a complicit intermediate
association, serving the state project.
Anderson perpetuates the same misunderstanding that Conyers does, but in different
ways. Both see intermediate associations as too independent of the state. Anderson sees them
as too strong and pushing in the wrong direction; Conyers sees them as too weak and as a
potential for change if strengthened. For Anderson, these “non-state actors” promote
nationalism apart from the state and thus must be accounted for separately in understanding
the power of the state. For Conyers, these intermediate associations, if strengthened, can
provide hope in resisting what he identifies as the “bipolar disorder” of modernity—the binary
of the autonomous individual on the one hand and the powerful state on the other. Both
Anderson and Conyers fail to take the disciplinary power of the nation-state as seriously as
Cavanaugh does. What Cavanaugh recognizes is that while intermediate associations do
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indeed predate the modern state and appear to have powerful prior elements of identity, they
have become complicit in promoting the state project. The theological shifts that Anderson
sees in the church (on American exceptionalism and providence, for example), do not in fact
challenge Cavanaugh’s notion of the state but instead serve as evidence that he is correct: the
state has risen to such a level of disciplinary power over the very imagination of these other
associations that these very associations have reformed themselves to serve the state. The
theological shifts Anderson identifies, though they occur in an association that predates the
state, are evidence of the state’s power.
The example of a local church that promotes Americanism can illustrate these
differences. For Anderson, the local church that promotes Americanism is at fault for
promoting national identity, and studies of nationalism must grapple with such churches as
non-state promoters of nationalism. For Conyers, the local church is too weak due to an
emphasis on a strong state and an independent individual, but if it were strengthened it could
help solve some of the problems. For Cavanaugh, the local church promotes Americanism
because of the state’s forming power and reorientation of intermediate associations. The
church is not an unfaithful or weak intermediate association, but a complicit intermediate
association, one ordered to the nation-state, subject to its taxonomy. If simply strengthened, it
could strengthen the state’s conception of reality rather than challenge it. So Anderson’s
solution is to stop the Americanism in the church, and Conyers’s solution is to strengthen the
notion of intermediate associations and the idea of vocation. Cavanaugh’s solution takes into
account the disciplinary power of the nation-state and sees that power as the primary
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problem, not nationalist churches or the weakness of some churches in forming people.
Cavanaugh and Conyers are mostly on the same page with the importance of intermediate
associations, but Cavanaugh is more explicit about the disciplinary power of the state and the
need for more than strengthening what used to be referred to as intermediate associations.
The entire power dynamic must be addressed. Many churches will continue to promote the
state’s view of reality, even if vocation is recovered, if the larger disciplinary power is not
challenged.
Thus, Anderson’s critique of Cavanaugh provides a clearer understanding of the
importance of properly situating intermediate associations in the broader spectrum. Conyers
takes the first step in situating these associations—he identifies the “bipolar disorder” but
then fails to take it adequately into account in formulating his resistance to it. Appropriating
this observation into Conyers’s work requires taking more seriously the forming reality of the
nation-state and the extension of that logic into globalization, another insight from
Cavanaugh that can strengthen Conyers’s work. While Conyers’s starting point for diagnosing
and resisting modernity can still work by focusing on vocation, the degree to which the
nation-state has reshaped the logic by which people view and imagine the world forces a more
basic reevaluation of intermediate associations. Conyers’s emphasis on vocation, in other
words, must consistently challenge the nation-state and not simply take its place within the
nation-state’s view of itself. Cavanaugh demonstrates that strengthening intermediate
associations cannot be a first step or even an early step, because these associations are all-toooften ordered to the nation-state already anyway. Thus, Cavanaugh’s more fundamental
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exposure of the way that the state serves as a religious simulacrum strengthens Conyers’s
position. Cavanaugh’s perspective not only emphasizes the importance of intermediate
associations but also the need for those associations not merely to serve as a way to assimilate
individuals into the state’s reality.
Conyers’s work can strengthen Cavanaugh’s treatment as well. Cavanaugh’s treatment
of the nation-state points out the disciplinary power of the way the state frames reality. This
treatment, though relying on other explanations as well, focuses primarily on the relationship
between the nation-state and violence. He explains that once the nation-state claimed to be
the keeper of the common good and protector of individuals from the violence of mediating
groups such as the church, the nation-state gained the power it needed to attain prominence.
Conyers’s genealogy of toleration strengthens Cavanaugh’s analysis of the state by
providing additional explanatory power. The heart of Conyers’s insight is that the idea of
toleration shifted in modernity from a practice rooted in humility to a doctrine meant to erase
social differences that were problematic to the rising power of the nation-state. In fact,
toleration, a practice that was rightly considered a positive idea, subtly shifted and became an
idea used to lessen the importance of the very differences it was once used to protect. The
relationship between the strong central power and the individual grew stronger, and
toleration was invoked in relation to almost everything else in order to protect the primacy of
the relationship of the individual to the state. We must tolerate differences that “do not
matter,” and what does and does not matter is defined by the rising power of the state.
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Conyers’s genealogy fits coherently with Cavanaugh’s analysis, and it extends the
issues of toleration more clearly into contemporary debates by calling into question how
toleration comes into play. For example, in A Brutal Unity, Ephraim Radner critiques
Cavanaugh’s understanding of the wars of religion.39 While Cavanaugh blames the rise of the
liberal state for violence, Radner takes the opposite track and argues that the church is better
for being embedded in liberal democratic societies, which serve to check the sinful power
ambitions of religions. He sees Cavanaugh’s work on religious violence as “a kind of political
ploy to shift the liberal state’s responsibility for bloodshed onto a falsely construed religious
zealotry.”40 Instead, “Religion…does in fact need the liberal state, not so much to protect it
from itself (although this could be said in some cases) as to provide a framework for selfaccountability; and the civil state needs the churches in order to wrest from her any illusion of
holding moral monopoly, or indeed any moral standing of its own apart from the values it is
able to receive from her citizens, many of whom will inevitably be religious.”41 Radner makes
three arguments. First, he argues that Cavanaugh does not properly grasp the significance of
“religion” with respect to violence. Second, Cavanaugh cannot properly engage examples of
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religious violence today because his explanation of religious violence is deficient. Third,
Cavanaugh obscures the relationship between religion and the liberal state today.42
Conyers’s work on toleration helps Cavanaugh counter some of these criticisms.
According to Radner, “One major difficulty with [Cavanaugh’s] argument is that it fails to take
seriously the actual attitudes of participants in what is called ‘religious violence’.”43 In other
words, focusing on a history-of-ideas approach to religion misleads Cavanaugh.44 Radner
thinks that if most of the people involved in the violence would have used religious categories
to explain it—even if they did not have that exact category—then ipso facto, those are
important categories. While there is some merit to this argument, failure to recognize the
ways terms change or are enlisted in a particular power shift can lead to a misreading of the
history.
For example, Radner repeatedly uses the idea of toleration to promote the gains of
liberalism and to criticize the myth of religious violence. He states,
What Cavanaugh and contemporary antiliberal revisionists do not address, then, is
the fact that the notion of religious tolerance over and against religious violence was
later overthrown by the ongoing and spectacular failures of Christians especially in the
midst of and in the face of violence in which they participated: it is this that has
inflated a narrative into a “myth,” but one for which the greatest blame—a term I use
deliberately—lies with the churches themselves.45
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So, in Radner’s judgment, the concept of religious tolerance is a key notion, one that was
exacerbated by Christian failures that caused religious violence to inflate into a myth. In this
telling, the liberal state is actually a product of Christians, “by and large trying to figure out a
way to deal with their own internal weaknesses, temptations, and sins.”46 What Radner fails to
see, and what Conyers’s treatment would help Cavanaugh to develop, is the fact that the term
“toleration” itself is loaded with the nation-state’s preferred view of reality. “The notion of
religious tolerance” is not something that Radner can so easily bring into the discussion over
against the myth of religious violence. He must define “toleration” more clearly before he can
assume it to be a good: if it is a toleration employed in the logic of the nation-state to destroy
difference and “intermediate groups” for the sake of power, it is much different than if it is the
practice of toleration rooted in early Christianity and other religions as well.47 Being attentive
to this change, charted by Conyers, strengthens our understanding of religious violence and
also the terms of the debate in today’s world because it shows how even when people give
certain reasons for their behavior, those reasons still must be understood in a broader context.
Conyers shows just how problematic the context of “toleration” is in this case.
Conyers’s treatment of toleration and the way that it dissolved social bonds works well
with Cavanaugh’s more thorough work on intermediate associations to address another one
of Radner’s concerns. Radner thinks that the church is to blame for much of the violence
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because Christians killed and because Christian reasons supported it. At this juncture, the
concept of intermediate associations again comes into the picture to situate properly the
church in relation to civil society and the nation state. If Cavanaugh is right (and Conyers’s
work suggests that he is), then intermediate associations are fundamentally different after the
rise of the nation state, because they are enlisted in the nation state’s project. While Christians
have committed and do commit violence and even give “Christian reasons,” we cannot
discount the fact that even intermediate associations have been influenced by the state’s view
of reality. They have been disciplined to a certain degree. Thus Cavanaugh can incorporate
Radner’s evidence on Christians and violence as evidence for the way that the church has
been unfaithful by taking its place alongside other intermediate associations in so-called civil
society, supporting the nation-state project.
This collaboration addresses Radner’s argument that the church actually needs the
liberal state because of the church’s sins. While Radner rightly points out that what people
said about their violent motives does matter, his own failure to take into account the way a
term like toleration changes and was co-opted into the rise of the nation-state weakens his
attempt to show the church’s failures and need for liberal democratic frameworks. Radner
cannot simply point to the rise of religious tolerance within Christian circles as evidence for
Christians creating the liberal state to help restrain their own sins. The case is more
complicated than that, and both Conyers and Cavanaugh are more nuanced in their
arguments, especially with regard to intermediate associations, than Radner’s criticism of
Cavanaugh allows.
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Conyers strengthens and advances Cavanaugh’s work on the nation-state. It is not the
case that Conyers simply saves Cavanaugh from the criticisms of scholars such as Anderson
and Radner, but his work illuminates a way to take the dialogue forward that strengthens
Cavanaugh’s overall approach in light of the criticism. The work that Conyers has done on the
changing nature of toleration serves as a key explanation of the way that the nation-state has
altered conceptions of reality, and how through such terminology it has ordered other
intermediate associations to its project. “Toleration” serves to diminish the importance of
intermediate associations and to discipline them to find their place within the dynamic of a
strong, centralized state and an autonomous individual. Cavanaugh’s criticism of the modern
world, however, does not end with the state.

Consumerism
The free market and consumerism stand alongside the state’s conception of reality in
Cavanaugh’s analysis. In his 2008 collection of essays, Being Consumed: Economics and
Christian Desire,48 Cavanaugh explains how the free market and consumerism mask reality in
the name of economic freedom. In the face of this unreality, Cavanaugh focuses on how
Christian concepts and practices create true freedom.49 He is clear that he is not focused on
blessing or damning the free market but instead on creating really free markets, “economic
spaces in which truly and fully free transactions—as judged by the true telos of human life—
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can take place.”50 Toward this end, he develops three primary angles for engaging capitalism,
the free market, and consumerism.
First, Cavanaugh reframes the discussion of freedom in relation to economics. The
standard narrative of the “free market” is that it provides the opportunity for “free”
transactions, defined as transactions that are both voluntary and informed.51 But Cavanaugh
points out that there is a difference between “negative freedom” (freedom from) and “positive
freedom” (freedom for, “a capacity to achieve certain worthwhile goals”).52 While the free
market in many ways may be free in the negative sense—because there are limited
hindrances—it is not free in the positive sense because it lacks treatment of the purpose of
human existence, of a true telos. Cavanaugh turns to Augustine for this understanding of
desire and freedom: “What is required is a substantive account of the end of earthly life and
creation so that we may enter into particular judgments of what kinds of exchange are free
and what kinds are not.”53 Desire properly conceived rests not on individual choice but is
instead a social product—“a complex and multidimensional network of movement that does
not simply originate within the individual self but pulls and pushes the self in different
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directions from both inside and outside the person.”54 Many Christians take for granted the
“freedom” of capitalism; Cavanaugh problematizes that conception by drawing on a fuller
sense of freedom that the market clearly lacks and in fact competes against.
Second, Cavanaugh focuses on the idea of “attachment” to material things, and argues
that consumerism actually reflects detachment, not attachment. The usual Christian picture
of greed does not capture what goes on in the consumer economy, for it focuses on an
inordinate attachment to things. Consumerism, instead, encourages detachment: “People do
not hoard money; they spend it. People do not cling to things; they discard them and buy
other things.”55 The spiritual tone of consumerism is set not by having, but by having
something else.56 Consumers are detached from production, producers, and products.57 And
this detachment influences the way people understand and interact with the world: “In the
Christian tradition, detachment from material goods means using them as a means to a
greater end, and the greater end is greater attachment to God and to our fellow human beings.
In consumerism, detachment means standing back from all people, times, and places, and
appropriating our choices for private use. Consumerism supports an essentially individualistic
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view of the human person, in which each consumer is a sovereign chooser.”58 Thus the
problem of consumerism is more than the traditional problem of greed, but a problem of
detachment that hides itself under material acquisition.
Third, Cavanaugh explores the logic of scarcity and abundance, arguing that
consumerism is based on the former (because it assumes scarcity) while the Christian
narrative centers on the latter. As he puts it, “We live our lives at the intersection of two
stories about the world: the Eucharist and the market. Both tell stories of hunger and
consumption, of exchanges and gifts; the stories overlap and compete.”59 Economics is a
science of scarcity because individuals continue to want. Augustine identified the constant
renewing desires that humans experience, but he moved from this to the conclusion that
material things cannot satisfy; humans must turn to God. This turn to God contrasts with
consumer culture: “Marketing constantly seeks to meet, create, and stoke new desires, often
by highlighting a sense of dissatisfaction with what one presently has and is.… Rather than
turning away from material things and toward God, in consumer culture we plunge ever more
deeply into the world of things.”60 Even the material problems in the world are solved by this
plunge: “Through the mechanism of demand and supply, the competition of self-interested
individuals will result in the production of the goods society wants, at the right prices, with
sufficient employment for all the right wages for the foreseeable future. The result is an
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eschatology in which abundance for all is just around the corner. In the contemporary
consumer-driven economy, consumption is often urged as the solution to the suffering of
others.”61 The eschatological hope provided by this logic, however, often “fades into
resignation to a tragic world of scarcity.”62 Scarcity, not abundance, is the dominant reality in a
society whose imagination is shaped by the free market. Because the free market is based on
the assumption of scarcity as a simple fact, it promotes a view of the world that centers on
scarcity. Cavanaugh is not so much interested in whether scarcity is a fact in a fallen world but
in the way that the free market’s focus on scarcity pushes scarcity to form more than just the
economic reality. Such terminology shapes Christian moral vision and moral imagination as
well.
This idea of viewing and imagining the world brings us to another way that
Cavanaugh’s work can strengthen Conyers’s. Cavanaugh takes seriously the ideas of moral
vision and moral imagination, the way that concepts shape the way people see the way the
world is and consider what it might be like. Conyers does not use this exact terminology
(though he does speak of a vision of the world), and doing so would clarify the way he wants
his insights to influence Christians. The concepts of moral vision and imagination would aid
Conyers in proposing how his diagnosis and remedies for the modern world might inform and
guide ethical praxis in the church. Though this change is not a large one, utilizing this
terminology better connects the history and theory to the practice of the church. It does so by
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more clearly exposing the idea that the nation-state imposes a vision and encourages a type of
imagination on all who are part of its project. Bringing people’s attention to this fact by
utilizing the terminology would expose the state’s power more clearly and help Christians see
better how the moral vision and imagination of the state in fact disciple or discipline
individuals into certain ways of life. And these ways of life may run counter to the moral
vision and imagination of the gospel.
Conyers’s work contributes to Cavanaugh’s analysis of consumerism in three ways.
First, Conyers provides more conceptual background on how the growing use of money and
the increasing abstraction of the economy in previous centuries altered the way that
individuals viewed and interacted within the economy. Second, Conyers makes strong
arguments about economic instrumentalization—going so far as to call aspects of the freemarket system “modern slavery”—that add more weight to a critique of consumerism. Third,
Conyers connects consumerism to issues of technology and the notions of power that shifted
in the modern world in a way that provides a broader context for understanding and
interacting with consumerism.63 Such critiques demonstrate Conyers’s sympathy with the
type of work Cavanaugh has done exposing consumerism.
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Globalization
The third way that Cavanaugh analyzes the ills of modernity is through his treatment
of globalization, which he relates to the project of the nation-state and the logic of free-market
capitalism.64 On the one hand, globalization results from the spread of global capitalism, but
on the other, Cavanaugh argues that it is in fact “a hyperextension of the nation-state’s project
of subsuming the local under the universal.”65 Globalization is an aesthetic that promotes a
consumer subject and a homogenizing culture.66
The rise of the modern state was marked by the universal’s triumph over the local in
the form of the sovereign state’s “usurpation of power from the Church, the nobility, guilds,
clans, and towns.”67 The medieval conception of complex space, with multiple, overlapping
associations, was replaced and flattened. Associations were recast as “intermediate
associations,” not just because they were smaller than the state and larger than individuals,
but also because their job was to mediate the state project to the individual. The local
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mediates the universal, and the institutions of civil society are educative and disciplinary.68
And while the nation-state benefitted from the destruction of localizations that challenged its
power, the nation-state is now the victim of the same logic: “Just as the nation-state freed the
market from the ‘interventions’ of local custom, and freed the individual to relate to other
individuals on the basis of standardized legal and monetary systems, so globalization frees
commerce from the nation-state, which, as it turns out, is now seen as one more localization
impeding the universal flow of capital.”69 Globalization extends the logic of the nation-state, a
logic that casts aside the nation-state itself as too local and particularized; the logic of the
nation-state has sawn off its own branch.
This subsumption of the local under the universal diverts attention from the fact that
globalization actually produces new forms of division. Competition leads diverse places to
tailor their uniqueness to attract capital development, modeled on other, “successful” places.70
And “global mapping produces the illusion of diversity by the juxtaposition of all the varied
products of the world’s traditions and cultures in one space and time in the marketplace… For
the consumer with money, the illusion is created that all the world’s people are
contemporaries occupying the same space-time.”71 Yet local traditions are slowly lost to the
mass, universal culture of successful corporations such as Coca-Cola: “Local attachments are
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loosed by the centrifuge of ephemeral desire, which is fueled by global capitalism’s ever
accelerating need for growth.”72 The divisions between rich and poor are reinforced, and local
cultures fall victim to a false sense of the universal.
Conyers also develops the dynamic between the local and the universal, but
Cavanaugh’s work helps Conyers to connect these concepts more explicitly to globalization,
which is becoming a more important reality for theological engagement. In his focus on place,
Conyers deals with both the particular and the universal. The modern tendency to abstraction
and the modern spirit of conquest weaken the importance of particular places, but Conyers
notes that the local is the context for human living and flourishing. In addition to this,
Conyers argues that universal reality comes to us through the particular: “A place is significant,
and we speak and sing of it, because it offers to us a door by which we know what is true for all
people, everywhere. It doesn’t just speak of itself—though it never ceases to speak of itself—
but it speaks of that which is truly catholic, truly universal—not bound by, but prior to, time
and space.”73 So we cannot abandon the local in favor of the universal, for then we lose both
the particular and the universal.
This opinion is similar to Cavanaugh’s argument regarding globalization and false
senses of the universal. In this case, Cavanaugh does not so much strengthen Conyers’s work
as he demonstrates an area where it can be extended. While Conyers deals tangentially with
globalization, he does not extend his critique into the economic realities in play as thoroughly
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as Cavanaugh does. Extending Conyers’s work in this way would help bring his theological
sensibilities to bear not only on the importance of being rooted in particular places but in
being aware of the way the culture of globalization pushes against this notion.
These three elements of modernity—the nation-state, consumerism, and
globalization—serve as the primary loci for Cavanaugh’s diagnosis of modernity’s ills. The
nation-state privatizes religion and sets itself up as a substitute savior, forming Christians into
its logic. Consumerism removes a true understanding of human ends, encourages detachment,
and operates on a scarcity that runs counter to a Christian understanding of reality.
Globalization, finally, extends the logic of both of these problems to a great degree and
provides a false sense of catholicity. For each of these problems, Cavanaugh finds the
Eucharist to be the primary remedy and location for resistance.

Cavanaugh’s Remedy
In simplest terms, the Eucharist is Cavanaugh’s answer to the problems of the modern
world. It is “one privileged site” for Christian reimagination of space and time.74 It provides
and enacts a conception of space and time that counters the detrimental aspects of the
nation-state, consumerism, and globalization. Analyzing the way the Eucharist counters each
of these aspects deepens our understanding of Cavanaugh’s constructive project centered on
the Eucharist because the Eucharist not only forms the substance of his solutions, it also
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serves as the reality by which he evaluates the modern world and identifies its problems as
outlined in the previous section.
But first, what does Cavanaugh mean by “Eucharist”? The Eucharist is the sacrament
of unity, in which people find communion with God and with one another. It both symbolizes
and works to bring about unity in Christ.75 The Eucharist is the proper response to the ways
that the world violently disciplines or shapes people because through the Eucharist the
church is reminded of Jesus’ own torture at the hands of the powers of the world.76 At the
same time, the Eucharist is not something that we apply; instead “the eucharist makes the
church itself a political body. The church practices the politics of Jesus when it becomes an
alternative way of life that offers healing for the wounds that divide us.”77 The Eucharist, then,
not only unites Christians and calls to memory the sacrifice of Christ, it also helps to expose
and remedy the various ways that the world—modern or otherwise—wounds and divides
people. With this basic understanding in mind, we can move to how the Eucharist particularly
informs the three ways the modern world shapes people.
The Eucharist counters the forming power of the nation-state by challenging its
conception of reality and exposing it as a soteriological simulacrum. Cavanaugh develops this
angle with respect to the nation-state generally and the state use of torture specifically. The
nation-state promises unity and peace, but the cost is the loss of the local and the particular:
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“The state thus succeeds in separating people from each other yet creating a direct and
powerful link between the state and the individual. The state does not merely wish to make its
citizens feel as independent as possible from each other, but also seeks to make them as
dependent as possible on the authority of the state.”78 In the face of this “promise,” the
Eucharist disrupts the logic of contract and exchange in modern social relations.79 While the
state depends on the subsumption of the local and particular under the universal, the
Eucharist gathers the many into one but without subordinating the local to the universal.80
Instead, the Eucharist’s unity is “an anticipation of the eschatological unity of all in Christ.”81
But this anticipation is dependent on each local expression; it does not replace the local in
favor of the universal. Our true hope should not be in the peace and unity that the state
promises, for “The Eucharist is not simply a promise of future bliss outside of historical time.
In the biblical and patristic witness we find the Eucharist as an earthly practice of peace and
reconciliation.”82
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In Torture and Eucharist, Cavanaugh develops how the Eucharist counters torture,
which forms the social body of the state primarily through isolation: “The Eucharist, as the gift
which effects the visibility of the true body of Christ, is therefore the church’s counterimagination to that of the state.”83 He explains that “Isolation is overcome in the Eucharist by
the building of a communal body which resists the state’s attempts to disappear it.”84
Cavanaugh expands the importance of the Eucharist by exploring an inversion in
Catholic thinking on the Eucharist. Patristic and early medieval tradition spoke of a threefold
distinction of the body of Christ: “(1) the historical body, meaning the physical body of Jesus of
Nazareth, (2) the sacramental body, or Christ as present in the Eucharistic elements, and (3)
the ecclesial body, that is, the church.”85 However, Henri de Lubac’s Corpus Mysticum shows
that in the twelfth century, there was an inversion of meaning: the altar became the site of
Christ’s corpus verum, and the church was seen as his corpus mysticum. In the older meaning,
both the Eucharist and the church are together the contemporary performance of the true
body: “Christians are the real body of Christ, and the Eucharist is where the church mystically
comes to be.”86 The inversion led to changed relationships: “Now the historical and
sacramental bodies form a pair, and the gap is between them and the ecclesial body… The
visibility of the church in the communal performance of the sacrament is replaced by the
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visibility of the Eucharistic object. Signified and signifier have exchanged places, such that the
sacramental body is the visible signifier of the hidden signified, which is the social body of
Christ.”87 De Lubac was concerned with a tendency that emerged from this inversion: the
Eucharist was reduced to a mere spectacle for the laity,88 and “the increased localization of the
sacred in the Eucharistic host in effect secularized all that lay beyond it.”89 Thus “The adjective
‘mystical,’ when applied to the church… signals a retreat in varying degrees from any
interruption of historical time by the Kingdom of God. We look for the Kingdom outside of
time. The eschatological significance of the body of Christ, and the sacramental action which
produces it, is effectively denied.”90 When the church is seen as the “mystical” rather than “true”
body of Christ, it encourages a view of the church as disincarnate, hovering over the temporal
world, uniting Christians in soul alone.91
After tracing the inversion of true body and mystical body in Catholic theology,
Cavanaugh examines the Eucharist with reference to the future, past, and present. He draws
on the eschatological nature of the Eucharist: “In contrast with secular historical imagination,
the Christian story is intrinsically eschatological… The Eucharist is the true heart of this
dimension of the church’s life, because it is in the Eucharist that Christ Himself, the eternal

87

Ibid., 212–13.

88

Ibid., 213.

89

Ibid., 214.

90

Ibid., 220.

91

Ibid., 207.

255
consummation of history, becomes present in time.”92 The Eucharist also changes the way we
understand time, focusing on the disruptive character of God’s gracious giving rather than the
monotonous succession of events: “The Eucharistic present is not just one moment in the
regular sequence of secular historical time—one damn thing after another. Eucharistic time is
marked by charity, the gratuitous and disruptive presence of the Kingdom of God.”93 Then he
points to the past element of the Eucharist, which is an anamnesis of the past. He defines
anamnesis not merely as remembrance but a performance that is the imagination of the
church.94 Third he treats the present nature of the Eucharist, which he explains as “that
performance which makes the body of Christ visible in the present.”95 In this context he deals
with excommunication, which he deems necessary for types of sin, like torture, that impugn
the identity of the body of Christ.96 In fact, excommunication done well is an act of hospitality
because it tells someone they are outside fellowship and how they might return.97 These
imaginations of space and time, torture and Eucharist, are strikingly different: “A crucial
difference in these imaginations is that the imagination of the church is essentially
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eschatological; the church is not a rival polis but points to an alternative time and space, a
mingling of heaven and earth.”98
The Eucharist also provides a new logic of consumption that challenges the way
consumerism shapes being in the world. First, the Eucharist “is a particularly important locus
for the Christian practice of consumption,”99 for in it “the insatiability of human desire is
absorbed by the abundance of God’s grace in the consumption of Jesus’ body and blood.”100
The Eucharist is not just another commodity to be consumed; instead, the Eucharist is God’s
gift, and consuming the Eucharist challenges individual consumption because in consuming
the Eucharist the consumer is taken up into the body of Christ. Thus “The act of consumption
is thereby turned inside out: instead of simply consuming the body of Christ, we are
consumed by it.”101 We do not consume the gift, but the gift consumes and remakes us. Second,
the Eucharist tells a different story of hunger and consumption, for “it does not begin with
scarcity, but with the one who came that we might have life, and have it abundantly.”102 And
this abundance is not one to be consumed individualistically and privately; through
consuming the Eucharist one becomes part of the body of Christ. And this abundance
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presented by God’s grace is now, in the present. God breaks in. It is not the gradual progress
promised by the market but the kingdom received as gift.
Finally, the Eucharist exposes the ruse of globalization’s supposed catholicity and
produces an alternate, localized center. Cavanaugh argues that “the Eucharist overcomes the
dichotomy of universal and local” by collapsing spatial divisions not by mobility (as in
globalization) but by gathering in local assembly.103 The Eucharist is then a decentered center,
for it is celebrated in multiple local churches scattered around the world but gathered up into
one. In addition, “the Eucharist not only tells but performs a narrative of cosmic proportions,
from the death and resurrection of Christ, to the new covenant formed in his blood, to the
future destiny of all creation. The consumer of the Eucharist is no longer the schizophrenic
subject of global capitalism, awash in a sea of unrelated persons, but walks into a story with a
past, present, and future.”104 Participation in the Eucharist changes the way space is
experienced, for the consumer walks “in the strange landscape of the body of Christ, while still
inhabiting a particular earthly place. Now the worldly landscape is transformed by the
intrusions of the universal body of Christ” in the particular, local spaces.105 The Eucharist
draws the consumer into the universal body of Christ through the local reality of the church
and the practice of the liturgy. And the local practice of the Eucharist is local in a way that the
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local franchise of McDonald’s is not. McDonald’s erases difference in favor of universalism,
while the Eucharist points to Christ, the one concrete universal.
In the end, Cavanaugh’s remedy is the Eucharist alone but not only the Eucharist. On
the one hand, I simply mean that Cavanaugh acknowledges that the Eucharist is one Christian
doctrine that yields fruit, not the only one. But on the other hand, I mean something more: in
his work so far, Cavanaugh has repeatedly returned to the Eucharist as a remedy. He has not
developed other potential remedies, or at least not nearly as fully and explicitly. So for
Cavanaugh the remedy is the Eucharist alone. However, as Cavanaugh turns to the Eucharist,
it is never a “bare” concept; it is not alone. Instead, it overflows into other concepts and
practices as implications of its own plenitude of significance. The Eucharist serves as a central
practice of abundance, a gift that overflows into other remedies. For instance, it affects the
communicability of pain from one person to another as all are united in one body, thus
underlying the obligation to feed the hungry.106 The Eucharist also anticipates future
reconciliation,107 because part of taking the Eucharist includes the command to “discern the
body,” a Pauline command that Cavanaugh connects to being aware of divisions and seeking
to remedy them.108 Thus Cavanaugh’s one “remedy” leads to other identifiable concepts and
practices.
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One potential limitation of Cavanaugh’s focus on the Eucharist is developed by David
Fitch in connection with the work of Nathan Kerr. In The End of Evangelicalism?, Fitch
identifies three beliefs that evangelicals have reified and turned into Master-Signifiers that
shape the evangelical way of life in negative ways. The three beliefs are an inerrant Bible,
personal conversion, and the Christian nation. Fitch seeks not to reject these beliefs but to
understand them properly and thereby to begin a recovery of an evangelical politics of
mission.
Cavanaugh’s work comes into play for Fitch in reshaping the third belief, the Christian
nation. Fitch explains that Cavanaugh “shows how the Eucharist births a political presence
that engages society for redemption and renewal.”109 A politics is born when the church
discerns “the body” around the eucharistic table “through the practices of reconciliation,
excommunication, and the mutual participation in receiving Christ’s body.”110 This politics
enables Christians to resist the politics of violence and isolation, to subvert them, and to draw
the world into God’s restoration. However, Fitch notes a potential limitation of this approach:
“one still wonders whether such a concentric view of the church can do anything more than
be subversive.”111 Can such a church see the ways that God’s Reign is already at work in the
world? Is a Eucharistic focus anti-mission?
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Fitch turns to Nathan Kerr’s Christ, History and Apocalyptic.112 Kerr contests
Cavanaugh’s “ecclesiocentrism.” By that term, he means a politically concentric
understanding of the church in relation to the wider world. Such an understanding implies
that the church is concerned so much with its own interior identity that engagement with the
world becomes subsidiary.113 In fact, “Jesus by default becomes domesticated by the church
and becomes part of its own ideology. It therefore becomes imperialistic in its engagements
with the world.”114 Unlike for Cavanaugh, for Kerr “‘mission makes the church,’ as opposed to
de Lubac where ‘the Eucharist makes the church.’”115 Kerr wants a church dispossessed, one
without place or center, always scattered in the world: “The church, then, according to Kerr, is
the ever open, non-territorial enactment of Jesus’ love in the world.”116 In fact,
it is precisely by way of the reality of and her participation in Christ’s apocalyptic
historicity that the Christian joins with Israel in embodying the coming of God’s reign
as a mode of apocalyptic hope. For only as it joins Israel in diaspora does the Christian
‘not yet’ become something other than a theological dilemma concerning the ‘delay’ of
the parousia and become rather the condition for the political cry of ‘come’, a cry for
the messianic inbreaking to occur everagain [sic], for the Spirit to gather us everanew
[sic], in the very contingencies of our own ongoing histories, into the reality of the
‘already’.117
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In this way, Kerr turns against the model of the church as “counter-polis,” which he sees as
dominant since Barth. This vision is anti-mission because it fails to take into account the
diasporic nature of being called out into the world. Thus, Cavanaugh’s eucharistic focus is
anti-mission.
While Fitch acknowledges the strength of Kerr’s critique of the potentially ideological
character of the Eucharist, ultimately he rejects it for various reasons. In short, “We need not
worry with Kerr that such a politic is inevitably territorial and/or closed off from the world
because if the church indeed becomes the very body of Christ in the world à la de Lubac, then
it should necessarily embody the very disposition of incarnation in the world in its politic… Its
very politic inhabits the posture of a servant to the world.”118 Formed as the body of Christ, the
church is not insular but humble, open, vulnerable, and hospitable to the world. The issue at
stake is whether a focus on the Eucharist causes a church to be isolated and inward focused,
and thus unable to effectively serve God in the world. While Kerr argues that the Eucharist
causes this problem, Fitch sees in the Eucharist a call to incarnation, to engagement with the
world.
With this change of focus, Fitch brings to the conversation one of the ways that I think
Conyers can strengthen Cavanaugh’s position. Conyers’s focus on vocation, along with the
way that he fills that out as an imitation of Christ, shifts the eucharistic emphasis in the same
direction that Fitch rightly sees is necessary in order to maintain a proper orientation to the
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world and the church’s mission. Conyers’s focus on vocation helps maintain a focus on
mission that prevents the church from becoming too ideological and self-concerned. God
constitutes the church through calling the church to himself, to community, and to God’s
work in the world.
Second, Cavanaugh’s eucharistic remedy does not work effectively as a starting point
for evangelicals. A Roman Catholic understanding of the Eucharist lies outside of typical
evangelical theological imagination. The Eucharist certainly has a place within evangelical
political theology, but other theological concepts are more promising starting points. The
Eucharist does not immediately serve as an inspiring rallying point for Christian political
theology; for evangelicals, it does not immediately inspire the Christian moral vision and
imagination that Cavanaugh requires. In short, a doctrine that is as hotly contested as the
Eucharist is not a promising starting point when it immediately makes clear the division
between different traditions. Conyers’s focus on vocation provides a more ecclesially broad
entry point, one connected to the “truly catholic vision” that Conyers desires.
A third, smaller limitation in Cavanaugh’s remedy emerges as he shifts from Eucharist
to various practices. For instance, at the end of Torture and Eucharist, Cavanaugh turns to
various practices that he believes are accounted for by the Eucharist. Specifically, he points to
Chilean practices of excommunication, the Vicariate of Solidarity, and the Sebastián Acevedo
Movement against Torture.119 Two avenues for critique emerge here. First, can the Eucharist
really account for all of these practices as Cavanaugh argues? And second, even if the
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Eucharist can account for them, are there other ways that Christians could move in these
directions, ways based on areas of broader agreement, ways more readily understandable?120
One of the weaknesses of Cavanaugh’s work emerges as one gets closer to concrete examples
of what his proposals would look like in practice.
It is not that Conyers provides something completely different from Cavanaugh’s
remedy. Rather, Conyers begins with doctrines that connect a broader spectrum of Christians
and therefore are more helpful for evangelical resistance to the formation of the modern
nation-state and globalization. Conyers focuses on a multi-layered description of the idea of
vocation to remedy problems with individualism and universalization present in modernity. 121
One layer combats individualism by focusing on the fact that it is God who calls, not the
individual who simply determines via arbitrary will what to do. Another layer combats
individualism and universalization by noting that God calls to specific places and to serve
one’s community. Thus the local matters, for place is the context of the call. Another layer of
Conyer’s description of vocation connects vocation to various practice-centered themes,
including attention, the practice of toleration, place, rest, and imitation. The multiple layers of
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vocation serve as an easier entry point for Christians into an alternative theopolitical
imagination.
Also, Conyers relies on the doctrine of the incarnation for two important remedies. On
one hand, the doctrine of the incarnation encourages the humility that underlies the true
practice of toleration, which is absolutely essential for navigating a world of difference. On the
other hand, the incarnation serves to tie together the local and the universal: “The
‘incarnational’ truth of place is that particular places, with their own regional characteristics,
and their own kind of community, nevertheless speak of that which is true for all people
everywhere, and for all time.”122 The incarnation affirms the importance of local place, since
place is “a reflection of the Mystery of the Incarnation. That is, God himself, made himself
known, in a particular man, of a particular people, in a particular place. And he did so not in
order to lead men to that place (as thousands of pilgrims thought), but in order to lead them
to their own place—and through that place to the God who made them and placed them
there.”123 Thus the incarnation begins to combat some of the negative tendencies of the
modern nation-state, consumerism, and globalization that Cavanaugh identifies.

Conclusion
Drawing Conyers’s work alongside that of Cavanaugh not only shows how Conyers
can serve as a bridge for evangelicals to political theology, it also demonstrates how Conyers’s
positions could be strengthened by insights from Cavanaugh. This comparison better situates
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Conyers’s work to serve as a resource and guide for evangelical political theology to develop
the social imagination necessary for navigating the modern world. Cavanaugh’s work
strengthens Conyers’s in two main areas: lending more explanatory power to Conyers’s
treatment of modernity and providing concepts and vocabulary for better guiding praxis.
I have explored how Cavanaugh and Conyers can strengthen one another in ways that
harmonize. Much of what they do can be reconciled together into a common position, a
common diagnosis of the modern world and a remedy for the future, even if they part ways in
particular ecclesial application due to Reformation differences. They both diagnose the
modern world as a place of polarization, with large nation-states relating to isolated
individuals who are being disciplined and discipled by the state’s version of reality.
Additionally, market economics has imposed its own disciplinary force, and that force has
extended into globalization. Cavanaugh and Conyers both alert Christians to the fact that
much of the disciplinary formation, much of the discipleship, that goes on in the modern
world leads down roads antithetical to the truths of the Christian gospel. Both point to
explicitly Christian concepts—Cavanaugh to the Eucharist and Conyers to the concept of
vocation—to help identify the ills in the modern world and to chart the path forward.
Conyers’s treatment of modernity provides aspects that strengthen Cavanaugh’s
position and arguments in two primary ways. First, Conyers’s analysis of the nation-state adds
depth to Cavanaugh’s treatment by providing a supplemental way of seeing the rise of the
nation-state and the shift to an emphasis on the individual and the state at the expense of
other groups. Second, Conyers’s remedies to the problems of modernity fit with Cavanaugh’s
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focus on the Eucharist to a degree while also serving to broaden the applicability of the
remedy to Christians that might not have the same eucharistic understanding as Cavanaugh
does. As Cavanaugh himself sees, there are other theological sites for encouraging and
developing theopolitical imagination, and Conyers develops some of these sites that are
particularly beneficial for Protestant—and even more specifically, evangelical—sensibilities.
This exploration of the work of Cavanaugh has shown that Conyers’s work resonates
with and contributes to contemporary political theology, especially in the realm of diagnosing
modernity and proposing remedies for faithful Christian practice. While Conyers’s work is not
perfect and can certainly be strengthened, especially by Cavanaugh’s careful treatment of the
forming power of the nation-state, Conyers’s work contributes depth in diagnosing what
modernity is and provides an ecclesially broad response.
Conyers’s corpus shows signs of constructive potential for a new wave of evangelical
political theology that is both more attentive to the concerns of political theology more
generally and more faithful in drawing on the evangelical theological tradition to form
evangelical theopolitical imagination for navigating modern challenges from an evangelical
context. In conclusion, I will turn my attention to characterizing an evangelical theopolitical
imagination influenced by Conyers.
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CONCLUSION
CONYERS AND A PATH FORWARD:
EVANGELICAL THEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION

Introduction
In the past five chapters, we covered a significant amount of ground, seeking to
understand A. J. Conyers as a theologian in order to comprehend his diagnosis of modernity
and—most importantly—the way he forms an evangelical social imaginary for navigating the
modern world in a way that overcomes common weaknesses. We grappled with major
intellectual influences, lines of argument, and themes. I now draw on an earlier thesis
regarding Conyers’s overarching project in order to connect the various threads into a
comprehensive understanding of Conyers’s work and then to begin to point to the way this
work can inform evangelical theopolitical imagination.
In chapters one and two, I argued that Conyers shows a range of influence that
provides resources for moving beyond the simple liberal-conservative binary that too often
characterizes evangelical theopolitical imagination. His work shows an overarching project
and trajectory that connects his earliest scholarly work on Moltmann with his final
monographs on the modern world. Now that we have covered the scope of these works, I will
try to make this connection clearer. In Conyers’s work on Moltmann, he positively draws on
Moltmann’s insight regarding the importance of eschatology for all of Christian theology.
Moltmann moved toward an eschatology of openness because he saw an emphasis on
monotheism and the created order as too open to abuse and power. For Moltmann, hierarchy,
depending on values in creation or in power, is always abusive. Conyers maintained
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Moltmann’s emphasis on eschatology but criticized his identification of hierarchy and the
abuse of power. Conyers turned to the work of Richard Weaver, who argued for the
importance of hierarchy and order for structuring human living. For Moltmann, such
hierarchy would yield to the abuse of power. Conyers synthesized these two positions. He
used Weaver’s emphasis on the hierarchy of the good for providing value and order to critique
Moltmann’s identification of hierarchy and the abuse of power. However, Conyers did not
entirely accept Weaver’s position either, for he tied the hierarchy of values not only to a
creation order but to the eschatological order; the good is defined by the good toward which
God is drawing creation through the redemptive work of Christ. So, through Weaver he
corrected Moltmann, and through Moltmann he corrected Weaver. Conyers created a
constructive synthesis of the two. Such a constructive synthesis begins to overcome the
liberal-conservative binary not by finding a third way between them but by seeking what is
true, whatever the sources, and by allowing nuance rather than drawing us-versus-them
binaries.
Three more strands of influence shape Conyers. In thinking about the modern world,
Conyers sees an alternative possibility in the work of Johannes Althusius. This alternative
vision, which is essentially the belief in the importance of mediating institutions, provides
Conyers with the realization that things could be different and with a method to pursue
change. Eric Voegelin provides a concept of order that Conyers draws on as well. The third
strand I described as Southern Agrarianism, a stream of influence that provides the context
for Richard Weaver, played a role in Conyers’s reception of Moltmann. The Southern

269
Agrarians provide Conyers with the resources for a different sort of conservatism, both
theological and political, within which he is able to draw together moral and economic
critiques of the modern world that are uncharacteristic of conservative evangelicals today.
Conyers synthesizes the work of Althusius with the concerns of the Southern Agrarian
influence to serve as the foundation for his diagnosis and remedy of the modern world.
This constructive synthesis is vital for understanding Conyers’s work on modernity.
For Conyers, the essence of modernity is viewing the world not as given but as open: “This
change of orientation experienced in modern times is a profound one: moving the human
being from the role of receptive discoverer, listener, and responder to the world, to that of
shaper, fashioner, even creator of the world.”1 Modernity is fundamentally human-centered.
He demonstrates how a change in the use of toleration serves to advance this new conception
of the world, to create an isolated individual and a strong, centralized state at the expense of
all mediating institutions. The problem of the modern world is that a shift from seeing the
world as gift to seeing the world as a project calling for arbitrary force has led to rampant
autonomous individualism. Under such conditions, there are no resources for charting a way
forward together or for binding communities. All that is left is force.
Conyers responds to this situation. He starts with vocation. While at first this concept
may seem arbitrary, he sees it as opposing the self-centeredness of the modern world: where
the modern world focuses on the autonomous individual’s creation of meaning and reality,
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Conyers lifts up vocation, being called, responding to Another.2 The sentiment of vocation
provides a path for delivering us from the decay of modernity.3 Where modernity exalts the
autonomous individual, vocation upholds the individual’s dignity while rooting the individual
in meaningful community. Where modernity calls for choice, vocation calls for faithful
response.
For Conyers, vocation is not the final answer but the starting point. Reclaiming
vocation reorients one’s worldview, shifting it from the self to Another, from self-will to the
acceptance of gift. Conyers narrows the choice to a vocational view of life versus an elective
view of life.4 Vocation is a starting point with concrete, particular practices and applications. A
person is called in a particular place, among a particular community. She is called toward a
destiny, to rest in a transcendent goal. While the modern world provides opportunity for
distraction by trying to deny the reality of final causes and purpose, starting with vocation
helps promote attention, attention needed to persevere among the suffering that comes in
pursuing the good.
Conyers’s diagnosis of modernity and his remedy come out of this creative synthesis,
through which he provides a “truly catholic vision” for navigating the modern world. He is
more than just the sum of his influences, and he uses these influences to correct deficiencies
that he sees in each and thus comes to his own constructive, creative stance. His untimely
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death prevented him from drawing out the full implications of his starting point of vocation
and from strengthening various weaknesses. That project is left for others who share his point
of view. In what follows, I sketch what an evangelical theopolitical imagination informed by
Conyers might look like.

Conyers and Evangelical Theopolitical Imagination
In the introduction, I noted four tendencies in evangelical theopolitical imagination. I
argued that these tendencies of imagination result from some of the strengths of
evangelicalism but in fact weaken evangelical theopolitical imagination. A brief review of
these four tendencies will be useful here: first, a tendency to reduce everything to a binary, usversus-them rhetoric, which stems in part from an evangelical emphasis on conversionism (a
focus on conversion contributes to viewing people in two opposing camps, which can then
fuel an us-versus-them rhetoric). Second, evangelicals embrace certain aspects of the modern
world uncritically. This embrace is especially true with regard to democratic and free-market
institutions. Evangelicals see such institutions as promising solutions (against problems such
as political totalitarianism) while failing to account adequately for the problems such
institutions themselves create.5 In other words, evangelicals promote how such institutions
can cooperate with the advance of the gospel without being as aware of the ways these
institutions can be harmful. This weakness is related to evangelical activism, and specifically
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with the desire to leave fundamentalist isolationism behind. Third, in seeking to be biblical,
evangelicals sometimes revert to an oversimplified reading of Scripture, despite their
commitment to the Bible as authority. This oversimplified reading reduces the text and makes
it serve ideological ends, often related to modern institutions, and this weakness is a
perversion of evangelical biblicism. Fourth, evangelicals often fail to incorporate the
theological work of other Christian traditions, even when that work would strengthen
evangelical priorities. In the case of political theology, more could be done to connect the
thinking of evangelicals to that of other Christians. This weakness correlates (at least in part)
to a focus on the Bible as the primary authority. Such a focus can lead to a neglect of other
sources for consideration, such as the work of Christians from other traditions.
Each chapter argued in part how Conyers provides resources for overcoming these
tendencies of evangelical theopolitical imagination. His work incorporates conservative and
liberal influences in a way that moves beyond a simple binary that all-too-often characterizes
evangelical discourse.6 The conservative sources that influenced him most do not coincide
comfortably with contemporary conservatism (for instance, they included an economic
critique that today’s conservatives do not often echo), and he also utilized eschatological
insights from theologians such as Moltmann to emphasize an aspect of openness and hope for
the future rather than a mere adherence to the past (as a caricature of conservatism would).
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Through his work on toleration, he unapologetically takes aim at modern institutions—such
as the nation-state and the free-market economy—that many evangelicals either take for
granted or actively promote. His foundational idea of vocation serves as a starting point for
building a vision that is biblically informed and saturated without resorting to simple proof
texting about economics or politics. Finally, his work provides a fruitful avenue for dialogue
with Christian political theology more broadly conceived and practiced, as shown through the
interaction with the work of William Cavanaugh. Conyers certainly does not solve these
weaknesses for evangelicals, but turning to his work points a way forward in beginning to
overcome such problems.
But besides overcoming a few perceived weaknesses, what are the primary features of
an evangelical theopolitical imagination shaped by Conyers? Conyers identifies three features
of a recovery of vocation. First, this sense of divine vocation is communal; “the generosity,
benevolence, forgiveness, and mercy of God finds representatives in the community of
disciples (imitators of Christ, whose own benevolence is mediated through virtuosos in the
community).” Second, “the virtues of generosity, kindness, mercy, forgiveness… are more
congenial” to a view of life informed by divine vocation. Third, distinctions among people that
are an embarrassment to a culture shaped by power and the market become points of greater
understanding. For “While giving expression to what is temporally divided, we begin together
to give witness to what is finally united. For the end of all things is the God who calls us, in
whom we find rest, by whose one light we find out separate ways toward that city ‘not made
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with hands, eternal, in heaven.’”7 In the following, I identify nine additional elements of
Conyers’s vocational theology that cluster into three groups: method, emphases, and
application. Though presented here in germ form, these elements begin to show what would
characterize and evangelical theopolitical imagination informed by Conyers’s work.

Method
First, an evangelical theopolitical imagination informed by Conyers will hold the Bible
as the final standard. While Conyers’s works were not all filled with explicit Scripture citations,
he had a reputation among his colleagues for being deeply committed to being biblical. For
example, he stated that his final book could be considered a commentary on James’s “What
causes wars among you?”8 If someone drew attention to some element contradicting Scripture,
he was always willing to listen.9 Just because Conyers’s writing topics were not explicit
expositions of Scripture does not mean that he was not concerned with being faithful to the
Bible and allowing it to be the final norm for his theology. Theology can and must have
Scripture as its final standard, but that does not mean the interpretation and use can only
occur on one level.10
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Second, Conyers was inspired by the Great Tradition of the Christian faith, and
evangelical theopolitical imagination could benefit from a similar priority. This element is
evident in Conyers’s work on the early Truett Seminary curriculum. It can also be seen as
Conyers interacts with a variety of sources throughout his theological work. Princeton scholar
Eric Gregory has recognized the need for evangelical political theology to engage more with
specific figures from the tradition.11 Additionally, drawing Conyers and Cavanaugh together
shows how evangelicals and Catholics can find common sources and themes for theopolitical
imagination. This cooperation extends beyond partnering on activism based on conclusions
about specific issues, such as abortion and extends to strategies for forming moral
imagination. These sources and themes are tied to the Great Tradition while creatively
interfacing with issues such as nationalism, consumerism, and globalization. Conyers’s focus
on the Great Tradition does not neglect contemporary concerns, but as with Cavanaugh he
mines the resources of the past for wisdom for the present and the future.
The third methodological element for evangelical theopolitical thought drawn from
Conyers is the practice of entering into dialogue with other Christian traditions not only on
the level of political issues (abortion, gay marriage, etc.), but on the level of doctrines and
practices that form theopolitical imagination. Conyers was committed to promoting a broadly
catholic vision for the world, and such a vision requires interaction not only (or even
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primarily) at the level of specific issues, but at the level of doctrines such as Eucharist,
incarnation, Trinity, and others that inform our being in the world.

Emphases
First and most obviously, an evangelical theopolitical imagination following Conyers’s
emphases would be oriented around a robust notion of vocation. It would respond wisely and
faithfully to the call of God, recognizing a few important elements. On one hand, Conyers’s
emphasis on vocation recognizes that God calls individuals, but on the other hand, Conyers
does not consider the individual isolated but placed within certain important formative
communities (family, church). Also, we must remember that the call of God does not always
draw one to prestigious positions, ideas, or places. Instead, in the Bible the call is often away
from comfort and “importance.”
Second, Conyers emphasized that vocation and incarnation lead to a humble
acceptance of the diversity that often causes division in the modern world (such as race).
These differences serve as points of entry for understanding existence in valid but partial ways.
This theme will change the tone of evangelical engagement with difference, racial or
otherwise. It sets a tone of humble listening to the other.
Third, eschatology will be central to any evangelical theopolitical thought inspired by
Conyers. Conyers found eschatology central because it made the gospel applicable to any
aspect of life. Eschatology makes the gospel central to all of life by showing that life requires a
telos, and that the future that God is calling his people toward serves as that orienting telos.
Human life is properly defined, understood, and pursued through an understanding of the
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future toward which God is calling his creation. Conyers shows in his work how eschatology
can provide a helpful balance between created order and redeemed order. While he noticed
that Moltmann privileged eschatology to a high degree in order to avoid abuses of power,
Conyers turned to concepts of hierarchy and order in the Southern Agrarians, Richard Weaver,
and Eric Voegelin to insist that eschatology could remind Christians of the good of what God
is calling the world toward without being involved in too radical of a critique of the present
world, as he felt Moltmann was. Evangelical theopolitical imagination must be formed not
only with what is present in the created order, but also with an openness to what God is
working through the power of the cross of Christ.

Application
Conyers’s work also inspires some specific applications to contemporary issues that
would direct evangelical theopolitical imagination, especially in light of its tendency to take
certain modern institutions for granted. First, Conyers’s work leads to a questioning of the
allegiances and the loyalties that the state proposes, because he understands that they can
divide true community because such loyalties can come at the expense of more immediate
ones.12
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This application leads to a second, more specific one: Conyers’s work will help
evangelicals refuse to let the church be characterized as a voluntary association in line with
the state’s preferred version of reality and destiny. Putting this view of the church into
practice is difficult, but it begins by questioning the state’s totalizing impulses and nurturing
the sentiment that American Christians are Christians first, and sometimes that makes it very
difficult to be American.
Third, Conyers leads evangelical theopolitical thought to understand that Christians
need to temper support of the free market’s strengths with its weaknesses as well. While we
can acknowledge good elements of it, we must be equally attentive to the way that it creates a
certain type of slavery and that many suffer because of it. We must be realistic about the
dehumanizing, autonomizing form of discipleship that it can be when economic logic extends
beyond economic transactions and into other areas of life. Just like we can see modernity

informed by Conyers can be positive about modernity while still taking seriously its nefarious qualities.
In fact, Conyers’s concern is with Christians who are so interested in the positive aspects of modernity
that they neglect the “sub-modernity” of the oppressed and suffering. Leaving the positive or the
negative out leads to an incomplete picture. See The Listening Heart, 107–8.
The line between the two can be difficult to discern, however, and the subsequent judgment of specific
policies and states is contested. For instance, evangelical theologian Peter Liethart believes America is
a “Babel,” an empire offering unity. But he argues that it is not yet a “Beast,” by which he means an
empire that persecutes God’s people. See Peter J. Leithart, Between Babel and Beast: America and
Empires in Biblical Perspective (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012). However, Leithart’s neat
categorization does not stand up to scrutiny. Is physical persecution of Christians the line? This
definition should be expanded in some way, perhaps to show that “Americanism” (as Leithart calls it)
persecutes faith in other ways and therefore can qualify as a beast. It is helpful to draw a distinction
between empires that physically persecute and those that do not, but is it also dangerous in that it is
helpful? Could it lead us to accept what America is without being as critical as we as Christians should
be of elements like those identified by Conyers? Because of evangelicals’ tendency to overaccept the
state and free-market economics, a voice like Conyers serves as a helpful corrective in finding a proper
balance amidst modern ambiguity.
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itself as a good thing or a terrible thing, free-market economics deserves the same attention to
both sides of the issue.
These important elements of method, emphases, and application begin to show how
Conyers’s influence might shape evangelical theopolitical imagination. In short, Conyers
directs evangelicals to take the Bible and tradition seriously while entering into dialogue with
Christians more broadly, to focus on vocation, humility, and the centrality of eschatology, and
to call into question the way that the state and the free market disciple Christians in ways
counter to the way of Jesus.

Conclusion
While the evangelical social imaginary certainly has its weaknesses, evangelical
theology does not lack resources for a critical engagement with and navigation of the modern
world. Younger evangelicals need not migrate to other traditions in order to be true to a sense
of Christ’s rule of political and economic life. Following the work of A. J. Conyers, if we begin
with a proper sense of who God is and what God call us to be and do, we can resist the power
lust of the modern world and nurture communities and individuals properly oriented toward
one another and toward Another. This route leads us toward the “truly catholic vision” that
Conyers sought. His final words are mine as well:
Only when members of a community understand life as a response to a large and
generous world, created by a great and merciful Providence, will the possibilities of
life together become more fully realized. Otherwise, without this spirit infusing and
animating a people, existence is reduced to competing forces, clashing at twilight,
grasping whatever is left of power, fame, and fortune, before the darkness descends.
For then, while the isolation becomes rooted in every human domain, its end is
necessarily found in the dust of death. But with this spirit of vocation, this conviction
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that we are not, after all, our own, but belong to Another, the world opens up,
becomes a place for others, and is illuminated by a spreading and abiding hope.13

13

Conyers, The Listening Heart, 193.
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